

3/ALM/gtp

3,800

Ser 003709467

CO 0105 1967

530067

ENDORSEMENT on CO, 9th Marines ltr 3/BJH/lcc, 3100, Ser
67 of 14 August 1967

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation CIMARRON)

Ref: (a) COMUSMACV Inst 335-8 of 2 April 1967

Re: Readdressed and forwarded occurring with the basic report.

J. R. Stockman
J. R. STOCKMAN
By direction

9TH MAR

A/A Rpt (Opn CIMARRON)

1 JUNE-2 JULY 1967

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9th Mar Regt
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HEADQUARTERS

9th Marines

3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
c/o FPO San Francisco 96602

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3/BH/100

3100

14 Aug 1967

SER # 35-63-67

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Subj: Combat After Action Report

- Ref: (a) Maps Vietnam 1:50,000 1:5 Series L701A, Sheets 6442 IV, 6342 I, 6342 II, 6442 I, 6442 II, 6441 I, 6541 IV, 6542 III, and 6441 IV.
(b) 3d MarDiv Ltr 1-67
(c) 3d MarDiv Op Order 2-67 (Sparrow Hawk)
(d) 3d MarDiv Op Order 30-67 (CG, Third MarDiv 201640Z May 67)
(e) 3d MarDiv O P02000 2E (COI)
(f) CG, 3d MarDiv 214153 Jun 67
(g) 3d MarDiv Frag O 35-67
(h) 9th Mar Op O 7-67
(i) 9th Mar Frag O 1-67 for Op CHU LACON
(j) 9th Mar Frag O 2-67 for Op CHU LACON
(k) 9th Mar Frag O 3-67 for Op CHU LACON
(l) 9th Mar Frag O 4-67 for Op CHU LACON
(m) 9th Mar Frag O 5-67 for Op CHU LACON
(n) 9th Mar Frag O 6-67 for Op CHU LACON
(o) 9th Mar Frag O 7-67 for Op CHU LACON
(p) 9th Mar Frag O 8-67 for Op CHU LACON
(q) 9th Mar Frag O 9-67 for Op CHU LACON

- Encl: (1) Operation CHU LACON Overlay I
(2) Unit After Action Reports 1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 2/3 Filed Sep

1. Code Name. Operation CHU LACON.
2. Date of Operation. 010000H Jun 67 to 021000H Jul 67.
3. Location. QUANG TRI Province (QUANG LO and GIO LINH District).
4. Command Headquarters. 9th Marines (Rein)
5. Task Organization

9th Marines (Rein)

HqCo, (-) (Rein)

Det, Comm Co, HqBn

Downgraded in three (3) year intervals

Declassified after twelve (12) years.

LTCOL KILLY 01 Jun 67 to 03 Jun 67
COL J. W. 04 Jun 67 to 02 Jul 67

1st Bn, 9th Marines

MAJOR FULHAM

Co A, 1st Bn, 9th Marines
 Co B, 1st Bn, 9th Marines
 Co C, 1st Bn, 9th Marines
 Co F, 1st Bn, 9th Marines

2d Bn, 9th Marines

LTCOL PEELER

Co E, 2d Bn, 9th Marines
 Co F, 2d Bn, 9th Marines
 Co G, 2d Bn, 9th Marines
 Co H, 2d Bn, 9th Marines

3d Bn, 9th Marines

MAJOR WOODRING

Co I, 3d Bn, 9th Marines
 Co K, 3d Bn, 9th Marines
 Co L, 3d Bn, 9th Marines
 Co M, 3d Bn, 9th Marines

2d Bn, 3d Marines

MAJOR BEARD

Co E, 2d Bn, 3d Marines
 Co F, 2d Bn, 3d Marines
 Co G, 2d Bn, 3d Marines
 Co H, 2d Bn, 3d Marines

6. Supporting Forcesa. Direct Support and General Support Units

12th Marines - Direct Support and General Support as required.
 3d Recon Bn (-) (Rein) - General Support.
 2d Bn, 12th Marines - Direct Support.
 Co C, 3d Engr Bn - Direct Support.
 Co C, 3d AT Bn - Direct Support.
 Co A, (Rein), 3d Tank Bn - Direct Support.
 Co C, (Rein), 3d SP Bn - Direct Support.
 1st Bn (Rein), (AW) (SP), 44th ADA, USA - Direct Support.
 G Btry, 29th Arty, USA - Direct Support.

b. Artillery

(1) Artillery support for the 9th Marine Regiment during Operation CIMARRON was provided by the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines operating in a direct support role. Reinforcing fires were provided by the 12th Marine Regiment. During operation, D/2/12 displaced from DONG HA (YD 2159) to (YD 2265).

(2) Direct support artillery fired 30,614 rounds, broken down as follows:

<u>Targets</u>	<u>Rounds</u>
Observed Missions 539	105mm 18,075
Unobserved Missions 253	107mm 7,230
H&I Targets 5,380	155mm 5,309
Total 6,172	Total 30,614

(3) Significant surveillances were as follows:

- 34 KIA (Conf)
- 20 KIA (Prob)
- 1 Bridge Destroyed
- 2 Bunkers Destroyed
- 1 Truck Destroyed
- 1 Gun Position Partially Destroyed
- 13 Secondary Explosions

c. Air Support

(1) Helicopter Support

(a) During this operation there was one battalion (-) troop lift, inserting two companies and a Battalion Command Group. The lift commenced at 290730H and was completed at 290850H. The lift was completed without incident or casualties.

(b) Resupply and medevac aircraft supported the operation from DONG HA. There was frequent helicopter resupply totaling 348,526 pounds helilifted to ground units. There were 85 medevac missions, lifting 156 casualties to DONG HA from units in the field. There were 108 WIA, 25 NBC, 11 KIA's, 10 civilians and 2 NVA WIA.

(c) Helicopters were utilized in a variety of missions including the helilift of captured rice, and rapid helilift of captured enemy equipment of intelligence value from the field to Regimental Headquarters.

(2) Fixed Wing Support

(a) Fixed wing were used as escort for the helicopter trooplift under control of a tactical air coordinator (airborne).

(b) Fixed wing and Q1 aircraft were on station or on call throughout the operation. During this operation, within the 9th Marines OA, fixed wing aircraft flew 482 CAS and 656 TPQ missions, dropping 4,903,000 pounds of ordnance.

(c) A flare equipped aircraft was either on station or on call throughout the operation.

7. Intelligence

a. Estimate of Enemy Strength in Operating Area. During the course of the operation, there was a change in the composition of enemy forces in the operating area. The area will be divided into two areas for purposes of this paragraph.

(1) South of Route #9 and CUA VIET River, the enemy strength stayed relatively stable.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>
808 Bn	YD 3757	190
814 Bn	HAI LANG District	350
C.10 Co	YD 3338	120
TRIEU PHONG Co	YD 2245	80
H.99 Co	YD 4251	80

(2) North of Route #9 and CUA VIET River, it was a changing situation. The 812th Regiment withdrew and was replaced by the 90th Regiment near the end of the operation. A battalion of the 803d Regiment moved into the area. Near the end of the operation, two battalions of the 29th Regiment moved to the western fringes of the operating area. During the course of the operation, the 31st Regiment moved into the old operating area of the 32d Regiment east of GIO LINH along the coast. Strength of these units at start of operation were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
31st Regt	Moved from KINH MON area to the coastal plains east of Route #1	2,285
803d Regt	Northern DMZ. Moved one Bn into southern DMZ (YD 1175) near end of operation.	2,400
812th Regt	Moved out of SVN to NVN	1,740
90th Regt	Moved out of NVN into area north of CON THIEN	2,400
29th Regt (-)	Moved east into NUI TOT MON area (YD 1162) during operation	1,500

b. Estimate of Enemy Capability of Reinforcing

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>
803d Regt	DMZ	2,400
32d Regt	Eastern DMZ	2,625
33d Regt	Eastern DMZ	2,625

c. Specific information on enemy in area

(1) Intelligence gained during this operation indicated that the enemy was using the month of June to reorganize and regroup. An extensive effort was made by the NVN/VC to collect rice from the QUANG TRI province. Some evidence of this was the almost nightly harassment of CAP P-2, with the mission of occupying this unit while other forces carried rice from the coastal plains across Highway #1 into the piedmont area. There were also frequent reports of the enemy harvesting rice at night in the area east of GIO LINH.

(2) In addition to the rice gathering mission the enemy was building his forces for an offensive move. The following was evidence of this action:

- (a) Increased sightings in the DMZ area by AO's.
- (b) Increased contacts by patrols around CON THIEN.
- (c) Build up of enemy artillery and anti-aircraft weapons in area north of BEN HAI.
- (d) S-2, 2d ARVN Regiment, indicated that enemy had a five year history of conducting these types of operations during this period of the year.
- (e) An increase of SPAR activity in the eastern DMZ region.
- (f) The "dark of the moon" coincided with other indications of offensive action.

(3) Outstanding cooperation with Division and 12th Marine Aerial Observers was obtained during this operation. Close contact between observers and S-2, 9th Marines, proved to be a prime source of accurate information on enemy movements and build-up.

(4) Extensive use of AN/TPS-21 radars at CON THIEN and on Hill 30 (YD 139613) provided valuable assistance for perimeter defenses.

d. Enemy Capabilities

(1) Enemy was capable of massing up to four regiments in the area North of Route #9 and CU VIET River and attacking friendly positions at a time of his choosing.

(2) Enemy was capable of massing up to two battalions and two local force companies in area South of Route #9 and CU VIET River and attacking positions at a time of his choosing.

(3) Enemy was capable of conducting small unit attacks against friendly forces throughout 9th Marine OA.

(4) Enemy was capable of withdrawing but would do so only under heavy pressure.

(5) Enemy was capable of defending in areas of his choice

(6) Enemy could reinforce with units from North Vietnam.

e. Adequacy of Pre-D-Day Intelligence. Information provided by division and obtained from intelligence gathering units in the OA provided adequate intelligence prior to commencement of operation.

f. Enemy Casualties

KIA 152 (Conf)

KIA 196 (Prob)

g. Fortifications. Extensive enemy bunkers and trenches were found throughout the northern portion of the 9th Marines OA. Bunkers were found in no specific pattern nor of a specific design. Some were fighting bunkers but the majority were strictly for shelter.

h. Terrain Analysis. No specific analysis was made for this operation. See 9th Marines Intelligence Estimate for June 1967.

i. Weapons Captured

34 Individual Weapons

11 Crew-Served Weapons

45 Total Weapons

j. Enemy Tactics. The enemy employed classical guerrilla tactics. In the southern portion of the area he harassed and distracted the CAP unit in that area so that he could move rice in another area. In the northern portion of the 9th Marines OA he employed scouting and patrolling techniques. In this method he was able to observe actions by FWMF and prepare for offensive action at a time and place advantageous to him.

k. Intelligence gained from interrogation. No tactically significant intelligence was gained from PW's or DETAINEES.

1. CIVIL AFFAIRS

(1) On 6 June, coordination was made with CM LO officials concerning curfew.

(2) On 8 June, conference was held with all OPCON units to review the Kit Carson Scout program, availability of civil affairs commodities, and reports.

(3) On 13 June, refugees in HA THANH (YD 220698) were granted permission to return to VAN ANH (YD 155685) for ten days to harvest rice.

(4) On 17 June, conference was held by Division Civil Affairs Officer. Area coordinators were appointed and units of coordination were assigned. 9th Marines were assigned villages of CAN THAT, CAN LO, HIEU, TRIEU LUONG, TRIEU LE, GIO HAI, and TRIEU VAN. District and village headquarters were visited and statistics compiled on all villages.

