

4th Mar. Regt.

Control No.

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1 of 10

HEADQUARTERS

9th Marines

3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO San Francisco, 966023D MARDIV S&C FILE
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From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
 Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein)
 (2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
 (3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 Aug to 31 Aug 1968

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
 (b) FMFPAC O 5750.8
 (c) 3d Mar Div O 5750.1A w/ch#1

Encl: (1) Command Chronology, 1-31 Aug 1968

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b), and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. The security classification of this document is down-graded at three (3) year intervals and declassified after twelve (12) years.

M. V. Palatas
 M. V. PALATAS
 By direction

Unclassified when enclosure (1) is removed.

HEADQUARTERS
9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO San Francisco, 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 Aug to 31 Aug 1968

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

ENCLOSURE (1)

PART I
ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

<u>1. Designation</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>Date</u>
Headquarters, 9th Marines	Col R. E. BARROW	1-31 Aug

Subordinate Units

Headquarters Company	1stLt W. A. COWLEY	1-31 Aug
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Attached Units

1st Bn, 9th Marines	LtCol F. K. COLLETON	7-31 Aug
2d Bn, 9th Marines	LtCol F. S. KNIGHT	1-6 Aug
		8-15 Aug
		17-22 Aug
		28-31 Aug
3d Bn, 9th Marines	LtCol E. J. LAMONTAGNE	1-25 Aug
		27-31 Aug
3d MT Bn, ("A" Co, 1st Plt)	Capt D. P. FLOOD	1-31 Aug

Direct Support Units

Company "A", 3d Tank Bn	Lt J. A. SPALSBURY	1-19 Aug
1st Bn, 4th Artillery, USA	LtCol J. M. HOUSE III	7-17 Aug
2d Bn, 12th Marines	LtCol R. P. DUNWELL	1-5 Aug
	LtCol J. SCOPPA Jr	6-31 Aug
Company "C", 3d Eng Bn	Lt W. M. RICE	1-31 Aug
3d MP Bn, (Scout Dogs)	LtCol J. J. GAMBARDIELLA	1-31 Aug

2. Location

Headquarters Company, 9th Marines, DONG HA, RVN	1-31 Aug
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3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer	LtCol M. V. PALATAS	1-31 Aug
S-1	NONE	1-31 Aug
S-2	Maj R. J. KIESELBACH	1-12 Aug
	Maj J. B. VANAIKSDALE	13-31 Aug
S-3	Maj J. I. HOPKINS	1-13 Aug
	Maj J. B. KNOTTS	14-31 Aug
FSO	Maj K. E. SOESBE	1-31 Aug
ALO	Maj J. H. DITTO	1-31 Aug
S-4	Maj M. CERVANTES	1-4 Aug
	Maj W. H. WIEDHAHN	5-31 Aug
S-5	1stLt G. S. CHACONAS	1-31 Aug
Comm	Maj C. H. GREISEN	1-31 Aug
Supply	1stLt W. N. TOBIAS	1-31 Aug

ENCLOSURE (1)

MT Officer
Scout/Sniper Plt
Chaplain

1stLt D. L. HOPIER
1stLt L. W. GILBERT
LCmdr R. D. BLACK

1-31 Aug
1-31 Aug
1-31 Aug

4. Average Monthly Strength

USMC	
OFF	ENL
19	197

USN	
OFF	ENL
1	4

OTHER	
OFF	ENL
0	0

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the month of August three multibattalion operations were conducted by the regiment with its organic battalions. At the beginning of the month, SCOTLAND II EAST, a clearing operation in the BA LONG Valley was conducted with a secondary and equally important mission of establishing fire support bases (FSB). FSB HOLCOMB was developed on the north ridge while FSB HENDERSON was built on the south ridge of BA LONG Valley. Little contact was developed with the enemy but valuable experience was gained in developing FSB's and the "quiet period" provided a good opportunity to break in the regiment's many new replacements. The second operation LANCASTER II JUPITER, was a clearing operation conducted to the east of the MUTTERS Ridge and HELO Valley area. Several significant contacts developed during which the enemy was severely hurt while only light friendly casualties were sustained. The final clearing operation, SCOTLAND TROUSDALE, commenced just prior to the end of the month in the mountains west of the ROCKPILE/RAZORBACK area.

9th Marines conducted two CP displacements during the month. On 16 August the CP moved from VANDEGRIFT Combat Base (VCB) to C-2 and then on 25 August from C-2 back to VCB.

For the second month in a row all integral battalions of the regiment continued to work together as a team.

ENCLOSURE (1)
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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1. Combat missions assigned.a. CG, Task Force HOTEL Operation Order 11-68.

(1) Find, fix and kill or capture the enemy in your zone of action: interdict known or newly found infiltration routes: establish helicopter LZ and fire support bases for this and future operations.

(2) Be prepared to reinforce 4th Marine elements in DA KRONG by fire or maneuver.

b. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 40-68.

(1) Continue preparations for BA LONG operations. Move 3/9 by truck to CUA Valley on 31 Jul. Assume responsibilities of your zone of action (see OP Order 11-68) at 312400H less 1st AirCavDiv ground which you will assume at 020800H Aug. Submit overlay 31 Jul showing boundary agreement with Detachment-5. Provide platoon as security enroute DONG HA for trucks bringing 2/9 west on 31 Jul. Reassume OPCON of 2/9 31 Jul on arrival LZ STUD. Provide working parties to 1/9 for base improvement. Direct liaison 1/9 and 2/9 authorized.

c. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 41-68.

(1) Do not displace the remaining elements of 3/9 from LZ STUD. The elements of 3/9 at CUA Valley with Arty will remain in present locations. Stand down on BA LONG operation for 48 hours. Be prepared to displace 2/9 to LANCASTER AO under OPCON of 3rd Marines.

d. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 42-68.

(1) The BA LONG target D-Day is 5 August. Continue your preparation for this operation as originally planned.

e. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 44-68.

(1) Continue preparation for BA LONG Operations. Pass OPCON of one battalion (-) to 1st Marines 3 August.

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f. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 45-68.

(1) That part of your boundary extension including 1st Air Cav Div ground will revert to 1st Air Cav Div at 062400H Aug. Postpone BA LONG Operation indefinitely.

(2) Continue development HENDERSON, maintain HOLCOMB and forces at CUA Valley.

(3) Assume new area of operations and reassume OPCON of 1st Bn (-), 9th Marines on order on 6 August. Provide forces for defense of LSA STUD, CA LU and Radio Hill.

g. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 46-68.

(1) Your defense Plan VCB/CA LU approved. Use organic forces and tenant forces at VCB. Fourth Marines units will not be available for CA LU security.

(2) Conduct search of high ground in AO both sides of VCB.

(3) Construct more defensive wire and fields of fire on priority basis.

(4) Maintain capability to helilift bulk of two Bns to new positions on six hours notice.

h. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 47-68.

(1) Continue present mission. Be prepared to chop to CG, 3d Mar Div on order as Div reserve.

i. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 48-68.

(1) Assume additional eastern extension of boundary when assigned AO and search newly assigned area of BA LONG for enemy or his munitions. Establish artillery positions as needed. Relinquish Hill 715 area on order.

j. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 49-68.

(1) Be prepared to displace your CP on order. Be prepared to displace your two battalions to either LANCASTER AO or KENTUCKY AO on order.

k. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 50-68.

(1) Continue defense of CA LU and VCB until relieved by 1st Bn, 4th Marines on or about 170800H.

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(2) Commit 3rd Bn, 9th Marines in heliborne assault into selected LZ north LANCASTER AO. L-hour 170830H.