(5) On 18 June, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines held a medcap and talent show in CAN LO.

(6) On 24 June, K Company, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines evacuated 8000 lbs of rice from (YD 268700). Delivered to 2nd RVN Regiment.

(7) On 27 June, regimental order was issued assigning units areas of responsibility for civil affairs.

(8) During July 1226 Vietnamese were treated at medcap.

m. Psychological Warfare.

(1) During operation CIMARRON the operating area was saturated with leaflets. On each day of the operation leaflet drops and broadcasts were conducted.

(2) The themes utilized during the operation were

- (a) NVA Chieu noi
- (b) NVA surrender
- (c) Exploitation of VC misery
- (d) A variety of Chieu noi appeals

(3) A total of 6,914,000 leaflets were dropped in support of the operation.

(4) A total of 20 hours and 25 minutes of aerial speaker broadcasts also supported the operation

8. Mission. Ninth Marines (Rein) provide security and defense of DONG HA Combat Base and CAI LO bridge site. Be prepared to provide reinforcements, counterattack and relief forces for GIO LINH artillery outpost and CUA VIET facility. Maintain an active ground surveillance program and conduct spoiling attacks throughout assigned OA to detect and destroy infiltrating NVN personnel. Provide security for Routes #9, #561 and #1 in assigned OA and AOR. Assume OrCON of Marine elements of CAC's within assigned OA and AOR. Support GVN RD program within assigned OA and AOR. Occupy and defend CON THIEN complex. Provide one rifle company (Rein) OrCON GIO LINH artillery QMGR for defense and security of that position. Assist units located at mouth of CUU VIET River in regard to defense and security measures and fire support. Augment security forces of CUA VIET facility as required. Conduct operations in coordination with 1st Airtac in to detect/deter waterborne infiltration and discover/destroy enemy weapons and ammunition caches in designated areas. Conduct operations as directed in designated AOR. Coordinate use of areas with RVN, as required.

9. Concept of Operations. Ninth Marines (-)(Rein) provides security and defense of DONG HA Combat Base by utilizing forces of tenable commands with infantry forces providing coordination and the reserve force. Security and defense of CAI LO bridge site is provided by one rifle platoon (Rein). Provides reinforcements, counterattack and relief forces for GIO LINH artillery outpost and CUA VIET facility from assigned forces as required. Maintains an active ground surveillance program and conducts spoiling attacks throughout assigned OA with assigned forces to detect and destroy infiltrating NVN personnel.

Provide security for Route #9, Route #61 and Route #1 in assigned OA by aggressive patrolling along flanks utilizing Combined Action Platoons and other assigned forces. Occupies and defends CON THIEN complex with a command group and a battalion (-). Provides one rifle Company (Rein) OPCON GIO LINH artillery commander for defense and security of that position. Assists units at mouth of CU VIET River with regard to defense and security measures and fire support as required. Augments these forces as required. Conducts operations in coordination with 1st Atrac Battalion to detect/deter waterborne infiltration and discover/destroy enemy weapons and ammunition caches in designated areas. Conducts operations as directed in designated AOR, coordinates use of area with ARVN, as required in carrying out these missions. General and direct support artillery will be employed as feasible. In addition fixed wing and helicopters will be used as feasible and commensurate with availability.

01 June 1967

At 010625H a patrol from F/2/3 discovered/destroyed a 60mm mortar round explosive device, vicinity (YD 120610). At 011130H vicinity (YD 121672) E/2/3 discovered 2 EN KIA (Conf). At 011500H vicinity (YD 275575) C.F-P2 administered first aid to and medevaced 2 VN children who had been playing with an M-79 round.

02 June 1967

At 020125H vicinity (YD 137665) E/2/3 received 4 rounds of incoming mortar fire. There was no damage or casualties. At 021200H vicinity (YD 154704) D/1/9 made small arms contact with 3 VC, swept area with negative results. At 021445H vicinity (YD 106123) B/1/9 captured 3 enemy rifles. At 021545H vicinity (YD 135666) E/2/3 detonated a chicom grenade resulting in 1 USMC KIA, and 1 USMC WIA, from an explosive device. At 021650 vicinity (YD 150115) a patrol from D/1/9 made small arms contact with unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 021700H vicinity (YD 122593) 1 Marine from 15th CIT was killed and 1 PF WIA by M-26 frag grenade explosion. At 022145H vicinity (YD 283570) C.F-P2 ambushed 5 VC, resulting in 1 PF KIA and 1 PF WIA. At 021400H 2 Marines from Hq Co, 9th Mar were wounded by accidental discharge of M-16 rifle.

03 June 1967

At 031000H vicinity (YD 155714) A/1/9 received small arms fire. Resulting sweep of the area revealed 1 M-16 AP mine, 1 3.5" rocket launcher serial number 175214, and assorted small arms ammunition and equipment. Also suffered 2 USMC WIA. At 031000H vicinity, Company area A/1/9 destroyed enemy emplaced M-16 AP mine.

At 031155H vicinity of (YD 253599) a C-130 aircraft received small arms fire while taking off from DONG HA. Area swept with negative results. At 1100H E/2/3 vicinity (YD 136683) destroyed 2 chicom grenades. At 031300H June 1967 Colonel JERUE assumed command of 9th Marines (Rein) vice Lt. Col. KELLY. At 031300H B/1/9 discovered 1 gas mask and 2 kahki shirts vicinity (YD 201678). At 031350H vicinity (YD 106675) B/1/9 discovered/destroyed an enemy bunker complex with assorted small arms and ammunition. At 031600H vicinity (YD 122600) A/2/3 apprehended 1 VN male 16 years old with a USMC dog tag in his possession.

04 June 1967

At 041130H vicinity (YD 173670) A/2/3 detonated explosive device resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 041130H vicinity (YD 215736) 2/9 received 3 incoming unknown caliber artillery rounds resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 041330H vicinity of (YD 150700) A/2/3 discovered/destroyed 50 enemy bunkers. At 041515H vicinity (YD 154718) E/2/3 discovered multiple explosive devices consisting of 32 chicom grenades and 10 pounds of TNT complete with electrical and non-electric blasting caps. At 041845H vicinity (YD 145141) E/2/3 discovered VC base camp area. Destroyed base camp with explosives. At 042145H vicinity (YD 144674) E/2/3 had two friendly ambush units exchange grenades resulting in 2 USMC injured NLC.

05 June 1967

At 040230H perimeter at DONG HA Combat Base received small arms fire and 3 incoming hand grenades. Returned fire and swept area with negative results. At 050745H vicinity (YD 156727) A/1/9 destroyed 1 AT mine consisting of TNT and 8 chicom grenades. At 050815H vicinity (YD 159697) A/1/9 discovered/destroyed a tunnel complex. At 050845H A/1/9 received 5 to 10 rounds of small arms fire vicinity (YD 158728) resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 051015H vicinity (YD 163702) A/1/9 discovered/destroyed a deserted defensive position of approximately 1 NVA company. At 051230H vicinity (YD 155605) E/2/3 evacuated 110 villagers. At 051235H vicinity (YD 115701) COM LILN an OH-6 aircraft made a forced landing. At 051300H vicinity (YD 158713) A/1/9 destroyed a triangular shaped enemy position consisting of 33 bunkers and 17 fighting holes complete with covered trenches. At 052140H vicinity (YD 130581) CA-13 fired an artillery mission on 1 VC squad with negative results. 2/9 (-) commenced search and destroy operations vicinity (YD GS 2668) and Northeast of DONG HA in the area used by the enemy to fire rockets. E/2/9 commenced search and destroy operations East of GIO LINH at 050215H.

06 June 1967

At 060745H vicinity (YD 274550) CAP P-2 exchanged small arms fire with unknown size VC force resulting in 2 USMC WIA and 1 EN KIA (Prob) and captured several enemy documents. At 060910H vicinity (YD 114721) A/1/9 received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire with negative results. At 060930H vicinity (YD 164727) A/1/9 destroyed an enemy defensive position composed of 13 bunkers and 42 fighting holes. At 061025H vicinity (YD 128718) 1/9 called an airstrike on an enemy bunkered position resulting in two secondary explosions. At 061200H E/2/9 exchanged small arms fire with unknown size NVN force resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 061200H vicinity (YD 270718) E/2/9 called an artillery mission on an enemy force fleeing a village resulting in 4 EN KIA (Prob). At 061350H vicinity (YD 166726) A/1/9 received 2 rounds of S/A fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 061430H vicinity (YD 143724) B/1/9 discovered 4 NVN KIA (Conf) and captured military equipment and three explosive devices. At 061440H vicinity (YD 133624) F/2/3 had 1 TD-16 bulldozer damaged by an AT mine and resulted in 1 USMC WIA. 2/3 (-) conducted screening mission vicinity CAM LO for Premier KY's visit.

07 June 1967

At 0730H vicinity (YD 115702) 1/9 detained 3 VN civilians who claimed to have escaped from NVN prison camp. At 070800H vicinity (YD 159748) a 9th Marines AD called airstrike resulting in 1 EN KIA (Conf) and 3 EN KIA (Prob). At 070845H vicinity of (YD 183710) A/1/9 exchanged small arms fire with 2 VC resulting in 2 EN KIA (Prob). At 071040H vicinity (YD 130724) to (YD 134726) B/1/9 made contact with an estimated NVN platoon resulting in 1 USMC KIA, 13 USMC WIA, and 5 EN KIA (Conf) and captured 1 M-47 rifle and assorted NVN equipment and ammunition. At 071600H vicinity (YD 152728) A/1/9 discovered 10 EN KIA (Conf). At 071945H vicinity (YD 163724) A/1/9 exchanged small arms fire with 1 NVN squad resulting in 2 EN KIA (Prob).

08 June 1967

At 081000H vicinity (YD 151711) A/1/9 destroyed an enemy fortified mortar position and 5 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition. At 081030H vicinity (YD 173669) E/2/3 detonated an explosive device resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 081130H vicinity (YD 157726) B/1/9 exchanged small arms fire with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 2 USMC WIA and 2 EN KIA (Prob). 2/9 (-) completed operations vicinity of (YD 2668) Northwest of DONG HA and returned to DONG HA at 081725H.

09 June 1967

9th Marines AO ran an airstrike Northeast of CON THLEN resulting in 3 EN KIA (Conf). 3/9 chopped ORCON to 9th Marines at 090800H. At 091320H vicinity (YD 153715) a truck from 11th Engineers detonated an AT mine resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 091520H vicinity (YD 271666) CAP-P2 exchanged small arms fire with an estimated enemy platoon resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 092300H vicinity (YD 115701), 1/9 received 50-75 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in negative damage. 2/3 moved to DONG HA to commence preparation for backloading as ELT 2/3 at 090045L.

10 June 1967

At 100940H vicinity (YD 167725) 1/9 discovered 1 NVA KIA (Conf) and captured 1 AK-47 rifle. At 101200H vicinity (YD 274554) CAP-P2 exchanged small arms fire with unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 USMC WIA. 1/3/9 relieved G/2/9 at GIO LINE at 101400L. G/2/9 moved by convoy to DONG HA at 101817H. At 101505H vicinity (YD 185735) B/1/9 attacked an enemy ambush resulting in 2 USMC WIA, 1 EN KIA (Conf) and 1 EN POW, captured assorted explosive device and 2 SKS rifles. At 101615H vicinity (YD 127675) E/2/9 discovered 2 NVA KIA (Conf). At 101940H 1/9 vicinity (YD 185735) received 60 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 102400H 2/3 chopped ORCON to CG, Third Mar Div.

11 June 1967

At 110700H G/2/9 commenced search and destroy mission in area bounded by (YD 160550, YD 200650, YD 160990, YD 200690). At 110945H 2/3 commenced backloading as SLF. At 112130H vicinity (YD 183673) G/2/9 received 7 rounds of friendly artillery fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

12 June 1967

At 120130H vicinity (YD 276576) CAP-P2 was attacked by unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 EN KIA (Conf), 10 EN KIA (Prob), 20 USMC WIA, 7 PF WIA and 10 civilians injured. At 120300H vicinity (YD 159713) C/1/9 received 1 round of enemy artillery resulting in 5 USMC WIA. At 120745H vicinity (YD 124658) E/2/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 121030H to 121730H 1/9 vicinity (YD 180727) received 40 rounds of 60mm mortar fire with negative damage. At 121630H vicinity (YD 118683) B/1/9 discovered 15 EN KIA (Conf). Late AO reports 15 EN KIA (Conf) and 18 EN KIA (Prob). 9th Marines AO called air strike on enemy positions vicinity of (YD 161779) resulting in 2 EN KIA (Conf).

13 June 1967

D/1/9 Chopped OPCON to Composite Arty Bn at 131200H. 3/9 moved to vicinity of CON THIEN to begin search and destroy operation. At 131020H vicinity (YD 103709) D/1/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 1 USMC WIA. 3/9 commenced search and destroy operations vicinity CON THIEN. G/2/9 continuing operations IAW 3d MarDiv Frag Order 35-67 to insert recon team west of CON THIEN. Platoon of L/3/9 moved to vicinity of CAP-P2 to screen CAP-P2 in the event of an enemy attack.

14 June 1967

At 140500H vicinity (YD 276577) the highway bridge was destroyed by enemy explosives. At 140610H vicinity (YD 096707) K/3/9 ambushed 2 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA (Conf). Captured 1 rifle. At 140915H vicinity (YD 128603) E/2/9 destroyed an enemy bunker complex and assorted explosive equipment and captured 1, M-79 grenade launcher ser no. 10482. G/2/9 completed operations West of CON THIEN IAW Div Frag O 35-67. At 140850H vicinity (YD 095709) L/3/9 received 1 short round from friendly 4.2" mortar resulting in 8 USMC WIA. At 140915H vicinity (YD 128683) E/2/9 discovered and destroyed an enemy bunker complex and assorted small arms, and mortar ammunition. At 140915H vicinity (YD 190740) C/1/9 was hit with several command detonated enemy AF mines resulting in 3 USMC KIA and 8 USMC WIA. At 141430H vicinity (YD 188722) B/1/9 received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 5 USMC WIA.

15 June 1967

At 150830H vicinity (YD 155655) E/2/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 151015H vicinity (YD 172672) G/2/9 captured 1 wounded VC, 1 AK-47 rifle, 2 chicom grenades and small arms ammunition. At 151215H vicinity (YD 174663) G/2/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 151255H vicinity (YD 193733) a bulldozer working with B/1/9 detonated an anti-personnel explosive device resulting in hydraulic line damage and 1 USMC WIA. At 151410H vicinity (YD 119668) E/2/9 discovered and destroyed a bunker complex and captured 1 chicom light machine gun. At 151415H vicinity (YD 173664) G/2/9 detonated an enemy directional type anti-personnel mine resulting in 7 USMC WIA. 9th Marines reported 9 EN KIA (Conf), 25 EN KIA (Prob), and 1 machine gun destroyed. At 152030H vicinity (YD 202567) CAP-P2 exchanged small arms fire with an estimated VC squad resulting in 2 USMC WIA and 1 EN KIA (Prob). At 140610H vicinity (YD 096707) K/3/9 ambushed 2 NVA resulting in 1 EN KIA (Prob), and captured 1 SKS rifle. At 151320H B/1/9 had one LVT detonate an enemy mine resulting in 2 USMC WIA.

16 June 1967

At 161200H vicinity (YD 172664) G/2/9 captured 1 60mm mortar destroyed bunker complex and 11 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition. One Marine from G/2/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 2 USMC KIA. At 161445H vicinity of (YD 200734) a bulldozer working with K/1/9 detonated 1 AT mine resulting in extensive damage to vehicle. At 161415H vicinity (YD 180655) G/2/9 detonated an explosive device resulting in 2 USMC KIA. At 161600H vicinity (YD 129722) H/3/9 received 2 rounds of heavy caliber flat trajectory (estimated) artillery fire resulting in 1 USMC KIA. At 161615H C/F-12 exchanged small arms fire with an estimated VC platoon resulting in 2 USMC KIA.

17 June 1967

At 170830H vicinity (YD 177661) G/2/9 captured 1 enemy carbine and assorted ammunition and grenades. One Marine from G/2/9 vicinity of (YD 178661) detonated an explosive device resulting in 1 USMC KIA. At 170845H vicinity (YD 177655) G/2/9 detonated an explosive device resulting in 3 USMC KIA, also exchanged fire with an unknown size NVA force resulting in 1 NVA officer KIA, captured 1 AK-47 rifle, maps and assorted documents and equipment. At 170920H vicinity (YD 202553) C/F-12 exchanged small arms fire resulting in 3 USMC KIA. At 171100H vicinity (YD 177661) G/2/9 destroyed one enemy bunker complex and captured 1 M-14 modified rifle, 1 AK-47 rifle, 2 chi com sub machine guns and 2 signaling devices, 1 EN KIA (Prob).

18 June 1967

At 180130H vicinity (YD 159650) G/2/9 received 40 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in negative damage. At 180830H vicinity (YD 131718) B/1/9 discovered 8 NVA bodies in a bunker complex. Results: 8 EN KIA (Conf). At 181145H vicinity (YD 125725) H/3/9 discovered 2 NVA KIA (Conf) also destroyed a bunker complex. At 181640H vicinity (YD 177660) G/2/9 discovered 1 NVA KIA (Conf). At 181530H to 161757H vicinity (YD 140733) K/3/9 destroyed a bunker complex, captured 1 light machine gun destroyed assorted small arms ammunition and mortar ammunition and discovered 2 NVA KIA (Conf) and 30 EN KIA (Prob) based on intense dead body smell.

19 June 1967

At 190600H vicinity (YD 148605) H/2/9 received 1 incoming hand grenade resulting in 1 USMC KIA. At 190845H vicinity (YD 1486732) C/1/9 received 5 rounds of mortar fire with no damage. At 191040H vicinity (YD 125615) H/3/9 received unknown number of mortar rounds resulting in 8 USMC KIA, returned fire and swept area resulting in 3 EN KIA (Conf), 3 EN KIA (Prob) and captured 3 AK-47 rifles and assorted military equipment. At 191100H vicinity (YD 130627) a tank with F/2/9 detonated an AT mine resulting in track damage and 1 USMC KIA.

20 June 1967

At 200100H vicinity (YD 102617) H/2/9 exchanged small arms fire and grenades with an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 200135H vicinity (YD 223730) B/1/9 received 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in negative damage. At 200710H vicinity of (YD 145716) K/3/9 captured 1 AK-47 rifle. At 201000H vicinity (YD 186744) B/1/9 detained 4 Vietnamese civilians. At 201130H vicinity (YD 276546) a CAP-P2 patrol was ambushed by estimated VC platoon resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 201425H vicinity (YD 226743) B/1/9 received 37 rounds of artillery fire resulting in 2 USMC KIA, and 4 USMC WIA. At 201635H vicinity (YD 217743) B/1/9 received 8 rounds of artillery fire, with no damage. At 201425H vicinity (YD 216743) B/1/9 received 37 rounds of artillery resulting in 2 USMC KIA and 8 USMC WIA. From 200800H to 201730H 9th Marines AO reported 3 enemy artillery pieces destroyed vicinity (YD 235800), 2 anti-aircraft weapons destroyed and 11 EN KIA (Conf) and 25 EN KIA (Prob). At 202200H the perimeter at DUNG HA Combat Base received 1 hand grenade resulting in 1 USMC WIA. C/1/9 replaced D/1/9 at CON THIEN at 201320H. D/1/9 returned to DUNG HA Combat Base.

21 June 1967

At 211840H vicinity (YD 244594) L/3/9 had an explosion for unknown reason in their ammunition bunker resulting in injury to 2 USMC. H/3/9 chopped OPCON to 4th Marines at 210700H.

22 June 1967

At 220850H vicinity (YD 155655) E/2/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 6 USMC WIA. K/3/9 commenced search and destroy operations in area of (YD 2466, YD 2469, YD 2970, and YD 2866) at 220910H.

23 June 1967

At 230030H vicinity (YD 149607) CAP-P3 patrol exchanged small arms fire with VC squad resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 230645H vicinity (YD 266699) K/3/9 detained 1 VC female. At 230815H vicinity (YD 254546) L/3/9 exchanged small arms fire with 2 VC resulting in 1 EN KIA (Conf) and captured 1 AK-47 rifle. At 231200H vicinity (YD 268700) K/3/9 detained 7 Vietnamese civilians and captured 3 tons of rice.

24 June 1967

At 240000H-241800H AO reported 4 EN KIA (Conf) and 11 EN KIA (Prob) vicinity (YD 164715) as the result of airstrikes. At 242210H vicinity (YD 169614) F/2/9 ambushed 3 NVA resulting in 1 EN KIA (Conf).

25 June 1967

At 250700H vicinity (YD 164708) C/1/9 exchanged s/a fire with 3 NVA resulting in 1 EN KIA (Conf), 1 EN KIA (Prob), captured 1 AK-47 rifle and 15 82mm mortar rounds. At 250830H vicinity (YD 280666) K/3/9 detained 2 Vietnamese civilians. At 251210H vicinity (YD 164709) C/1/9 captured 1 enemy light machine gun, machine gun ammunition and 4 chicom grenades. From 250600H to 251800H AO's reported 2 EN KIA (Conf) and 4 EN KIA (Prob) from airstrikes Northeast of CON THIEN. F/2/9 commenced operations vicinity (YD 1762, YD 1767, YD 2062, YD 2067) at 250000H.

26 June 1967

At 260600H vicinity (YD 131715) C/1/9 fired small arms at 2 NVA resulting in 2 EN KIA (Prob) and 1 AK-47 rifle captured. At 260725H to 2601800H vicinity (YD 187758) AO reported 21 EN KIA (Prob), 5 EN KIA (Conf) from airstrikes Northeast of DONG HA. At 261200H vicinity (YD 119667) E/2/9 killed 1 VC and captured 4 others. At 261145H vicinity (YD 155646) F/2/9 exchanged small arms fire and received 4 USMC WIA from an enemy command detonated explosive device. At 261000H M/3/9 chopped OPCON to 12th Marines and I/3/9 chopped OPCON to 9th Marines and returned to DONG HA.