(3) Be prepared to heliborne assault all or part of 1st Bn, 9th Marines into selected LZ on or after 170830H.

(4) Search and kill or capture enemy in zone of action. Overlay PASEP.

(5) Be prepared to reassume OPCOM of 2nd Bn, 9th Marines upon their relief by another force. Select suitable LZ for use by this Bn.

(6) Advise when displacing CP.

1. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 51-68.

(1) Continue mission assigned Frag Order 50-68. Search western part of your zone of action as soon as practicable.

m. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 52-68.

(1) Conduct aggressive search within zone of action. 2nd Bn, 9th Marines earmarked as Division Reserve. Provide working party at VCB.

n. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 53-68.

(1) Continue to seek out and destroy enemy in zone of action.

o. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 54-68.

(1) Continue offensive operations in assigned zone of action. Conduct heliborne assault with available forces in western part of zone of action. Continue planning offensive at NUI TIA PONG and commence HIZ prep with fixed wing as required.

p. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 55-68.

(1) Continue offensive operations in assigned zone of action. Prepare to move one Bn to VANDEGRIFT Combat Base 23 Aug and the other Bn on 24 Aug.

(2) Continue planning for offensive in NUI TIA PONG area with two Bns D-Day 25 Aug.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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q. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 56-68.

(1) Continue offensive against enemy forces within your zone of action. If contact ceases be prepared to helilift one battalion to VANDEGRIFT Combat Base on 24 August.

(2) Continue prep HLZ VENUS and MARS and plan two battalion heliborne assault NUI TIA PONG on 25 August.

r. CG Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 57-68.

(1) Defeat enemy in zone of action.

(2) D-Day for NUI TIA PONG (SCOTLAND TROUSDALE ACTION) changed to 26 August.

(3) Assume objective area for TROUSDALE Action as your A.O. Effective 240600H Aug. Overlay PASEP.

s. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 58-68.

(1) If no further contact develops, helilift 1/9 to VCB 251000H August. Use extraction. Notify this Hqs when last helilift of 1/9 is airborne so A.O. can be turned over to 3d Marines. Prepare to realign forces for defense of VCB in preparation of SCOTLAND TROUSDALE Action 26 Aug.

t. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 59-68.

(1) Continue planning for SCOTLAND TROUSDALE action. Submit assault fire plan by 261130H. D-Day for SCOTLAND TROUSDALE action 27 Aug.

(2) Reassume OPCON of 2/9 afternoon 28 Aug. Provide working party to 4th Marines on request, for work on VCB defensive perimeter.

u. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 60-68.

(1) Conduct attack with two battalions via NUI TIA PONG on 27 Aug. L-hour 1000H.

(2) Assume OPCON 2/9 27 Aug approx 0900H. Advise this Hq prior to committing 3/9 (-) to SCOTLAND TROUSDALE A.O.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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SECRET**v. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 61-68.**

(1) Continue offensive in NUI TIA PONG objective area with two battalions.

(2) While 3/9 (-) is uncommitted, provide one company to 4th Marines as reaction force during hours of darkness and four platoons during daylight hours as working party for defense perimeter.

w. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 62-68.

(1) Continue offensive in NUI TIA PONG Area.

(2) Maintain Sparrow Hawk and Bald Eagle during 1800H to 0800H daily.

(3) Provide four platoons to 4th Marines for work on defense perimeter.

x. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 63-68.

(1) Continue offensive action to kill/capture enemy in NUI TIA PONG objective area.

(2) Provide four platoons as working party to 4th Marines to improve defense perimeter.

(3) Provide reaction company to 4th Marines during hours of darkness.

(4) Requirement to maintain Sparrow Hawk/Bald Eagle during 1800H - 0800H daily is cancelled.

y. CG, Task Force HOTEL Frag Order 64-68.

(1) Continue offensive operations NUI TIA PONG. Brief your plans on Phase II as soon as firmed.

(2) Provide four platoons as working party to 4th Marines to improve defensive perimeter.

2. Operations.

01 August 9th Marines continued preparation for Operation SCOTLAND II EAST. (SitRep 8)

02 August At 0650H, 9th Marines assumed OPCON of 3/9 (-) from Task Force HOTEL. I/3/9 helilift into PSB HOLCOMB commenced. Completed at 0810H. At 0800H, CP/M/3/9

SECRET

helilift into South CUA Valley commenced. Completed at 0830H. At 1030H, M/3/9 helilifted from CUA Valley into FSB HOLCOMB. Completed at 1050H. (SitRep 12) At 1330H, 9th Marines chopped G/2/9 to Task Force HOTEL. (SitRep 13)

03 August At 0845H, Maj Gen DAVIS visited 9th Marines CP. Departed 0900H. (SitRep 16) At 1400H, 9th Marines chopped OPCON 2/9 (-) to Task Force HOTEL. (SitRep 17)

05 August At 0810H, D/1/9 helilift into FSB HENDERSON commenced. Completed at 1135H. (SitRep 24)

06 August At 1200H, LZ STUD officially renamed VANDEGRIFT Combat Base (VCB). (SitRep 29) At 1730H, 9th Marines assumed OPCON 2/9(-). (SitRep 29)

07 August At 1515H, 9th Marines assumed OPCON G/2/9. At 1700H, 9th Marines assumed OPCON 1/9 and the responsibility for the defense of VCB and CA LU COB. (SitRep 33)

08 August At 0826H, 2/9 helilift to high ground surrounding VCB commenced. Completed 0955H. (SitRep 36)

09 August At 1000H, L/3/9 helilifted to area south of QUANG TRI River vic YD 110417. (SitRep 40)

11 August At 1430 H, H/2/9 helilifted to Hill 715 vic XD 945476. Completed at 1500H. At 1445H, K/3/9 helilifted to FSB HENDERSON. Completed at 1522H. (SitRep 49)

13 August At 0840H, L/3/9 vic YD 072415 received an erratic 81mm HE mortar round causing 1 USMC KIA (NBC) and 2 USMC NBC (ovao). (SitRep 56)

14 August At 0840H, M/3/9 helilift to FSB HOLCOMB commenced. Completed at 0930H. At 1000H, CP/L/3/9 helilift commenced. Completed at 1028H. (SitRep 60)

15 August At 0830H, I/3/9 helilifted into area south of QUANG TRI River. Completed at 0930H. (SitRep 64) At 0955H, H/G/2/9 helilifted into VCB. Completed at 1030H. At 1540H, H/2/9 helilift to C-3 commenced. Completed at 1600H. At 1615H, F/2/9 helilift to Camp CARROLL commenced. Completed at 1635H. At 1635H, E/G/2/9 commenced truck movement to THON SON LAM. At 1730H, 2/9 chopped OPCON to TF HOTEL. (SitRep 65) At 1915H, 3/9(-) commenced helilift from East BA LONG Valley to VCB. Completed at 1900H. (SitRep 66)

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16 August At 1330H, K/3/9 helilifted from FSB HENDERSON to VCB.
At 1400H, 9th Marines CP displaced to C-2. (SitRep 69)

17 August At 0001H, 9th Marines concluded operations in SCOTLAND II AO and commenced operations in LANCASTER II AO. (SitRep 6) At 0926H, 3/9 helilift from VCB to LZ SPARROW commenced. Completed at 1042H. At 1140H, 1/9 helilift from VCB to LZ SATURN commenced. Completed at 1330H. At 1500H, 9th Marines assumed OPCON 2/9 from Task Force HOTEL. (SitRep 1,2)

19 August At 1030H, M/3/9 vic YD 057665 made contact with NVA Squad. Contact developed until enemy force was estimated to be 2 NVA companies. Numerous artillery missions and fixed-wing strikes were utilized to assault the enemy position. An F-4 was shot down but both pilots were immediately rescued. Action resulted in 3 USMC KIA, 14 USMC WIAE, 44 NVA KIA, 2 NVA POW, 2 CSWC and 6 IWC. (SitRep 11)

21 August At 1650H, I/3/9 vic YD 053655 found from the previous days contact 14 NVA KIA, 1 CSWC and 6 IWC. (SitRep 18) At 1900H, I/3/9 vic YD 053665 discovered 2 IWC and 1 CSWC. (SitRep 19)

22 August At 1000H, I/3/9 vic YD 053675 found 1 NVA KIA, 2 CSWC and 2 IWC. (SitRep 21) At 1545H, B/1/9 patrol vic YD 011642 made contact with an NVA company. B/1/9 received S/A, A/W and 60mm mortar fire. Within minutes an AO was on station calling in air and artillery. At 1800H contact continued with the B/1/9 patrol maintaining a night position 600 meters from the B/1/9 position. (SitRep 22).