27 June 1967

At 270700H vicinity of (YD 123706) B/1/9 discovered 2 EN KIA (Conf). At 271005H vicinity (YD 182662) F/2/9 detonated an explosive device resulting in 3 USMC WIA. At 271650H vicinity (YD 104658) E/2/9 had 2 USMC KIA and 6 USMC WIA resulting from detonation of 4 enemy claymore mines. At 271730H vicinity (YD 115721) D/1/9 discovered 1 EN KIA (Conf). At 271745H vicinity (YD 164655) F/2/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

28 June 1967

At 280550H vicinity (YD 153723) C/1/9 detonated 2 enemy explosive devices resulting in 8 USMC WIA. At 281100H vicinity (YD 097668) E/2/9 destroyed an enemy bunker complex, a 50 foot tower, and 50 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition. At 281250H vicinity (YD 122723) D/1/9 exchanged small arms fire with 3 NVA resulting in 2 EN KIA (Conf) and captured 17 grenades and assorted enemy military equipment. At 281520H vicinity (YD 116701) I/9 received 8 rounds of 85mm artillery fire. At 281630H vicinity (YD 124724) D/1/9 exchanged small arms fire with an estimated NVA squad resulting in 3 USMC WIA, 3 EN KIA (Conf) and 2 EN KIA (Prob). At 282045H vicinity (YD 137674) E/2/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

29 June 1967

At 290010H vicinity (YD 135670) E/2/9 had 1 Marine WIA by enemy hand grenade. At 290605H vicinity (YD 128722) D/1/9 patrol received small arms fire from unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 290610H vicinity (YD 125716) D/1/9 exchanged small arms fire with an estimated NVA platoon sized force and called artillery mission resulting in 3 USMC KIA, 15 USMC WIA, 13 EN KIA (Conf) and 18 EN KIA (Prob) captured one light machine gun, 1 AK-47 rifle and miscellaneous equipment. At 291020H vicinity (YD 265538) L/3/9 detained 20 Vietnamese civilians. At 291127H vicinity (YD 273513) K/3/9 detained 7 Vietnamese civilians. At 291129H vicinity (YD 162691) E/2/9 detained 1 Vietnamese civilian. From 291340H to 291610H vicinity (YD 133724) AD's ran airstrikes resulting in 3 EN KIA (Conf) and 7 EN KIA (Prob) North of CON THIEN. At 291455H vicinity (YD 292528) K/3/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 2 USMC WIA. 3/9 (-) commenced operations IAW 9th Marines Frag Order 7-67. 2/9 (-) commenced operations IAW 9th Marines Frag Order 8-67.

30 June 1967

At 300715H vicinity (YD 053685) E/2/9 and G/2/9 made small arms contact with unknown size NVA force resulting in 4 USMC KIA, 9 USMC WIA, 1 EN KIA (Conf) and 9 EN KIA (Prob), captured 1 SKS rifle. At 300900H vicinity (YD 053685) E/2/9 discovered 4 EN KIA (Conf). At 301045H vicinity (YD 117702) 1/9 CP received 4 rounds of 85mm artillery fire. Called air strike on suspected position with unknown results. At 301230H G/2/9 and 3d Recon element IAW 3d Recon Div Frag Order 35-67 discovered the area of helicopter crash. The area was completely burned and no bodies or equipment were recovered. At 301300H vicinity (YD 130695) E/1/9 detained 2 Vietnamese civilians as VC. At 301440H vicinity (YD 292535) I/3/9 exchanged small arms fire with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 2 USMC WIA, 1 EN KIA (Prob) and 2 Detainees. At 301545H vicinity (YD 055683) E/2/9 had 3 USMC WIA from ally no debris by friendly air strike. At 301800H vicinity (YD 115703) 1/9 received 4 rounds of 85mm artillery fire, fired counter battery fire and called 2 secondary explosions. At 301830H G/2/9 vicinity (YD 055683) discovered 3 EN KIA (Conf).

1 July 1967

At 010900 vicinity (YD 295543) I/3/9 exchanged small arms fire with a VC squad resulting in 3 USMC WIA, and captured 1 US Carbine. At 011100H vicinity (YD 292535) L/3/9 exchanged fire with 5 VC/NVA carrying weapons resulting in 1 USMC KIA, 1 EN KIA (Prob). At 011715H vicinity (YD 114701) 1/9 CP received 11 rounds of artillery and recoilless rifle fire resulting in 4 USMC WIA. At 011900H vicinity (YD 294546) I/3/9 exchanged small arms fire with unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 USMC WIA. At 011930H vicinity (YD 204545) exchanged small arms fire with 2 VC resulting in 1 EN KIA (Prob) and 3 USMC WIA. At 012025H vicinity (YD 114701) 1/9 received 9 rounds of 85mm artillery resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 012210H vicinity (YD 122591) CAP-P1 received 50 rounds of enemy mortar fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 012235H vicinity (YD 148616) H/2/9 exchanged small arms fire with an unknown size NVA force resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 012240H vicinity (YD 204574) CAP-P2 exchanged small arms fire with

(2)

2 VC resulting in 3 USMC WIA. AO fired artillery mission on hut containing an enemy vehicle vicinity (YD 198817) resulting in 1 EN KIA (Prob) and 1 EN KIA (Conf). AO ran air strikes resulting in 1 EN KIA (Conf) and 4 EN KIA (Prob) North of CON TRIEN.

02 July 1967

A. 020910H vicinity (YD 142726) B/1/9 exchanged small arms fire with an estimated N7 squad. At 020745H vicinity (YD 106719) 1/9 received 8 rounds of artillery fire resulting in 3 USMC WIA. At 020840H vicinity (YD 114717) 1/9 detonated an explosive device resulting in 2 USMC WIA. Operation CIMARRON terminated at 020000H Jul67.

11. Results

Personnel

Friendly:	19 KIA	Enemy weapons captured or destroyed	45
	242 WIA	Individual Weapons	34
Enemy.	152 KIA (Conf)	Crew-served	11
	196 KIA (Prob)		
	74 Detainees		

12. Administrative Matters.

a. Supply.

Discussion All resupply was provided through FLSU-1 and the using of the unit's own organic stock. The method of resupply was via the LSA and road. The LSA was utilized correctly to order all helicopter resupply with the exception of those emergency requests which went through the ALO and HST.

Problem Areas Units tend to go immediately to emergency resupply whenever it appears they won't be getting rations or water when requested on routine request.

Solution. Unit Commanders should be aware of the limited availability of helicopters and limit emergency requests to those of a definite emergency nature. The LSA is currently publishing a SOP explaining the functioning of the LSA. This should greatly assist in solving this problem in the future.

Communications. Upon commencement of Operation CIMARRON normal operational communications within the 9th Marine Regiment had been established and continued to function throughout the operation without incident. No unusual communication problems occurred during Operation CIMARRON for this regiment.

During this operation, additional radio circuits and radio relay circuits for command and control were not necessary. Command and control was maintained during Operation CIMARRON from the 9th Marines CP at DONG HA.

13. Commander's Analysis.

a. Operation CIMARRON can best be described as a normal operating period. It was characterized by day-to-day patrolling and nightly ambushes. It was not a spectacular operation with headline type results, however the mission assigned was accomplished.

b. In view of the above, the one concise lesson learned was the need to constantly remind units to emphasize the basic principles of scouting and patrolling and of land combat. The tendency exists to become lax as operations become routine. It calls for increased command attention to re-emphasize previous lessons learned.

c. This period also lent itself to an increased civic action program. Units were more stable and could establish a good rapport with villages in their immediate vicinity and accomplished "grassroots" civic action.

14. Recommendations. It is recommended that a unit, during a period such as Operation CIMARRON, take the opportunity to re-establish and re-emphasize basic training subjects and also concentrate on maintenance of unit and individual equipment.

G. E. Jerue
G. E. JERUE

3979 67

HEADQUARTERS
9th Marines
3d Marine Div (Rein), MAF
PO Box San Francisco 96601

7/BJE/1-1
SER 18 01-67
15 AUG 67

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (1st Bn, 9th M) (1st Bn, 9th M)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division
(2) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 July to 31 July 1967

Ref: (a) HQ 5750.2A
(b) 3d Marine Div O 5750.1A
(c) MAF O 5750.3

Encl (1) 9th Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. The security classification of this document is downgraded at three (3) year intervals and declassified after twelve (12) years.

J. L. Smith
G. L. Smith

UNCLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR
INTERVALS' DECLASSIFIED AFTER
12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200 10

HEADQUARTERS

100-100000 (Per) DTF

100-100000 (Per) DTF

100-100000 (Per) DTF

100-100000 (Per) DTF

100-100000 (Per) DTF

UNCLASSIFIED

PART II

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Ninth Marines 1967 Col C. E. JERUE
3d Marine Div
- 1st Bn. 9th Marines 1967 Capt J. E. NICHOL
2d Bn. 9th Marines 1967 Col J. A. CONWAY
3d Bn. 9th Marines 1967 LtCol T. J. [REDACTED]
4th Bn. 9th Marines 1967 LtCol R. J. [REDACTED]
5th Bn. 9th Marines 13-21 July 1967 LtCol L.N. VEST
6th Bn. 9th Marines 22-31 July 1967 LtCol L.R. [REDACTED]
7th Bn. 9th Marines 13-16 July 1967 Maj R. C. BELL
8th Bn. 9th Marines 1-31 July 1967 Maj J. J. [REDACTED]
9th Bn. 9th Marines 1-3 July 1967 LtCol J. J. PEBLER
10th Bn. 9th Marines 1-31 July 1967 LtCol W.D. KENT
2. 1-31 July 1967 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
3. Executive Officer 1-31 July 1967 LtCol J.J. KELLY
S-1 1-31 July 1967 Capt J.F. ANGIL
S-2 1-31 July 1967 Maj J.P. SWEENEY
S-3 1-31 July 1967 Maj P.D. RATCLIFF
S-4 1-31 July 1967 Maj B.J. HILL
S-5 6 July 1967 Maj J. S. VOGT
S-6 1-31 July 1967 Maj J. G. METAS
S-7 1-12 July 1967 LtCdr N.L. RICARD
S-8 13-31 July 1967 LtCdr D.P. [REDACTED]
S-9 [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

PART II

1. INFORMATION

1. Personnel

a. Personnel - The following personnel were assigned to the following assignments on July 1967:

Baron
Bart
Non Battle

b. Personnel - The following personnel were assigned to the following assignments on July 1967:

MC OFF	MC INF	NAVY ON	NAVY INF
-3	22		0

c. Replacement - The following personnel were assigned to the following assignments on July 1967:

MC OFF	MC INF	NAVY ON	NAVY INF
3	20		1

2. Informational Services - How about news releases were sent out or personnel promoted.

3. Special Services - 3 ice chests, 2 game kits, 40 general purpose kits (including 200 stationary kits, 130 paper, 3000 1/2 inch, 200 2-horse shoe, 4 baseball, 400 baseball, 400 volleyball and 2 football) and 500 1/2 inch of 1/2 inch of 1/2 inch of 1/2 inch were distributed to the 1000 1/2 inch of 1/2 inch of 1/2 inch of 1/2 inch.

4. Discipline

a. No unusual problems

b. Discipline

Discipline

MC	0	MC	0
MC	0	MC	0
MC	0	MC	0

c. Regimental Commander's Office Hours - 0

d. Many - 0

11.

Morale, P.X., Postal Affairs and R&R

1. Morale. Morale of the Headquarters Company remains excellent.

2. Postal Affairs. The 1st Lt. is continuing to work on the postal affairs.

3. R&R. The 1st Lt. is continuing to work on the R&R.

4. Other. The 1st Lt. is continuing to work on the other.

5. Summary

1st Lt.	3
2nd Lt.	4
3rd Lt.	1
Sergeant	1
Private	2
Private	3
Private	1
Private	1

Returnees from R&R reported no problems and expressed satisfaction with the program.