23 August At 0900H, B/1/9 relief force vic YD 017642 received a fixed wing strike on their position resulting in 10 USMC WIAE. (SitRep 25) Follow up report covering B/1/9 contact indicates following casualties: 1 USMC KIA, 14 USMC WIAE, 7 USMC BNR and 1 USMC MIA. At 1300H, 3/9 helilifted to VCB. (SitRep 26) At 1845H, D/1/9 vic YD 030690 received 14 rounds 82mm mortar. Results 2 USMC KIA and 4 USMC WIAE. (SitRep 27)

24 August At 1300H, B/1/9 commenced operations to recover their 7 ENR and 1 MIA. At 1700H, all 8 bodies were recovered. Results 8 USMC KIA. (SitRep 31)

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25 August At 1000H, 1/9 commenced helilift to VCB. (SitRep 33)
 At 1100H, L/3/9 secured and commenced development of
 FSB LAMBU. At 1200H to 1330H, B/1/9 via YD 020649
 recovered 27 82mm mortar rounds. Results 8 USMC KIA,
 4 USMC WIA. At 1340H, 9th Marines chopped 3/9(-) to Task Force
 HOTEL. At 1355H, 1/9 helilift to VCB completed.
 (SitRep 34) At 1430H, 9th Marines CP displaced to
 VCB.

26 August At 0810H, 9th Marines assumed OPCON of 2/9. At 0810H
 Operation SCOTLAND TROUSDALE commenced as G/2/9 was
 helilifted into LZ MARS. Helilift complete at 0930H.
 At 1130H, H/2/9 helilift into LZ LEO completed. No
 contact. (SitRep 7) At 1300H, 9th Marines assumed
 OPCON H/1/3/9. At 1345H, H/2/9 helilift into LZ ARIES
 via YD 915546 received heavy ground fire. 1 CH-46
 shot down in LZ ARIES. Two other CH-46's received
 battle damage. No casualties. At 1420H, remainder
 of 2/9 helilift completed into LZ LEO. At 1435H,
 H/2/9 in LZ ARIES via YD 915546, while using RT-12
 gunships in an attempt to suppress enemy fire
 received a pod of rockets in their perimeter from a
 gunship. Results 2 USMC KIA and 2 USMC WIA. At
 1547H, 1/9 helilift into LZ MCCN and EARTH commenced.
 At 1720H, 1/9 helilift completed with no contact.
 (SitRep 8-11)

28 August At 1500H, K/3/9 was chopped OPCON 3/9. (SitRep 13)

29 August At 0915H, Bravo Command Group H/1/2/9 commenced
 helilift from LZ LEO to LZ KRYPTON. Completed at
 1045H. At 1200H, I/3/9 chopped OPCON Task Force
 HOTEL. (SitRep 15).

31 August At 1055H, flying crane delivering bulldozer at FSB
 SANDY via YD 910564 failed to locate dozer correctly
 on LZ. Dozer rolled down side of mountain approx-
 imately 25 meters. Inoperable at this time, requiring
 major repairs. (SitRep 23) At 1105H, F/2/9 via YD
 895538 made contact with unknown size enemy force.
 Following massive artillery and air preps the enemy
 position was assaulted resulting in 1 USMC KIA, 1
 USMC WIA, 1 USMC WIA, 20 NVA KIA, 6 IVC and 3
 CSVC. (SitRep 25)

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3. Training.

a. The continual movement of this headquarters and its OPCON battalions precluded an extensive training program; however, formal schools were utilized along with small unit instruction and on the job training.

b. The scout sniper platoon continued classes on platoon level.

- (1) 11 hours on camouflage and concealment.
- (2) 9 hours on compass, map reading and FO procedures.

c. In country indoctrination was held as new men joined the regiment.

d. Hq Co, 9th Marines FAM fired their weapons at C-2 and VANDEGRIFT Combat Base.

e. Formal schools attended by Hq Co personnel were:

<u>SCHOOLS</u>	<u>NO DAYS</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ATT</u>
Basic supply accounting school	3	DANANG	1
Personal response course	1	QUANG TRI	1
Embarkation school	30	OKINAWA	2
Ground surveillance school	8	DONG HA	5

4. Statistical breakdown by units of the operational action of the 9th Marines during the reporting period.

a. The continual movement of this headquarters and its OPCON ~~activities~~ **Fire Team Squad Platoon Company** precluded an extensive training program; however, formal schools were utilized along with small unit instruction and on the job training.

LP	86	75	
Ambush (night)	60	76	
Combat patrol (day)			21
Search and destroy (day)			4
Clearing			

- (1) 11 hours on camouflage and concealment.
- (2) 9 hours on compass, map reading and FO procedures.

b. From 7-17 August the 9th Marines conducted a one battalion operation in BA LONG Valley. Indoctrination was held as new men joined the regiment.

c. From 17-25 August the 9th Marines conducted a two battalion operation in LANCASTER II AO and from 25-31 August conducted a two battalion operation in the SCOTLAND II AO.

d. Formal schools attended by Hq Co personnel were:

<u>SCHOOLS</u>	<u>NO DAYS</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ENCLOSURE (1)</u>
Basic supply accounting school	3	DANANG	1
Personal response course	1	QUANG TRI	1
Embarkation school	30	OKINAWA	2

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5. Casualties and damage inflicted on the enemy.a. Personnel

- (1) NVA KIA 63
- (2) NVA POW 2

b. Weapons Captured

- (1) Individual 20
- (2) Crew Served 6

c. Munitions

- (1) Small Arms 6000
- (2) Mortar Rounds 100
- (3) Rockets (107mm) 3

d. Structures Destroyed

- (1) Bunkers 130

6. Friendly casualties sustained during the reporting period.a. SCOTLAND II EAST

None

b. LANCASTER II JUPITER

KIA 15 WIAE 54 WIANE 0

c. SCOTLAND TROUSDALE

KIA 4 WIAE 34 WIANE 5

d. Totals for month

KIA 19 WIAE 88 WIANE 5

7. New techniques employed. None8. Equipment.

- a. The following is a report of the readiness of major items of combat essential equipment:

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(1) Motor Transport.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Allowance</u>	<u>OH</u>	<u>OP-Ready</u>
Truck, Utility, M151A1	15	15	14
Truck, Cargo, M37	2	2	1
Trailer, Water, M107	3	3	3

(2) Communications.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Allowance</u>	<u>Special</u>	<u>OH</u>	<u>OP-Ready</u>
MRC-83	2	0	2	2
MRC-87	2	0	2	1
AN/GRA-39	8	0	5	5
KY-8	6	0	6	5
TD-101	20	4	24	24
RT-252	10	2	12	7
*PU-278	20	4	20	20
PRC-25	9	0	9	9
RT-524	4	0	4	3

*Received 18 PU-278/TRC-27 on 2 September.

b. Major and items previously evacuated to higher echelon maintenance facilities that have not been returned:

(1) Motor Transport.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Location</u>
Decontamination unit M-8	1	FLSG-B

(2) Communication.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Location</u>
AN/TRC-27 (BT-252)	2	FLSG-B

c. Battle losses not replaced. 3 AN/GRA-39- Not received.