6. Adm. Staff. No problems. The Regimental Command post moved to the location of the 1st Lt. on 13 July 1965.

7. Other. The 1st Lt. is continuing to work on the other.

2-2 THROUGHOUT

1. AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Location. The area of operations is located on the east coast of South Vietnam. The northern border of the OA is the southern boundary of the 17th parallel. The eastern boundary follows the line (YD 100000) south to the coast and then follows the coastline to the southeast to the coordinates (YD 100000), (YD 100000) to (YD 100000). The southern boundary of the OA follows the following coordinates (YD 100000), (YD 100000), (YD 370420), (YD 400430) to (YD 100000) then follows the QUANG TRI/THUA THIEN Provincial boundary east to the Gulf of Tonkin. The eastern boundary follows the coastline south to the southern boundary of the OA to the QUANG TRI/THUA THIEN Provincial boundary.

b. Description of the Area

(*) The OA encompasses an area of approximately 308 square miles. There are two distinct geographic regions represented:

(a) Coastal Lowland. The coastal lowland consists primarily of poorly drained flat areas of rice cultivation. Rice cultivation extends inland for approximately 20km but may extend further along river valleys. A continuous strip, approximately 4km wide along the coast consists of well rounded sand dunes and sand beaches. Elevations in this area rarely exceed 5 meters. Large areas of open grassland and sand dunes occur on the gently rolling plains between the beach and paddy land and National Route #1. The elevation of these rolling plains is less than 5 meters.

(b) Rolling Plains and Hills. Further inland west of Route #1, the flat coastal plains are replaced by rolling plains and hills. The elevations range from 10 meters to generally less than 100 meters; the ground slopes range from 10 to 50 percent but may be as steep as 50 percent. The topography is more rugged. The slopes are generally 3 to 4km apart so that in the rolling plains and hills, the topography affords large areas for dispersion. The hills become increasingly rugged toward the west and the DMZ. The DMZ runs along the only natural pass, and is generally followed by Route #9.

c. Cultural Features. Cultural features with important tactical significance are:

(*) QUANG TRI City YD 338532

- (2) DONG HA Combat/Air base YD 246990
 (3) CAO LICH Facility YD 27332
 (4) CON THIEU Facility YD 179111
 (5) CUA LAM FAC YD 440098
 (6) CON THIEU YD 145548
 (7)
 (8)

population. The OA includes a population of approximately 240,000 people concentrated around the major population centers of CUA TRI, CAO LICH, DONG HA and CON THIEU. Statistical data reflecting the ethnic and religious make-up of the population is limited, but available sources indicate that ethnic Vietnamese make up approximately 90% of the population, 9% are Montagnards and 1% a mixture of Cambodians, Chinese and others. Roughly 80% of the population is Buddhist, 15% Catholic and a smaller number are of the CAO DAI and CONFUCIUS sects. Approximately 75% of the population are subsistence farmers, 20% are employed in some type of family industry, 5% work for the Government of Vietnam.

e. Waterways and LOC's. The OA has numerous waterways. Most of the large rivers, used as LOC's and supply routes, flow into the CUA VIET River, which empties into the Gulf of TONKIN. The waterways have great tactical significance, emphasized by the fact that they reach into all sections of the OA. National Route #1 runs from the DMZ on the north, south through the major population centers of the OA. Route #9 from PONG H. westward to the Laotian border is used as a main east-west LOC for the OA.

f. Weather. The weather in July was characterized by monsoon associated winds beginning in the mornings and carrying on throughout the day and into the early evening. Winds were from 10 to 15 miles per hour from the southwest causing dust and sandstorms. Later in the month rain clouds moved in, generally from the west. Humidity during the month averaged about 65%. There were small amounts of rain, usually in the evenings, from the 22d until the end of the month.

2. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS.

a. Operation BUFFALO. Operation BUFFALO commenced at 1000H on 2 July 1967, when Company-B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines made contact with an estimated two battalion force of the 90th NVA Regiment in grid squares (YD 1272) and (YD 1372). Companies A and B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, were on company-sized sweeps north of CON THIEU on the morning of 2 July. Company B on their advance began receiving small arms fire from their right front, from a large number of NVAs. As Company B advanced on the enemy,

the volume of small arms increased and they began receiving a heavy mortar barrage. As the contact grew, Company A was called to join and reinforce Company B, which was pinned down by small arms and mortar fire. As Company A moved from the west, they came under small arms fire and were joined by Company B until late on the evening of the 2d of July. Company C was a limited force south of Company B and began moving north. As Company B advanced, they received sniping and harassing fire from their flanks and as they were closing they came under a heavy artillery and rocket attack. Full force from 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, were shifted into the area on the evening of the 2d of July. On the morning of the 3d, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, elements swept north toward the battle field firing numerous NV weapons and gear including an RPG 7 and 2 rounds of ammunition. On 4 July, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, joined the operation. Termination of Operation BUCKLE UP was 1534 on 12 July 1967. The operation accounted for 904 NVA KIA (Confirmed), 297 NVA KIA (Probable), 11 Detainees including 2 NVA PWs, 76 individual and 20 crew served weapons captured or destroyed.

b. Operation HICKORY II. Operation HICKORY II commenced at 1200H on 12 July, with a force of 5 battalions 2/9, 3/9, 1/3, 1/4 and 3/4. Forces swept from the "trace" on the north to Highway #2 on the south. There was no contact. NVA/VC casualties were attributed to air. Total enemy casualties for the operation were 3 NVA KIA (Confirmed), 8 NVA KIA (Probable), 2 individual and 1 crew served weapons captured. Operation HICKORY II ended on 16 July 1967.

c. Operation KINGFISHER. Commencing at 1600H on 16 July, Operation KINGFISHER opened with little or no contact through 29 July, when 2d Battalion, 9th Marines entered the DMZ in what was to be a spoiling attack. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines advanced into the DMZ following generally the road starting in grid square (YD 0970) and terminating north in the village of CAN SON (YD 0875). The battalion met no resistance until the morning of the 29th, when they commenced to move out of the DMZ. The front of the battalion column on the road started the initial contact by detonating a mine which was followed by mortar barrages and heavy AW fire from their flanks and rear. The NVA had an estimated battalion-sized unit well entrenched along the road and on the high ground to the battalion's right flank. Contact was maintained during the day and only subsided when dark came. Contact was broken on the 30th and the battalion returned to the area of CON TIEU. Totals as of 31 July were 101 NVA KIA (Confirmed), 273 NVA KIA (Probable), 7 Detainees including 1 NVA Returnee, 8 individual and 1 crew served weapons captured.

3. NVA/VC TACTICS. NVA/VC tactics did not vary during the month. The enemy continued to use his supporting arms, artillery, rockets and mortars, against FVMPF bases in this area. The enemy continued to use mines and booby

traps with a slight increase during the month. Tactics employed by the NVA in the contacts made by 21 Battalion, 9th Marines and 1st Battalion, 9th Marines were L shaped and piecemeal. The similarity of both attacks showed that the NVA elements had supporting arms to their rear and frontage. During the contact by 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, the NVA advanced piecemeal with their supporting arms elements during the contact with 1st Battalion, 9th Marines holding their supporting arms pre-registered on strong points along the axis of their advance. The enemy continued to fight until overpowered by our supporting arms and forces. Throughout the period the enemy continued his sniping/harassing type actions.

4. NVA/VC COB

a. 34th Division

Strength 10,000
Weapons Unk
Commander Col LUONG TINH
Location DMZ

b. 31st Regiment, 341st Division

Strength 2,360
Weapons Unk
Commander Col NGUYEN NCOG HUNG
Location YD 1677

c. 32d Regiment, 341st Division

Strength 2,600
Weapons Unk
Commander Maj TINH
Location DMZ

d. 324B Division

Strength 9,600
Weapons Unk
Commander Gen TRAN DO
Location DMZ

e. 803d Regiment, 324B Division

Strength 2,600
Weapons 82mm mortars, 75mm RR, 60mm mortars, 12.7mm AAMG, MG's.
Commander Maj VO THIET
Location DMZ

~~SECRET~~f. 812th Regiment, 324B Division

Strength 2000
 Weapons 82mm mortars, 75mm RP, 60mm mortars, 57mm RR, 12.7mm AAMG,
 MG's
 Commander Lt Col NGUYEN HUUH HE
 Location RMZ

g. 90th Regiment, 324B Division

Strength 1040
 Weapons 82mm mortars, 75mm RP, 60mm mortars, 57mm RR, 12.7mm AAMG,
 MG's
 Commander THIEP
 Location DMZ

h. 808th Battalion, MF

Strength 90
 Weapons 4 81mm mortars, 2 75mm RR's, 8 60mm mortars, 3 57mm RR's,
 3 MG's
 Commander VAN KIEN
 Location YD 3757

i. 814th Battalion, MF

Strength 280
 Weapons 2-81mm mortars, 2 60mm mortars, 1 B-40, 2 57mm RR's, 2 MG's
 Commander THANH
 Location HAI LANG

j. H-99 Company, LF

Strength 80
 Weapons 1 MG
 Commander VO BA
 Location YD 4251

k. TRIEU PHONG Company, LF

Strength 80
 Weapons Unk
 Commander NGUYEN XUAN LAM
 Location YD 2245

II-7

1. C-10 Company, LF

Strength 120
 Weapons Pistols, M1-47's
 Command C40 1st G
 Location ID 3338

n. CAM FO Company, LF

Strength 60
 Weapons Lmk
 Commander NGHIA
 Location YD 1058

n. K-120 Company, LF

Strength 120
 Weapons 3 60mm morts, 2 B-40's 6 BAR's
 Commander 1st Lt DAM
 Location GIC LINE District

~~SECRET~~S-3 CHRONOLOGY

1. General. In July 1967, the 9th Marines conducted search and destroy operations throughout the OI. In addition, the Regimental commander hosted visits dignitaries the most notable being Major General HOCHMUTH.

2. Operation CLEARFIRE. Operation CLEARFIRE commenced at 010001H June 1967 and terminated at 021000H July 1967. Units under operational control of the 9th Marines during this period of July were First Battalion, Ninth Marines; Second Battalion, Ninth Marines and Third Battalion, Ninth Marines. There were no major engagements. The results of Operation CLEARFIRE during July were 1 USMC KIA, 25 USMC WIA, 2 EN KIA (Conf), and 7 EN KIA (Prob). Total results for Operation CLEARFIRE were 19 USMC KIA, 242 USMC WIA, 152 EN KIA (Conf), 106 EN KIA (Prob), 74 detainees, and 45 (34 individual - 11 crew-served) weapons captured or destroyed.

3. Operation BUFFALO. Operation BUFFALO commenced at 021000H July 1967 and terminated at 140900H July 1967. Units under operational control of the 9th Marines in this period were First Battalion, Ninth Marines, Second Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Battalion, Ninth Marines, First Battalion, Third Marines, First Battalion, Fourth Marines and Third Battalion, Fourth Marines. There was one major engagement fought primarily by First Battalion, Ninth Marines and Third Battalion, Ninth Marines and involving possibly one Regiment of NVA. The results of Operation BUFFALO were 129 USMC KIA, 576 USMC WIA, 991 NVA KIA (Conf), 297 NVA KIA (Prob), 11 Detainees, 2 POW'S and 96 (76 individual - 20 crew-served) weapons captured or destroyed.

4. Operation HICKORY II. Operation HICKORY II commenced at 140900H July 1967 and terminated at 161600H July 1967. Units under operational control of the 9th Marines in this period were Second Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Battalion, Ninth Marines, First Battalion, Third Marines, First Battalion, Fourth Marines, and Third Battalion, Fourth Marines. There were no major engagements. The results of Operation HICKORY II were 1 USMC KIA, 9 USMC WIA (Medevac), 8 USMC WIA (Nonevac), 3 NVA KIA (Conf), 8 NVA KIA (Prob) and 3 (2 individual, crew-served) weapons captured or destroyed.

5. Operation KINGFISHER. Operation KINGFISHER commenced at 161600H July 1967. Units under operational control of 9th Marines during this period of July were Second Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Battalion, Ninth Marines, First Battalion, Third Marines and Third Battalion, Fourth Marines. There was one major engagement on 29 July 1967 in which Second Battalion, Ninth Marines engaged approximately two NVA Battalions. Results of Operation KINGFISHER during this July were 26 USMC KIA, 169 USMC WIA (Medevac), 73 USMC WIA (Nonevac), 101 NVA KIA (Conf), 273 NVA KIA (Prob), 7 Detainees and 9 (8 individual and 1 crew-served) weapons captured and/or destroyed.

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FIRE SUPPORT CHRONOLOGY1. Artillery Support.

a. During July 1967, artillery support for the 9th Marine Regiment was provided by 2d Bn, 12th Marines operating in direct support with general support/reinforcing fires from the 12th Marine Regiment with the landing of the 1st Marine Operation FIFTY-FO, batteries in direct support reached a maximum of 4-105mm, 1-155mm, and 2-107mm batteries. When the 9th Marine Regiment landed on 1 July after completing MICK F1 II, artillery support for the 9th Marines reverted to the norm of 1-155mm, 1-107mm, and 3-105mm batteries. On 22 July, 2/2/12 displaced forward to OCA THIN to better support operations to the north.

b. Significant Events. During July, artillery support was concentrated in two periods. Operation FIFTY-FO from 1000, 2 July to 0900, 14 July and the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines operation in the DMZ commencing 0600 23 July. During MICK F1 II, 2/12 fired 25,386 rounds resulting in 229 KIA confirmed. Over 9,000 artillery rounds were fired in support of the 2/3 operation in the DMZ.

c. Total Rounds Fired

Observed	444
Unobserved	616
H & I	8,802
Total	9,862

d. Rounds Expended.

105mm	42,914
107mm	12,967
155mm	3,300
Total	59,181

e. Significant Surveillances

- 255 KIA (Conf)
- 108 KIA (Prob)
- 13 Secondary Explosions
- 5 Captures
- 1 Artillery Piece Destroyed
- 1 Tank Destroyed
- 1 Tunnel Complex Destroyed
- 1 Automatic Weapon Destroyed

2. Naval Gunfire. No Naval gunfire operated in direct support during July. General support/reinforcing fires were provided throughout the month.

AIR SUPPORT CIRCULARI. Operational Highlightsa. Operation STABCON

(1) Operation STABCON commenced at 021000H July 67. Helicopters and fixed wing aircraft were utilized extensively throughout this operation.

b. Operation WILLOW

(1) Inclusive dates EUSPAC commenced at 021000H July 67 and concluded at 140900H July 67. Aircraft were utilized extensively throughout the operation.

(2) Helicopter Support

Helicopters performed a variety of missions including reconnaissance, resupply, liaison, trooplift, medevac, helicopter escort and CAS (strafing) missions. UH 1H gunships were utilized in a CAS role during the initial contact of this operation, until relieved by fixed wing aircraft. There was a 640 man troop-lift on the opening day of the operation. Helicopters medevaced 322 troops and helilifted 267,861 pounds of resupply during this operation.

(3) Fixed Wing Support

Fixed wing aircraft were utilized on close air support, deep air support, TPQ, aerial reconnaissance, F43 (airborne) and helicopter escort missions. Fixed wing flew 523 CAS and 472 TPQ missions, expending 4,297,500 pounds of ordnance.

c. Operation HICKORY II(1) Inclusive dates

Operation HICKORY II commenced at 140900H July 67 and concluded at 161600H July 67.

(2) Helicopter Support

Helicopters lifted 29 medevacs and 30,096 pounds of resupply during this operation.

(3) Fixed Wing Support

Fixed wing flew 71 CAS and 42 TPQ missions expending 446,500 pounds of ordnance.

2. Helicopter Support

a. Helicopters were utilized on all assigned missions except the spread of riot control agents. They were loaded on 30 minutes standby, but were not utilized in the mission.

b. There were two large troop lifts this month. A battalion (.) and a company sized troop lift to lift 800 troops helilifted.

c. There was 20 105 pounds of resupply flown for 9th Marine units this month.

d. Medevac missions evacuated 503 troops.

3. Fixed Wing Support

a. Fixed wing aircraft were utilized on close air support, deep air support, fire, aerial reconnaissance, aerial observation, FAC (air force) smoke screen and helicopter escort missions.

b. There was 1,058 close air support and 913 FRO missions expending 8,385,500 pounds of ordnance this month.

4. Personnel and Equipment.

a. All battalions are up to strength in AFM, FAC's. The UnF capability remains unsatisfactory with no FAC's and no on field to provide UnF radio available.

S-4 CHRONOLOGY1. Supply and Distribution

a. During the reporting period HSH 1 was the primary source of supply and maintenance for organizations of the 9th Marines.

b. Supply point distribution was in effect during the reporting period.

2. Transportation

a. The primary method of transportation was vehicular. Units utilized organic vehicles and primarily 9th Motor Transport Bn for troop lifts, resupply runs, and "how-to" type runs.

b. HMG 16 was the primary source of helicopter support, and was utilized for resupply, med evacs and troop lifts.

3. Engineer Support. Co C, 3rd Bn was in direct support during the reporting period. The DNGM Combat Base Coordinator controlled all support of a general camp maintenance nature. Route 9 and 561 have been open during the reporting period and have been utilized as the MSR for units at Camp CARROLL, Co. L, and Co. N. TRIN.

4. Medical. Casualties requiring treatment beyond the capabilities of the organic b S were evacuated to Co. L, 3rd Med Bn for treatment or further evacuation to 1st Med Bn., US DANANG, the USS SPECTOR, USS HPOSL, or further evacuation out of country.

5. General

a. The LSG, using the AIF concept of helicopter resupply coordinated all helicopter resupply during the reporting period.

b. Support by all support units was considered excellent.

S-5 CHRONOLOGY1. General

a. Activities during the month of July included making liaison with District Officials, local officials and members of our OPCON units, to coordinate the Civil Affairs and Psy-War program and reporting on same.

b. Three new Civil Affairs Officers were appointed during this reporting period. 3/4 has replaced the former position of the 7/9 P&S and the 3/4 CA Officer is Lt GRAHAM. The new CA Officer for 2/9 is Lt HERNANDEZ, and the new CA Officer for 3/9 is Lt PENLAND. S-5, 9th Marines made liaison with the new CA Officers.

c. SSgt VIOLETTE, of the 244th Psy-Ops Co, replaced Lt MARTIN USA, and is now supporting the 9th Marine Regiment psychological operations.

2. Civil Affairs

a. On 1 July a Regimental S-5 staff visit was made to the CA IC and the District Headquarters. Future CA projects were discussed with the District officials. Local village chiefs have agreed to provide guides and Popular Force personnel as security for S-5 representatives of OPCON units when traveling to less secure hamlets within the districts respective villages.

b. On 4 July, 3/9 found a rice cache and brought the rice to the 3/9 rear. Regimental S-5 made arrangements to have the rice trucked to the CA IC District Chief for distribution in his area. The cache totaled 60 bags of rice.

c. On 8 July, Regimental S-5 made a staff visit to all OPCON units to discuss their requisitions and future CA projects.

d. On 11 July, S-5 met with the Subsector Advisor of TRIEU PHONG District at QUANG TRI to obtain information concerning the pacification progress report on the village of TRIEU VAM. While in QUANG TRI City a staff visit was made to the CHIEF of Center. The problem of absent Kit Carson Scouts was discussed and partially solved.

e. On 14 July, Regimental S-5 attended a Civil Affairs conference at CA IC meeting with the Division CA Officer. CA operations in the 9th Marine's Task were reviewed.

f. On 20 July, 300 lbs of Bulgar and 8 gallons of cooking oil was issued to 3/9 from supplies on hand at Regimental S-5 in support of a food for work project for the Vietnamese people in the 3/9 area.

g. On 21 July, 150 school kits and medical supplies were issued to 1st MIERAC Bn from supplies on hand at Regimental S-5.

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h. On 22 July the S-5 of "A" Co Shore Party Bn was issued 70 school kits, 150 bars of soap and 70 lbs of clothing in support of their CA projects.

i. On 23 July 60 lbs of medical supplies was issued to 1st METAC Bn in support of their CA program.

j. On 24 July, "A" Co Shore Party Bn held a MedCap in the Hamlet of MCC DOC (YD 191594). This was the first MedCap held in this area.

k. On 27-28 July, Regimental S-5 assistant made a staff visit to QUANG TRI, meeting with Sgt LEWIS to coordinate acquisition of CA commodities.

l. On 29 July, S-5 transported 90 sheets of roofing tin and 45 bags of cement from the OCO warehouse in QUANG TRI City to CAC-P in support of their CA projects.

m. On 30 July, Regimental S-5 made staff visits to all OPCON units to review future CA projects and reporting.

n. The following is additional data relative to the Regiment's Civic Action program:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
MedCap totals	1,634 persons treated
Food distributed	3,920 lbs
Soap distributed	150 bars
School kits distributed	220
Tin sheets distributed	70
Bags of cement distributed	45
Number of projects in progress	20

3. Psychological Warfare

a. Three Kit Carson Scouts were utilized during this period. One scout assigned to Regiment was wounded at the beginning of this month and is still in the hospital. One scout was on leave at the beginning of this month, came back for about two days and went UA. He has been fired. Preliminary reports indicate that the remaining three scouts performance is outstanding.

b. On 4 July, Maj SHILL, Psy-War Officer for 3d INF made a staff visit to Regimental S-5. The Kit Carson Scout program, leaflet drops, aerial broadcasts and hand distribution of leaflets by troops in the field was reviewed.

c. On 26 July, the Regimental S-5 Officer attended the Psy-War conference at 3d INF.

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d. Leaflets dropped during the month of July, including Operation HICKORY II, totaled 5,725,000.

e. Broadcasts for the month of July totaled 11 hours. Due to faulty equipment the Regiment was not able to comply with all OPCON units' requests for IB team support.

f. A total of 200,000 leaflets and 6,000 To Do newspapers were hand distributed by OPCON units while on patrol and at rest.

COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1. During the month of July operations ~~OPERATION~~ BUFFALO, HICKORY II and KINGFISHER were conducted within the 9th Marines TDR.

2. Communication Center

a. Comm Spt Co., 7th Com Bn assumed communication guard for all target activities within the DUNG H. Combat Base.

b. During Operations ~~OPERATION~~ BUFFALO, and HICKORY II, the 9th Marines established a forward CP at COM LO, at which time a half a Duplex covered teletype circuit was established to the DUNG H. Combat Base Comm Center.

c. During this period the 9th Marines CI (Pear) moved to a new area within the DUNG H. Combat Base and a messenger service was established from the new CP to DUNG H. Combat Base Comm Center.

d. 3947 messages were processed by Comm Center during the month of July.

3. Radio

a. During Operations ~~OPERATION~~ BUFFALO, HICKORY II and KINGFISHER, a radio team was dispatched to COM THIN to relay all traffic on Regimental TAC to CP units because of the difficulty of voice radio comm to units northeast of COM THIN.

b. During the month of July, an experimental method of relaying the AM/PRC-25 over long distance was tried. Utilizing a voice channel of the AM/PRC-27B, the remote capabilities of the AM/PRC-25 were extended in that we were able to remote an AM/PRC-25 from the DUNG H. Combat Base to COM THIN. This system of relaying our Regimental Tac Net from COM THIN to DUNG H. CP, gave us direct communications to our units operating north, northwest and northeast of COM THIN.

4. Wire

a. During the month of July, Comm Spt Co., 7th Com Bn, installed new telephone cables and a new switching central to relieve the wire section, 9th Marines of the wire system of the DUNG H. Combat Base.

b. During operations conducted during the month of July, wire section established a Senator Forward telephone system and also installed a new Senator Pear telephone system at DUNG H. Combat Base due to the transplacement of our rear CP.