9. Logistics.a. Supply and Distribution.

(1) Force Logistic Support Group Bravo was the primary source of supply and maintenance for Headquarters Company, 9th Marines and infantry battalions under the OPCON of 9th Marines.

(2) Significant items that were in short supply included field protective masks, flak jackets, and utilities.

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(3) Supply point distribution was in effect.

b. Resupply.

(1) Resupply figures, (by class), of supply to battalions under OPCON of 9th Marines were as follows:

<u>Class</u>	<u>Pounds</u>
I	429,389
II	5,251
III	1,760
IV	49,247
V	342,008

(2) Total resupply figures for OPCON battalions are as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Pounds</u>
1st Bn, 9th Marines	224,190
2nd Bn, 9th Marines	114,486
3rd Bn, 9th Marines	490,041

(3) Hot meals were provided by battalion rear located at VANDEGRIFT Combat Base to units in the field as the tactical situation permitted. The SURE program was also used whenever battalions returned to their rear.

c. Supported strength.

(1) The average supported strength for the 9th Marines for the month of August was 3,149.

d. Transportation.

(1) Surface transportation utilized Route 9, between DONG HA and VANDEGRIFT Combat Base and Route 561, between CAM LO and C-2.

(2) Hq Co, 9th Marines organic transportation support has been satisfactory. One vehicle is deadlined as a result of vandalism.

(3) First Platoon, Company "A", Third Motor Transport Battalion is in direct support of the 9th Marines. This platoon provided vehicles for tactical and administrative troop movements, resupply, and "household" commitments as required. Additional vehicles on an "as required" basis were provided by the Third Division. The 9th Motor Transport Battalion furnished additional transportation when "A" Company, 3rd Motors was not adequate. Truck support has been very satisfactory.

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(4) Air transportation was provided by Task Force HOTEL from MAG-36 and MAG-39. Helicopters were used for resupply, medical evacuation and troop lifts under routine and emergency conditions.

(5) A total of 454 tons of resupply was moved by helicopter during August.

c. Engineer Support

(1) Company "C", Third Engineer Battalion provided direct support to 9th Marines. Engineer support was very satisfactory.

f. Services Situation

(1) This regiment utilized shower, bakery, ice and laundry services located at VANDEGRIFT Combat Base and DONG HA.

(2) Resupply remains undependable in both availability and quantity.

(3) Electric power provided by 11th Engineers has been adequate. Maintenance support for power generators has been speedy but unreliable. Mechanical failures are too frequent on generators operating in the field.

g. Headquarters Supply Situation

(1) Headquarters Company has a 25 percent shortage of supply personnel.

(2) Statistical data on priority O2 requisitions:

(a) Seventy-nine (79) priority O2 requisitions unfilled at beginning of period.

(b) Eleven (11) O2 requisitions submitted.

(c) Eighteen (18) O2 requisitions filled.

(d) Seventy-two (72) priority O2 requisitions unfilled at end of period.

(3) Priority O2 requisitions unfilled consist of the following general categories:

(a) Communication T/E items and repair parts.

(b) Motor Transport repair parts.

(c) Messhall Equipment.

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h. Medical.

(1) Casualties requiring treatment beyond the capabilities of the organic Battalion Aid Stations and Regimental Aid Station were evacuated to Company "D", Third Medical Battalion DONG HA. Company "D" has moved to QUANG TRI where Third Medical Battalion is now located. In the future only emergency casualties will be treated at the medical facility in DONG HA.

(2) There were no medical problems encountered during this period.

10. Civic Action. The 9th Marines has temporarily been relieved of the responsibility for Civic Action in the 3d Marine Division AO with the 12th Marines assuming the responsibility in the interim period.

11. Psychological Warfare. None utilized.

12. Personnel and Administration.

a. Personnel.(1) Enlisted MOS shortages.

<u>MOS</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Shortages</u>
0311	E-2/E-3	17
0369	E-7	1
1141	E-4	1
2112	E-4	1
2511	E-1/E-2	6
2531	E-1/E-2	1
2542	E-5	2
2831	E-3	2
3051	E-4	1

(2) Rotations during Month (CONUS).

<u>MC OFF</u>	<u>MC ENL</u>	<u>NAV OFF</u>	<u>NAV ENL</u>
3	13	0	1

(3) Replacements received during month.

<u>MC OFF</u>	<u>MC ENL</u>	<u>NAV OFF</u>	<u>NAV ENL</u>
3	12	0	1

(4) Casualties. 2 KIA

<u>Promotions.</u>	<u>SGT</u>	<u>CPL</u>	<u>LCPL</u>
3	7	9	

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(6) Awards Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry - 4
 Purple Heart - 4
 Navy Achievement Medal - 1
 Air Medal - 1

b. Administration

(1) Special Services. During the month of August, the 9th Marines Special Services had no sweatshirts or writing kits to allocate, and there was no request for games.

(2) Discipline

(a) No unusual problems.

(b) Court Martials:	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Pending</u>
GCM	0	0
SPCM	1	0
SCM	0	0

(c) Regimental Commander's Office Hours - 0

(d) Company Commander's Office Hours - 0

(3) Marine P.X., Postal Affairs and R&R

(a) P.X. The branch of the 3d Marine Division P.X. located in the 9th Marines CP stocks an adequate supply of health and comfort items and some luxury items.

(b) Postal. Postal service during August between Division (forward) and the 9th Marines was very good.

(c) R&R. Headquarters, 9th Marines was allocated the following quotas for R&R during this month:

OKINAWA - 1	BANGKOK - 4	HONG KONG - 2	TAIPEI - 2
MANILA - 1	KUALA LUMPUR - 1	SINGAPORE - 1	PENANG - 1
TOKYO - 1	HAWAII - 3	SYDNEY - 2	

(4) Chaplain Services

(a) During August the Regimental Chaplain provided counsel for 27 individual cases. The following religious coverage was provided to the units indicated, which have no Chaplain attached at present.

Services Held

Protestant

11 Sundays
 13 Weekdays

Catholic

8 Sundays
 12 Weekdays

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(b) Unit coverage

FLSG-B:

1st Bn, 4th Mar

2nd Bn, 9th Mar

CAM LO Dist Hq

CAP 3-4-1/3/5/6

2nd Bn, 12th Mar

C-3

C-3 Bridge

CAP 3-5-2/3

13. Intelligence.

August was characterized in QUANG TRI Province by the positioning of major NVA units in an attack posture generally along the border of the Demilitarized Zone. Major elements of the following NVA units were considered ready to launch the frequently mentioned "third offensive". In the coastal D.M.Z. area the 270th Regiment, the 138th Regiment, and the 126th Naval Sapper Regiment, while in the central D.M.Z. the 27th Independent Regiment and 27th Independent Battalion operated as far south as central LEATHERNECK SQUARE. Further to the west, in the jungled area north of the Camp CARROLL/ROCKPILE area, the 64th Regiment and 52nd Regiment of the 320th Division appeared in early August. There were indications that the 48th Regiment of the 320th Division was being held in reserve, probably north of the BEN HAI. As the month progressed friendly operations in the area north of the Camp CARROLL/ROCKPILE area had significant contact with elements of the 7th Battalion, 64th Regiment. The information was provided by 2 POW's, document translations and one Hoi Chanh from that battalion.