5. Radio Relay

a. During the stated period, a 4 channel radio relay circuit was established between our forward CP to the DUNG H. Combat Base.

b. Also an experimental method of extending the remote capabilities was conducted as described in paragraph 3a of this report.

6. Personnel

a. Personnel strength is nearly up to manning level with the exception of a teletype technician (MOS 261) and 2 R/T Technicians (MOS 2615) which limits our immediate cletype and crypto repair capabilities.

7. Equipment

a. 9th Annex is in fairly good shape equipment wise with the exception of the below listed items

	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>Lead Time</u>
KV-8	6	4
AN/ARC-110	2	1

Spare parts required to remove above items from deadline are on request and at this time.

MEDICAL CHRONOLOGY1. Significant Events.

a. Headquarters Company 9th Marines has changed its geographical location, but is still situated in DONG H4. The regimental Aid Station is located within the company area. The treatment and disposition of all regimental personnel is made by the company personnel of this facility. A dental unit is available at Company 3d Med Bn, and gives dental service to all personnel in this area.

2. New Developments

a. HHC Harold H. JOHNSON reported to regiment on 13 July 1967, as relief for HHC R. J. BAKER, who was transferred to 3d Med Bn, PHU BAI.

3. Problem Areas:

a. A sanitary inspection of Regiment by PMU-2 was held on 20 July 1967 and several discrepancies were noted at that time, and as of this writing most discrepancies have been corrected or are being worked on.

4. Patient Statistical Data

a. The number of patients seen this month was approximately comparable to those seen last month. All 9th Marine personnel are being seen by the company personnel and any referrals are being seen by M. O. Dr. FERRERA at Co B, 3d Med Bn.

b. Breakdown of patient statistical data: number of patients 210, referrals 5, admission 1, dental 8.

c. The majority of treatment consisted of diarrhea, lacerations, and minor infections. Emergency treatment consisted of contusions and burns. No impairment of functional capacity of the unit.

5. Innoculations and Prophylactic Medicine Administered

a. Total immunizations for the month of July were 300, and malarial prophylactic 1,000.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF
STAFF COUNT EVENTS

- 1 Jul 67 - Continued Operation CHAMPION as provided for in 9th Marines Op O 7-67 (See Tab C).
- 2 Jul 67 - 1/9 became heavily engaged with NVN forces. See SitReps number 1 and 2. At 021000H July 67 Operation CHAMPION terminated and Operation BUFFALO commenced, initiated as provided for in 9th Marines Frag Order 9-67. See Tab D.
- 3 Jul 67 - At 030500H to 070545H DONG HA Combat Base received 120 rounds of heavy artillery/rocket fire resulting in 30 WIA (7 medevac) and minor damage to 9th Marines area (See Sitreps #3 and #4).
- 4 Jul 67 - At 041645H 9th Marines CP at DONG HA Combat Base received approximately 7 rounds of heavy caliber artillery fire resulting in 5 USMC WIA (3 medevac) (See SitRep #9). Assumed OPCON CTG 79.4 effective 040328Z from 3d Marine Division.
- 5 Jul 67 - At 050330H DONG HA Combat Base received approximately 12 rounds of heavy artillery fire resulting in 2 USMC KIA and 3 USMC WIA (See SitRep #1). At 051745H 9th Marines CP, DONG HA Combat Base, received four rounds of heavy artillery fire, resulting in 16 USMC WIA (3 medevac) (See SitRep #13).
- 6 Jul 67 - At 061800H to 062215H 9th Marines CP at DONG HA Combat Base received approximately 25 rounds of heavy artillery. Fired counter-battery fires. Results were 7 USMC WIA (6 medevac). At 061430H to 062205H personnel of 9th Marines CP observed a suspected surface-to-air (SAM missiles) from launch to destruction. One missile destroyed itself approximately 1000 meters south of DONG HA Combat Base at an altitude of 1500 feet (See SitRep #17).
- 7 Jul 67 - Chopped OPCON CTG 79.4 (minus H/T 1/3) to 3d Marine Division effective 071450Z. 9th Marines CP at DONG HA closed 071245H and opened via COM LO effective 071245H Jul 67.
- 9 Jul 67 - 2/9 commenced relief of 3/9 in place. See 9th Marines Frag Order 10-67, Tab E and SitRep #26.
- 10 Jul 67 - 2/9 completed relief of 3/9 whereupon Co A and C/1/9 were chopped OPCON from 3/9 to 1/9. See Tab and SitRep #31.
- 13 Jul 67 - Chopped OPCON of 1/9 to 3d Marines effective 131600H. Assumed OPCON 3/4 from 3d Marines effective 131200H (3/4 relieved 1/9 and assumed mission of defense of CON THIEU). Assumed OPCON 1/4 effective 131200H. All units commenced preparations for execution of 9th Marines Op O 11-67 (HICKORY II). See Tab F and SitRep #43.

III-1

- 14 Jul 67 - At 140900H Operation BUFFALO terminated and Operation HICKORY II commenced. All units commenced operations in accordance with 9th Marines Op O 11-67. See Tab F and SitRep #46 for Operation BUFFALO and SitRep #A for Operation HICKORY II.
- 15 Jul 67 - The JOC on two occasions made his helicopter available to the 9th Marine Regimental and the Battalion Commanders for reconnaissance. This greatly facilitated OPCON units in planning future days' operations.
- 16 Jul 67 - Chopped OPCON 1, + to 4th Marines effective 161915H. See SitRep #2. Operation HICKORY II terminated at 161600H and Operation KINGFISHER commenced. See SitRep #3 for Operation KINGFISHER.
- 17 Jul 67 - 1/2 moved to DUNG HA at 171615H. Commenced backloading to recon mission as SLF. See SitRep #4 and #5. Assumed OPCON of Co I, 3d Bn, 4th Marine effective 171335H and passed OPCON to 3/4 effective 171335H.
- 18 Jul 67 - Chopped OPCON ALT 1/3 to CTG 79.4 effective 181300H. See SitRep #9.
- 19 Jul 67 - Issued 9th Marines Op O 12-67 (KINGFISHER). See Tab G. At 192200H via ID 143613 9th Marines CP received two rounds of arty/rocket fire approx 1000 meters outside perimeter. See SitRep #14.
- 20 Jul 67 - H/2/9 commenced combined search and destroy operation vic of VAN KIM village and adjacent villages. See 9th Marines Frag Order No. 1 (In support of ARVN Operation LAI SON 08), Tab H and SitRep #16.
- 21 Jul 67 - H/2/9 completed Operation. See SitRep #21.
- 22 Jul 67 - 9th Marines CP at (YD 139615) closed at 221300H Jul 67 and opened at DUNG HA Combat Base (YD 239506) at 221300H Jul 67.
- 25 Jul 67 - Assumed OPCON M/3/9 from 12th Marines and passed OPCON to 3/9. Chopped OPCON M/3/9 to 12th Marines. All effective 251615H. See SitRep #37. Issued 9th Marines Frag Order No. 2 for Operation KINGFISHER. See Tab I.
- 27 Jul 67 - Set Red Alert at 9th Marines CP at 270337H because of incoming arty at DUNG HA Combat Base. Secured Red Alert at 270430H. See SitRep #43. At 271103H DUNG HA Combat Base received three rounds of artillery.
- 28-30 Jul 67 - At 280530H 2/9 commenced execution of 9th Marines Frag Order No. 2 for Operation KINGFISHER. See Tab I and SitRep #48. On 29 Jul 2/9 became heavily engaged with an estimated two NVA battalions. On 30 Jul contact broken and all units out of DMZ at 301150H. See SitRep #48.

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NAVAL MESSAGE

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G. E. JERUE

COLONEL

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P. D. RATCLIFF MAJOR

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INFO

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FROM: NINTH MARINES

TO: FIRST BN, NINTH MARINES
 SECOND BN, NINTH MARINES
 THIRD BN, (-), NINTH MARINES

INFO CG, THIRD MARDIV
 TWELFTH MARINES
 THIRD MARINES
 THIRD TANK BN
 THIRD AT BN
 NINTH MT BN
 THIRD MED BN
 THIRD LNCR BN
 THIRD SP BN
 FIRST AMTRAC BN

Change I made

22 June 66
JRM

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OPERATION ORDER 7-67 (OPN CIMARRON) CHANGE NO. 1

A. 9TH MARINES 311331Z MAY67

1. THE FOLLOWING CHANGES WILL BE MADE TO REFERENCE (A):

A. UNDER PARAGRAPH 2 DELETE THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE: "BE
 PREPARED TO REINFORCE OR PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO CON THIEN CIDG
 CAMP IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY ATTACK". INSERT THE FOLLOWING
 SENTENCE: "OCCUPY AND DEFEND CON THIEN COMPLEX".

B. UNDER SUBPARA 3A DELETE THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE "PRO-
 VIDES FORCES AS REQUIRED TO REINFORCE OR PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO
 CON THIEN CIDG CAMP IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY ATTACK". INSERT THE

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MESSAGE

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FOLLOWING SENTENCE: " OCCUPIES AND DEFENDS CON THIEN COMPLEX
WITH A CMD GRP AND A BATTALION (-)."

C. UNDER SUBPARA 3B (2) DELETE THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE:

" COORDINATE AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CON THIEN CIDG CAMP
AND ARMY UNITS AT CON THIEN WITH A CMD GRP AND A BATTALION
(-)". INSERT THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE: " OCCUPY AND DEFEND
CON THIEN COMPLEX WITH A CMD GRP AND A BATTALION (-)".

D. DELETE THE FOLLOWING PHRASE FROM SUBPARAS 3B (3) AND

3 C (8): " AND CON THIEN CIDG CAMP".

E. UNDER REFERENCES ADD: "F. CG THIRD MAR DIV
211415Z JUN 67."

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NAVAL MESSAGE
FORM 2110-28 (REV 3 61)

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KELLY, LTCOL

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P. D. RATCLIFF, MAJOR

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FROM: NINTH MARINES

TO: FIRST BN, NINTH MARINES
SECOND BN, NINTH MARINES
SECOND BN, THIRD MARINESINFO: CG, THIRD MARDIV
TWELFTH MARINES
THIRD MARINES
THIRD TANK BN
THIRD AT BN
NINTH MT BN
THIRD MED BN
THIRD ENGR BN
THIRD SP BN
FIRST ATRAC BNCpl R F Kelly
31210PH

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OPERATION ORDER 7-67 (OPERATION CIMARRON)

- A. MAPS VIETNAM 1:50,000 SERIES L7014 SHEETS 6342 I, 6342 II, AND 6442 IV, 6442 III, 6442 I, 6442 II, 6441 I, 6541 IV, AND 6542 III, 6441.IV
- B. THIRD MARDIV OP ORDER 30-67 (CG, 3RD MARDIV 281640Z MAY67)
- C. THIRD MARDIV LOI 1-67
- D. THIRD MARDIV OP ORDER 2-67 (SPARROW HAWK)
- E. THIRD MARDIV O P02000.2E (OOI)
- F. CG THIRD MARDIV 211415Z JUN 67
- WORK ORGANIZATION

NINTH MARINES (-) (REIN)

LTCOL KELLY

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H400, 9TH MARINES

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DET, COMM CO, HQEN

FIRST BN, NINTH MARINES

MAJOR FULHAM

SECOND BN, NINTH MARINES

LTCOL PEELER

SECOND BN, THIRD MARINES

MAJOR BEARD

TIME ZONE: H

1. SITUATIONA. ENEMY FORCES. CURRENT INTSUMS, PERINTREPS AND SIGR'SB. FRIENDLY FORCES

(1) THIRD MARDIV CONDUCTS OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE COMMENCING 1 JUN 67 WITH MULTI-REGIMENTAL FORCE TO COUNTER NVA INFILTRATION AND VC ACTIVITIES AND TO SUPPORT RD ACTIVITIES IN THAT AREA.