9th Marines spoiling operations during the month blunted the enemy's capability to launch a general attack in our operating areas and have delayed the onset of the "3rd General Offensive."

14. Air Support.a. Fixed wing support.

(1) Fixed wing support was highly effective in meeting the regiment's needs. Numerous flights were flown in preparation of landing zones for helicopter assaults and in conducting close air support for troops in contact with the enemy. Because of the nature of the type missions flown, bomb damage assessment was minimal. Also during one period when numerous day and night CAS flights were flown in support of an accurate bomb damage assessment was not obtained because the terrain on which the airstrikes were conducted was not occupied by the unit. However, since enemy units in the area were reported as being two battalions, the airstrikes conducted were obviously quite successful.

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(2) A total of 254 close air support missions were flown amounting to 508 sorties expending 658.5 tons of ordnance.

(3) Requested TPQ's resulted in 82 sorties expending 259.4 tons of ordnance.

(4) Tactical air observer support consisted of 118 sorties for 167.5 hours flown.

(5) Nine (9) Arc Light missions were flown in direct support of the 9th Marines.

b. Helicopter support.

(1) The helicopter played a prominent role in all the operations conducted by the regiment. The terrain in which regimental operations were conducted, demanded quick helicopter response to exploit tactical situations and to effect resupply and medical evacuations. Even though available helicopter resources were often taxed to the limit, regimental requirements were met.

(2) 7,690 troops were lifted by helicopter. Seven (7) heliborne combat assaults were conducted and seven (7) artillery battery lifts accomplished.

(3) 9th Marines OPCON battalions received 54 tons of helicopter resupply.

(4) 106 medical evacuation missions were flown lifting 266 Marines.

(5) UH-1E gunships flew 20 missions in support of the regiment.

(6) A total of 657 helicopters were utilized.

c. Personnel and equipment.

(1) All OPCON battalions have one (1) ALO and one (1) FAC assigned.

(2) ALO FAC's controlled 47 air strikes in their assigned areas of operation. This is a monthly high for the past year.

d. Bomb damage assessment.

(1) KBA (C) - 2; KBA (EST) - 173

(2) Bunker destroyed - 121; damaged - 15

(3) Military structures destroyed - 0

(4) Automatic weapons destroyed - 1

(5) Positions destroyed - 9; meters of trench line destroyed - 80

(6) Secondary explosions - 115; secondary fires - 9

(7) Miscellaneous destroyed; 1 mortar tube, 16 fighting holes, numerous trails cut.

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15. Fire support.a. Artillery.

(1) General. The Second Battalion (Rein), 12th Marines continued in its mission of direct support of the 9th Marines. Numerous organizational changes and displacements occurred during the month to enable the battalion to accomplish its mission. These are listed below.

- 1 Aug Command Group at Delta-5
- 1 Aug E/2/12 at C-1
- 1 Aug D/2/12 at CA LU
- 1 Aug F/2/12 at Delta-5
- 2 Aug E/2/12 from C-1 to LZ PEDRO
- 3 Aug F/2/12 from Delta-5 to Hill 385 FSB HOLCOMB
- 3 Aug Assumed OPCON 1st Prov 155mm How Btry (towed)(-) at FSB HOLCOMB
- 4 Aug D/2/12 from CA LU to C-3
- 5 Aug E/2/12 from LZ PEDRO to Delta-5
- 7 Aug D/2/12 from C-3 to CA LU
- 8 Aug 1st Prov How (-) from FSB HOLCOMB to CA LU
- 11 Aug Command Group to VCB
- 11 Aug E/2/12 from Delta-5 to VCB
- 11 Aug F/2/12 from FSB HOLCOMB to FSB HENDERSON
- 15 Aug E/2/12 from VCB to C-2
- 16 Aug F/2/12 from FSB HENDERSON to C-3
- 16 Aug D/2/12 from CA LU to THE GIO Bridge
- 16 Aug Command Group A to C-2
- 17 Aug Command Group B to C-2
- 17 Aug F/2/12 from C-3 to C-2
- 23 Aug Command Group A to VCB
- 23 Aug F/2/12 from C-2 to ROCKPILE
- 23 Aug W/2/12(-) from A-4 to ROCKPILE
- 25 Aug D/2/12 from north of Camp CARROLL to VCB
- 26 Aug E/2/12 from C-2 to ROCKPILE
- 26 Aug D/2/12 from VCB to FSB LEJEUNE
- 27 Aug W/2/12(-) from A-4 to VCB
- 28 Aug W/2/12(-) from VCB to FSB LEJEUNE

(2) Significant events. All 9th Marines operations listed in Part III of this chronology were supported by the Second Battalion (Rein), 12th Marines. Support consisted of preparation fires, attack of targets of opportunity, counterbattery, countermortar and counterrocket fires.

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(3) Type missions fired.

Observed: 551 Unobserved: 1,285 H&I's: 642

(4) Number of rounds fired.

105mm: 35,709 155mm: 254 4.2": 455

(5) Significant surveillance.

- 1 KIA
- 77 WIA
- 27 Secondary explosions
- 1 Bunker destroyed
- 1 Secondary fire started

16. Communications-Electronics

a. General. During the month of August 1968 the Ninth Marine Regimental Comm Platoon actively supported the Regimental Headquarters in operations against enemy forces in the LANCASTER II and SCOTLAND II AO's. During this period the Ninth Marine Regimental Comm Platoon utilized FM radio and radio relay to its fullest extent. Numerous command post displacements characterized much of the Ninth Marines operational communications.

b. Comm Center. From 1-17 August, message traffic was distributed from the Task Force HOTEL communications center. As Ninth Marines were under the operational control of Task Force HOTEL and both headquarters were co-located at VANDEGRIFT Combat Base. During this period the teletype circuit reliability at Task Force HOTEL was not satisfactory for the air and artillery requirements of the Ninth Marines. The Task Force HOTEL teletype circuit was down and it remained down for three days. Ninth Marines communications center personnel established a special courier run to supplement the deficiency of the Task Force HOTEL teletype circuit. From the 18th of August until the 25th of August the regimental communications platoon was located at C-2. During this time period a regular courier run was established to handle message traffic between DONG HA and C-2. Extra courier runs were made for Flash or Immediate traffic. From the 25th of August to the 31st of August 1968 the Ninth Marine Regimental Comm Platoon was again at VCB. Task Force HOTEL continued to guard for the Ninth Marines on the teletype circuit from Third Marine Division. Ninth Marines provided for supplemental administrative message traffic as Task Force HOTEL receives tactical traffic only. Total incoming traffic for the month was 1395 messages while 107 messages were sent out.

On the first of August 1968, an advance party was sent to VCB to establish the regimental CP. An advance party of three wiremen initiated the emplacement of land lines and locals. An SB-22 field switchboard was temporarily installed. A 16 pair cable was installed from the frame to the COC bunker in order to facilitate the lines going to Task Force HOTEL. In addition, these cables were used for FSCC hot lines and radio remote lines to Signal Hill. Two five pair cables were installed from the Ninth Marines wire frame to Task Force HOTEL. Three of these lines were for radio remote lines to the top of Signal Hill. Two pair were trunk lines to Task Force HOTEL and one pair linked Ninth Marines to 3d Marine Division. Three hot lines were used in the cable. These were:

- (1) 9th Marines FSCC to 3d Marine FSCC.
- (2) 9th Marines FSCC to 2/12 FDC.
- (3) 9th Marines FSCC to 4th Marine FSCC.

All cable used by the Ninth Marines was subsurface construction. Upon arrival of the remaining CP group an SB-186 switchboard was installed to facilitate additional local subscribers.

On the 17th of August, an advance party of wire and radio personnel were sent to C-2 in anticipation of a coming move by the Regimental Headquarters. The entire wire system was emplaced by the wire team. However, word was received that Ninth Marine would not be at C-2, subsequently the entire system was removed. On the 19th of August the word came that Ninth Marine Hq would move to C-2. There was a delay in installing the system due to the departure of wire and radio advance party from C-2.

On 25 August a wire team was dispatched to VCB to establish wire communications in the new CP. All locals and common user lines were established and an SB-22 switchboard was installed. The system was complete and ready when the CP group arrived.

Radio. Upon arrival of the forward command group at VCB on 30 July the following radio nets were established for command and control of 9th Marines units; Command Net, Regt TAG, 1, two TAGP and Artillery Conduct of Fire Nets. By 1 August 1968 the radio and the wire personnel remoted the Regimental Tactical Net and the Command Net from Signal Hill. This was done by using two pair of cable from Task Force HOTEL, running this through their terminal box, through our terminal box terminating this into the COC. Two radio operators were sent to the top of Signal Hill with 3 RT-505's, 3 RC-292's and 2 local units of the AN/GRA-30's.

On 3 August 1968 a relay team was sent to QUANG TRI with the following items of equipment:

- (1) AN/MRC-83
- (2) 2 RT-505's
- (3) 1 IC-292
- (4) 1 AS-2336/GRC Log Periodic Antenna

This relay was programmed by the Communications Officer in anticipation of operations into East BA LONG Valley. The relay was deactivated due to cancellation of the operation. A stand-by team was also programmed as part of a jump CP to go into East BA LONG Valley.

On 17 August 1968 an advance party was sent to C-2 to establish a CP. At this time all nets were established and continuous communications were maintained between the advance party, CO and XO's group.

On 25 August 1968 an advance party was sent to VCB to establish a forward CP. No radio difficulties were encountered on this displacement. The regimental tactical net #1 and the commanders net were remoted from Signal Hill. Also two lines were provided for 2/12 FDC.

On 27 August 1968 a relay team was sent to THON SON LAM to be used for units operating to the north and west of the ROCKPILE.

Radio Relay. During the month of August 1968 radio relay was used at the C-2 position only while at the C-2 site. 3d Mar Div supplied an AN/MRC-62 radio relay van enabling us to communicate with Task Force HOTEL. Ninth Marines communications platoon established an AN/TRC-27 relay shot to DONG HA and one to Camp CARROLL for the use of supporting arms and common user admin channels. These shots enabled FSGC personnel to more closely coordinate fire support with the 3d Marines.

Power still remained a problem during August as our PU-270's did not come in to supply until 2 September.

The DONG HA to C-2 shot was closed down due to the Army's movement and control of the position. Generally, a high degree of reliability on AN/TRC-27 equipment has provided the regiment excellent tactical telephone communications during this operational period.

On 17 August 1968 an advance party was sent to C-2 to establish a Regimental Scout Snipers. All nets were established and continuous communications were maintained between the advance party and the regimental command. The scout sniper platoon has employed teams with 1/9, 2/9 and 3/9 throughout the month. VCB to establish a forward CP. No radio difficulties were encountered on this displacement. During the reporting period the scout sniper platoon continued to provide instruction to MCB-7 on patrolling and VC/NVA tactics.

On 27 August 1968 a relay team was sent to THON SON LAM to be used for units operating to the north and west of the ROCKPILE. ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART IV

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CONTENTS

TASK ORGANIZATION AND OPSTAT

SITREPS

INTSUMS

9TH MARINES ORDERS

9TH MARINES AO OVERLAYS

A/A Rpt (OPN LANCASTER II, JUPITER)
 msg 310735-1710Z, 5th Jt Div Opn Area
 Western Kentucky AO

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
9th Marines3d Marine Division (Rein), FMP
FPO San Francisco, 96602

9th Mar. Regt.

Control No. 22555-68

3D MAR DIV NG-28 FILE
BTZ 639768

003035-68

3/JBK:jer

3100

168369

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division (Rein), FMP
 Via: Commanding General, Task Force Hotel
 Subj: Combat After Action Report

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014 Sheets
 6342 I and 6442 IV.
 (b) CG, Task Force Hotel Frag Order 50-68.
 (c) 9th Mar Frag 0 72-68.
 (d) 9th Mar Frag 0 73-68.
 (e) 9th Mar Frag 0 74-68.
 (f) 9th Mar Warning 0 75-68.
 (g) 9th Mar Frag 0 76-68.

Encl: (1) 9th Marines LANCASTER II JUPITER AO OVERLAY.

1. Code Name. Operation LANCASTER II JUPITER.
2. Date of Operation. 170600H Aug 68 to 251800H Aug 68.
3. Location. Northern QUANG TRI Province.
4. Task Organization.

9th Marines (Rein)	Col	BARROW
1st Bn, 9th Marines	LtCol	COLLETON
2nd Bn, 9th Marines	LtCol	KNIGHT
3rd Bn, 9th Marines	LtCol	LAMONTAGNE
2nd Bn, 12th Marines	LtCol	SCOPPA
Co A(-), 3rd Tank Bn	Lt	SPALSBURY
Co C, 3rd Engineer Bn	Lt	RICE
1st Plat, Co A, 3rd MT Bn	Capt	FLOOD

5. Supporting Forces.

a. Direct Support and General Support Units.

- (1) 12th Marines - General Support

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9th Marines

17-25 Aug 68
LANCASTER II
JUPITER

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(2) 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines - Direct Support

(a) See artillery (paragraph 5B)

(3) Co A(-), 3rd Tank Battalion - Direct Support

(a) Elements of Company A(-), 3rd Tank Battalion were in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, operating several kilometers west of C-2 during the initial phase of LANCASTER II JUPITER. Mountainous and jungle covered terrain made movement impossible for tracked vehicles and the tanks were returned to C-2. The tanks were not used during the remainder of the operation.

(4) Co C, 3rd Engineer Battalion - Direct Support

(a) Company C, 3rd Engineer Battalion provided 9th Marines close combat engineer support throughout Operation LANCASTER II JUPITER. Operating with the maneuver battalions the engineers used approximately 1,000 pounds of demolitions to destroy numerous enemy bunker positions, equipment and stores of ammunition and supplies.

(4) 3rd Motor Transport Battalion - General Support

(a) Support by 1st Platoon, Company A, 3rd Motor Transport Battalion was responsive to all requests of this command during Operation LANCASTER II JUPITER. Support consisted of personnel/bulk cargo movements from DONG HA to C-2 and household activities within the C-2 site.

b. Artillery.(1) Supporting fires.

(a) Artillery support during Operation LANCASTER II JUPITER was provided by the 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines which was in Direct Support of the 9th Marines. General Support fires were provided by the 12th Marine Regiment. Fire support coordination centers were maintained at each infantry battalion and clearance of fires and control of integrated air and artillery missions was accomplished at the 9th Marines FSCC. Sav-a-plane information was passed to TF HOTEL.

(b) Artillery preparations and on-call fires were delivered in support of infantry operations. Other fires included an active program of harassing fires, countermortar, counterrocket and flak suppression programs. The MPQ-4 radar was valuable for registrations but ineffective in acquiring information on active mortars.

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(c) A total of 13,908 rounds were expended as follows:

105mm	11,987
155mm	1,921

(d) Artillery fired from positions at C-2 and north of Camp CARROLL provided favorable gun target lines while in support of the 9th Marines. A blanket Sav-a-plane was obtained enabling 2/12 units to fire through 1st Marines airspace without clearance.

(e) Throughout the operation, artillery support was timely, accurate, and effective.

c. Air Support.

(1) Fixed Wing Support.

(a) Numerous airstrikes were conducted in support of 9th Marines OPCON battalions and in particular of 1/9. These strikes were effective against NVA troops, bunkers and supply caches. In most cases, fixed wing support was responsive to battalion needs during hours of both daylight and darkness. Spooky, flareships and attack aircraft were all made available on short notice when requested.

(b) A total of 108 close air support missions were flown amounting to 216 sorties. Air strikes accounted for the following BDA:

- 1 KBA; 110 KBA (ost)
- 97 Bunkers destroyed; 9 damaged
- 50 Motors trenchline destroyed
- 44 Secondary explosions
- 2 Secondary fires
- 1 Automatic weapon position destroyed
- 1 12.7mm AA gun destroyed
- 1 Mortar destroyed
- 2 Mortar positions destroyed

(c) Total TPQ's amounted to 29 sorties expending 59 tons of ordnance.

(d) Tactical air observer flights consisted of 55 sorties for 90 flight hours

(e) Flareship missions flown - 4; Spooky missions - 1.

(2) Helicopter Support.

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(a) Two battalion size helicopter assaults were conducted during the operation. The same battalions were transported to VCB at the termination of the operation with one battalion, 1/9, being lifted under mortar fire. The commendable response by the helicopters resulted in the completion of various support missions including resupply, medovac, C&C, TACA and gunship escort.

(b) Total medovac: 43 missions/127 troops.

(c) Total helicopters utilized: 168

6. Intelligence.

a. Estimation on enemy situation prior to operation.

(1) At the beginning of the operation there were suspected elements of 1 NVA regiment in and adjacent to the 9th Marines AO. Prior to and during the operation, NVA units were continuously infiltrating in and around the AO, as reported by Agent and Intelligence reports. The 64th NVA Regiment was generally northwest of C-2 with 2 battalions and 1 battalion in the DMZ.

b. Situation.

(1) Enemy situation and contacts during the operation.

(a) During the operation only one heavy contact was made. The contact took place in the vic of YD 0164 with an estimated reinforced Company. Light sniper fire and A/W fire was received sporadically throughout the entire AO.

c. Unit Identification.

(1) A POW identified his unit as 9th Battalion of the 64th Regiment, part of the 320th Division.

d. Terrain.

(1) Terrain in the area of operation is rolling hills covered with 6' to 8' elephant grass in the eastern extremities of the AO and heavily canopied ridges, hills, and valleys in the western portion of the AO. Intermittent streams are found throughout the AO providing some augmentation to water resupply for the troops. Additionally, some foot trails are located in the heavily wooded areas allowing for easier movement.

e. Weather.

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(1) Temperature for the operational period: high average of 96 degrees during the day and a low average of 79 degrees during the night. Little rain fell during the operation. Over all, the weather had little effect on the operation.

7. Mission. At L-Hour on D-Day, 9th Marines conducts a two battalion holiborne assault in the northeast LANCASTER II AO to find, fix and destroy enemy forces, supply/logistic caches and interdict infiltration routes in assigned zone of action.

8. Concept of Operations. Two battalions conduct a holiborne assault into the northern portion of zone of action. One battalion, at a time to be designated, conducts a holiborne assault/mechanized attack into the eastern portion of AO.

9. Execution.

17 Aug At 0926H, 3/9 helilift from VCB to LZ SPARROW vic YD 055650 commenced. Comploted at 1042H with no contact. At 1140H, 1/9 Helilift from VCB to LZ SATURN vic YD 095665 commenced. Comploted at 1330H with no contact. At 1230H, 3/9 vic YD 052648 discovered two graves. Each grave hold two NVA dead approximately two days old. 4 NVA KIA.

18 Aug At 1905H, 3/9 vic YD 056653, received 20 rounds 82mm from vic YD 048664. No casualties. 81mm and artillery missions fired with unknown results. At 2215H, C/1/9 vic YD 091670 observed 5 NVA in front of lines. Throw M-26 grenade and fired small arms. 81mm mortar mission fired with unknown results.

19 Aug At 1030H, M/3/9 vic YD 057665, surprised a squad of NVA vic YD 058668. Enemy engaged with S/A, A/W fire, artillery and air strikes. At 1350H, 3/9 reported enemy force estimated at 2 NVA companies. NVA have been reinforced from the east by an unknown size unit. At 1400H, K/3/9 moved to YD 066664 to reinforce M/3/9. An F-4 Phantom was shot down by enemy ground fire; however, both pilots were immediately rescued. At 1600H, area of initial contact was swept with following results: 3 USMC KIA, 14 USMC WIAE, 38 NVA KIA, 2 NVA POW's, 6 LWC, and 3 CSWC. At 1835H, M/3/9 vic YD 053650 observed 3 NVA in the open vic YD 058668. 60mm mortar missions and machine guns fired resulting in 2 NVA KIA.

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- 20 August At 1100H, 3/9 vic YD 058665 received 5 rounds 60mm mortar from a northwest direction. No casualties. At 1340H, M/3/9 vic YD 056668, found 1 NVA body, 1 NVA KIA. At 1920H, L/2/9 vic YD 055645 found a grave with 2 NVA bodies. 2 NVA KIA.
- 21 August At 1330H, 1/9 helilift into LZ's FALCON EAST, JUNIOR and VULTURE commenced. Helilift completed at 1502H with no contact. At 1510H, 1/9 vic YD 032646 received 15 rounds unknown caliber artillery. AO on station. 2 USMC WIAE. At 1535H, 3/9 vic YD 053665 received 10 rounds incoming artillery from 6200 Mills. No casualties. AO on station. At 1650H, 1/3/9 vic YD 053665 made moderate contact. Artillery and fixed wing utilized to maximum extent possible. Action resulted in 1 USMC KIA, 5 USMC WIAE, 14 NVA KIA, 6 IWC and 1 CSWC. At 1900H, 1/3/9 vic YD 053665 found a complex of 60 well built bunkers, 1 large mess area, laundry hung out to dry and a 60mm mortar in a tree. At 1945H, 1/3/9 vic YD 053665 received 10 rounds 60mm mortar from vic YD 046678. No casualties.
- 22 August At 1000H, 1/3/9 vic YD 053675 found 1 NVA KIA, 3 IWC and 2 CSWC. At 1200H, 1/3/9 vic YD 048670 found 2 IWC. At 1545H, B/1/9 patrol vic YD 011642 made contact with an NVA Company. Patrol received S/A, A/W and 60mm mortar fire. Within minutes an AO was on station calling in air and artillery. At 1800H, contact continued with the B/1/9 patrol unable to return to the company defensive position. B/1/9 patrol maintained a night position 600 meters from Bravo Company's main position. No casualty reports received at this time.
- 23 August At 0900H, B/1/9 relief force vic YD 017642 attempting a link up with the B/1/9 patrol, erroneously received a fixed wing strike on their position resulting in 10 USMC WIAE. Follow up reports concerning B/1/9 contact of previous day indicate the following casualties: 1 USMC KIA, 14 USMC WIAE, 7 USMC BNR, and 1 USMC MIA. At 1300H, 3/9 was helilifted to VCB. At 1845H, D/1/9 vic YD 030690 received 14 rounds 82mm mortar resulting in 2 USMC KIA and 4 USMC WIAE.
- 24 August At 1300H, B/1/9 commenced operations to recover 7 BNR and 1 MIA from previous day. At 1700H, all 8 bodies were recovered. Results 8 USMC KIA. At 1700H, 1/9 while firing 81mm mortar mission vic YD 001658 observed small secondary explosions. Artillery mission called on grid resulting in one large 300-400 foot high explosion. AO on station observed bunker complex with crater estimated about the size of 2000 lb. bomb crater.

(F)

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25 August At 1000H, 1/9 commenced helilift to VCB. At 1200H, to 1330H, B/1/9 via YD 020649 received 27 rounds 82mm mortar resulting in 3 USMC KIA. At 1355H, 1/9 helilift to VCB completed. At 1430H, 9th Marines CP displaced to VCB.

10. Results.a. Friendly Losses.

- (1) 15 USMC KIA
- (2) 54 USMC WIAE

b. Enemy Losses.(1) Personnel.

- (a) 72 NVA KIA
- (b) 2 NVA POW

(2) Weapons.

- (a) 27 IWC
- (b) 6 CSWC

(3) Equipment/munitions captured/destroyed.

- (a) 250 bunkers
- (b) 4 launching sites
- (c) 2 mortar pits
- (d) 4 fighting holes
- (e) 6 chicom (grenades)
- (f) 3 122mm rockets
- (g) 23 RPG rounds
- (h) 5175 rounds small arms
- (i) 92 mortar rounds
- (j) 74 82mm fuses
- (k) 2 60mm fuses
- (l) 5 AP mines
- (m) 1 75mm dud
- (n) 160 lbs Rice
- (o) 8 first aid packs
- (p) 22 packs
- (q) 11 helmets
- (r) 16 ponchos
- (s) 8 E-Tools
- (t) 11 mosquito nets
- (u) 18 shirts
- (v) 22 trousers
- (w) 23 rice bowls
- (x) 1 basket with 9 bowls of rice
- (y) 2 large cooking pots
- (z) 1 mess kit
- (aa) enough NVA 782 gear to equip 60 men

SECRET

11. Administrative matters.a. Communications.

(1) General. During this operational period the 9th Marines Regimental Comm Platoon utilized FM radio, and wire/ radio relay to maintain continuous tactical communications.

(2) Comm Center. From the 18th of August until 25 August the 9th Marines Regimental Headquarters was located at C-2. During this time, message traffic from DONG HA was delivered via scheduled courier runs made twice daily by Comm Center personnel. During the operation a total of 71 messages were processed by the Comm Center. There were 37 incoming messages and 34 outgoing messages.

(3) Wire. On the 17th of August an advance party of wire personnel was sent to C-2 to prepare for the displacement of the Regimental Headquarters. The wire system was installed on the 19th of August shortly after the 9th Marines Regimental Headquarters moved to C-2.

(4) Radio. On 17 August an advance party was sent to C-2 to prepare for the LANCASTER II JUPITER Operation. Regt TAC 2, Regt CMD net, Cipher net, Div TAC II 'A' and the TACP 1 and 2 were established when the CO and XO's group arrived. Normal FM radio communications continued for the operational period with a minimum of frequency interference.

(5) Radio Relay. On 17 August, the 3rd Mar Div supplied an AN/MRC-62 radio relay terminal providing communications with TF HOTEL. 9th Marines Comm Platoon established an AN/TRC-27 radio relay shot to DONG HA and one to Camp CARROLL for the use of supporting arms and common user/admin channels. These shots enabled FSCC personnel to closely coordinate fire support with 3rd Marines. During the operation a high degree of reliability on AN/TRC-27 equipment provided the regiment excellent tactical telephone communications.

b. Supply.(1) Discussion.

(a) The administrative plan was considered adequate for the operation. In compliance with a TF HOTEL directive, a Regimental S-4 representative was located at VCB to coordinate the logistical requirements and anticipate possible problem areas.

(F)

SECRET

To facilitate higher level coordination, the OPCON Battalions were required to maintain a S-4 representative at the Regimental Logistics Operation Center (LOC) located at C-2. The combination of the above resulted in positive control of resupply.

(b) All resupply during this operation was accomplished by air.

(c) No significant maintenance problems were encountered.

(d) Transportation was provided to the regiment by 1st Platoon, A Company, 3d Motor Transport Battalion.

(e) Casualties were first treated by attached Naval personnel. Evacuation from the field was to "D" Company, 3d Medical Battalion, DONG HA, and from there to higher headquarters.

(f) Medical evacuation through organic medical facilities proved adequate for the operation.

(1) A forward RAS was established with the forward CP on 17 August and staffed by a chief and one corpsman. Approximately 32 men were treated during routine sick call from 17 to 25 August.

(2) No adverse medical problems were encountered. The forward RAS was centrally located in the CP area and was completely stocked for field operation.

12. Special Equipment and Techniques. None

13. Commander's Analysis.

Operation LANCASTER II JUPITER provided the Regiment with valuable information and improved the planning process for future operations in the AO. The enemy did not attempt to attack Marine units with ground troops unless forced into a contact. Generally, he continued to harass friendly forces with supporting arms (mortars and artillery) and with sniper fire. The contacts that were forced upon the enemy remained moderate with the exception of one relatively heavy encounter in the northwestern portion of the AO, in the vicinity of HELICOPTER Valley.

SECRET

Indications are that enemy NVA forces maintain significant strongholds in the heavily canopied high and low ground in and just south of the DMZ in the northwestern LANCASTER AO. He did not appear to be looking for contact with Marine forces at this time, rather holding, improving, and stockpiling present positions for future operations.

Rapid helicopter insertions, moving battalions into difficult terrain, proved very effective in reaction to contacts or sightings and exploitation of a tactical situation. The operation proved that ground troops can conduct successful operations in such difficult terrain.


R. H. Barrow
R. H. BARROW

SECRET

(E)

SECRET

3D MARINE DIVISION

**SHOVE LUC**

CO CHIEF

G-3 W.O.

G-2 W.O.

DCPO

APC

ACTION

DRAFTER: 6/RHB:jjm

RELEASED BY: R.H. BARROW COL

IMMEDIATE ³¹⁰⁷³⁵ Z AUG 68

FROM: CO NINTH MAR

TO: CG, THIRD MAR DIV

INFO: CG, TASK FORCE HOTEL
FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV (MECH)**SECRET**
FIRST BDE FIFTH INF DIV OPERATION IN WESTERN KENTUCKY AO

A. CG, 3RD MAR DIV 300800Z AUG 68

1. THE OPERATION OUTLINED IN REF A WILL BE CONDUCTED IN AN AREA THE 9TH MARINES HAVE CONDUCTED RECENT OPERATIONS, i.e. LANCASTER JULY AND LANCASTER JUPITER.

2. THE 9TH MARINES WOULD BE PLEASED TO PASS ON TO THE 1ST BDE 5TH INF KNOWLEDGE GAINED CONCERNING THE AREA, e.g. SUITABILITY OF LZ'S, TRAFFICABILITY, BEST APPROACHES PAST AND LIKELY ENEMY POSITIONS.

3. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 1ST BDE 5TH INF DIV WOULD VISIT HQ 9TH MARINES (VCB) AT ANY TIME AND ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE TO DISCUSS AREA OF OPERATIONS WITH SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS AND STAFFS.

GP-4
BT

310735Z AUG

A-3

2/4/COCDy

310735 Z Aug 68

SECRET

TAG 25