(2) FIRST MAW PROVIDES AIR CONTROL AND AIR FIELD OPNS FACILITIES AND FIXED AND ROTARY WING, ALL-WEATHER AIR SUPPORT.

(3) U. S. NAVAL FORCES PROVIDE NAVAL SUPPORT IN COASTAL AND CONTIGUOUS WATERS.

(4) FIRST ARVN DIVISION CONDUCTS OPNS AND SUPPORTS THE RD PROGRAM IN 11TH DTA.

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(5) QUANG TRI PROVINCE HQS PROVIDES RF SUPPORT AND DEFENDS GVN VITAL AREAS.

(6) THIRD MARINES CONDUCTS OPERATIONS IN WESTERN PORTION OF GIMARRON-0A TO COUNTER NVA INFILTRATION AND VO ACTIVITIES AND TO SUPPORT RB ACTIVITIES IN THAT AREA.

(7) TWELFTH MARINES (-) (REIN) - ~~12TH MARINES~~ MAINTAINS FSCC AT DONG DA, SUBORDINATE TO DIVISION FSCC, FOR COORDINATION OF FIRE SUPPORT IN OPEN TERRAIN AND FOR LIAISON WITH DASC. CONTINUES CURRENT MISSION OF GROUND LINE ARTILLERY OUTPOST IN AREA ASSIGNED. PROVIDES BS, GS AND CS REINF FIRES TO INFANTRY REGTS AS REQUIRED.

(8) FIRST BATTALION, ADA AV (REIN), 44TH ARTY - PROVIDES TWO BTHYS (-) REINFORCED WITH THREE ADA MG SECTIONS IN DIRECT SUPPORT NINTH MARINES.

(9) THIRD TANK BN - PROVIDES ONE COMPANY (REIN) WITH FLAME SECTION - DIRECT SUPPORT NINTH MARINES.

(10) THIRD AD BATTALION - PROVIDES ONE COMPANY (REIN) DIRECT SUPPORT NINTH MARINES.

(11) FIRST ATRAC BATTALION (-) - GENERAL SUPPORT.

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AS INSTALLATION COORD, CUA VIET FACILITY, COORDINATES
SECURITY AND LOCAL DEFENSE MEASURES IN OPERATING AREA
ASSIGNED. CONDUCTS C.M. COURSE OF A IN COORD WITH CO NINTH

MAHINES.

(12) NINTH MT BN - GENERAL SUPPORT OF OPEN GEM-ARCON

FORCES.

(13) CO D (-) (REIN), THIRD MED BN - GENERAL SUPPORT
OPEN GEM-ARCON FORCES.

(14) CO C (-) (REIN), THIRD ENGR BN - GENERAL SUPPORT -
PRIORITY OF EFFORT TO THE NINTH MARINES.

* (15) DET, THIRD SP BN - GENERAL SUPPORT OF OPEN GEM-ARCON
FORCES. PROVIDE HST AS REQUIRED.

C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS

(1) DET 2/3 DETACHED FROM 9TH MARINES TO 6TH 79.5
ON OR ABOUT 10 JUNE 67.

(2) - 3RD BN, 9TH MARINES DETACHED 3RD BN. CS TO 9TH

MAINTAINED ON ORDER.

2. MISSION. NINTH MARINES (S) (REIN) PROVIDE SECURITY AND DEFENSE
OF LONG HA COMBAT BASE AND CAI LO BRIDGE SITE. BE PREPARED TO

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		INFO						

PROVIDE REINFORCEMENTS, COUNTERATTACK AND RELIEF FORCES FOR G10 LINE
 ARTILLERY OUTPOST AND ~~ONE~~ ^{CUA} VIET FACILITY. MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE GROUND
 SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND CONDUCT SPOILING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED
 OA TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING NVA PERSONNEL. PROVIDE SECURITY
 FOR ROUTES #9, #561 AND #1 IN ASSIGNED OA. ASSUME OPCON OF MARINE
 ELEMENTS OF CAC'S WITHIN ASSIGNED OA AND AOR. SUPPORT CVN RD PROGRAM
 WITHIN ASSIGNED OA AND AOR. ~~BE PREPARED TO REINFORCE OR PROVIDE~~
~~COMPLEX.~~ ^{COMPLEX.} ~~ASSISTANCE TO CON THIEP CAMP IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY ATTACK.~~
~~ASSISTANCE TO CON THIEP CAMP IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY ATTACK.~~

COORDINATE AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ENGINEER CLEARING OF 600 METERS
 WIDE STRIP BETWEEN ~~G10~~ ^{G10} LINE AND CON THIEP. PROVIDE ONE RIFLE
 COMPANY (REIN) OPCON G10 LINE ARTY COMDR FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY
 OF THAT POSITION. ASSIST UNITS LOCATED AT MOUTH OF CUA VIET RIVER
 IN REGARD TO DEFENSE AND SECURITY MEASURES AND FIRE SUPPORT.

AUGMENT SECURITY FORCES OF CUA VIET FACILITY AS REQUIRED.

CONDUCT OPNS IN COORD WITH FIRST AMTRAC BN TO DETECT/DETERM WATER.

FORCE INFILTRATION AND DISCOVER/DESTROY ENEMY WNS AND AMO

CACHES IN DESIGNATED AREAS. CONDUCT OPNS AS DIRECTED IN DESIGNATED AOR;

COORDINATE USE OF AREAS WITH ARVN, AS REQUIRED.

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3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. NINTH MARINES (-) (REIN) PROVIDES SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF LONG HA COMBAT BASE BY UTILIZING FORCES OF TENANT COMMANDS WITH INFANTRY FORCES PROVIDING COORDINATION AND THE RESERVE FORCE. SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF CAM LO BRIDGE SITE IS PROVIDED BY ONE RIFLE PLT (REIN). PROVIDES REINFORCEMENTS, COUNTERATTACK AND RELIEF FORCES FOR ^{G/O} ~~THE~~ LINE-ARTILLERY-OUTPOST AND CUA VIET FACILITY FROM ASSIGNED FORCES AS REQUIRED. MAINTAINS AN ACTIVE GROUND SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND CONDUCTS SPOILING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED OA WITH ASSIGNED FORCES TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING NVA PERSONNEL. PROVIDES SECURITY FOR ROUTE #9, ROUTE# 561 AND ROUTE # 1 IN ASSIGNED OA UTILIZING COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS AND OTHER ASSIGNED FORCES BY AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING ALONG FLANKS. ^{OCCUPIES AND DEFENDS} ~~PROVIDES FORCES AS~~ ^{CH 1} ~~CON THIEU COMPLEX WITH A CMD G-AP AND~~ ^{G/O} ~~REQUIRED TO REINFORCE OR PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO CON THIEU, GTC CAP, A BNC-)~~ IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY ATTACK. ~~ASSIGNS ONE INFANTRY BN TO COORDINATE~~ AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ENGINEERS CLEARING ^{G/O} ~~OF~~ 600-METER WIDE STRIP BETWEEN ~~THE~~ LINE AND CON HELLEN. PROVIDES ONE RIFLE CO (REIN) OPON GEO LINE ARTY COMDR FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF THAT POSITION. ASSISTS UNITS AT MOUTH OF CUA VIET RIVER WITH REGARD TO DEFENSE AND SECURITY

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MEASURES AND FIRE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. AUGMENTS THESE FORCES AS REQUIRED. CONDUCTS OPNS ~~IN~~ IN COORD WITH FIRST AMTRAC BN TO DETECT/ETER WATERBORNE INFILTRATION AND DISCOVER/ AND DESTROY ENEMY WPNs AND AMO CACHES IN DESIGNATED AREAS. CONDUCTS OPNS AS DIRECTED IN DESIGNATED AOR; COORDINATES USE OF ARMA WITH ARVN, AS REQUIRED, IN CARRYING OUT THESE MISSIONS. GENERAL AND DIRECT SUPPORT ARTY WILL BE EMPLOYED AS FEASIBLE. IN ADDITION FIXED WING AND HELICOPTERS WILL BE USED AS FEASIBLE AND COMMENSURATE WITH AVAILABILITY.

B. ~~1ST BN, 9TH MARINES~~

(1) --COORDINATE AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR 11TH ENGINEER PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT CLEARING 600 METER STRL. BETWEEN CON THLEN AND GIO LINE WITH A CMD GRP AND BN (-).

~~(2) COORDINATE AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CON THLEN~~
~~OCCUPY AND DEFEND CON THLEN COMPLEX~~
~~WITH A CMD GRP AND ARTY UNITS AT CON THLEN WITH A CMD GRP AND BN (-).~~ CH1

(2) (3) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE RELIEF/REINFORCEMENTS
~~AND CON THLEN~~ OF GIO LINE ARTY OUTPOST, AND CUA VIET FACILITY, IN THE EVENT OF AN ENEMY ATTACK. CH1

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(4) CONDUCT GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND SPOILING ATTACKS
THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED OA; IN ASSIGNED FORCES TO DETECT AND DESTROY
INFILTRATION OF NVA FORCES. (OPN OVERLAY TO BE PUBLISHED SEPARATELY)^E

(5) MAINTAIN SECURITY ON ROUTE 561 IN 20A BY
AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING ALONG FLANKS.

(6) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR MINE SWEEP TEAMS IN 20A.

C. ~~207TH~~ 3RD MARINES

(1) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ARTY POSITIONS LOCATED

VIC YD 147617.

(2) POSITION FORCES ALONG ROUTE 561 IN 20A TO PROVIDE
SECURITY FOR MSR AND FURTHER SITE VIC YD 136666 BY AGGRESSIVE
PATROLLING ALONG FLANKS.

(3) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR MINE SWEEP TEAMS ALONG
ROUTE 561 (MSR) IN 20A.

(4) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CAM LO BRIDGE SITE.

(5) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR TRUCK CONVOYS BETWEEN VIC

YD 145615 AND CON THLEN.

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				ACTION					
				INFO					

(6) CONTROL TRAFFIC ON MSR BETWEEN CON THIEU AND VIC
YD 145615. EACH TRUCK CONVOY WILL HAVE A MINIMUM OF ONE PLT
(REIN) AS SECURITY. NO VEHICLES WILL PROCEED WITHOUT THIS
SECURITY ELEMENT.

117H
(7) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ENGINEER PERSONNEL AND
EQUIPMENT WHILE UPGRADING MSR.

(8) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE RELIEF/AND
REINFORCEMENT OF GIO LIN ARMY OUTPOST, CUA VIET FACILITY AND
~~CON THIEU GIG CAMP~~ IN THE EVENT OF AN ENEMY ATTACK.

(9) CONDUCT GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND SPOILING ATTACKS
THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED OA WITH ASSIGNED FORCES TO DETECT AND DESTROY
INFILTRATING NVA FORCES. (OPN OVERLAY TO BE PUBLISHED SEPARATELY).

(10) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE A PLT/ (REIN) REACTION
FORCE IN THE EVENT CAM LO RESETTLEMENT VILLAGE COMES UNDER
ENEMY ATTACK.

B. 28 MAR 65 - JARDINS

(1) PROVIDE ONE RIFLE CO (REIN) UPON 12TH MARINES
FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF GIO LIN ARMY OUTPOST.

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		ACTION							
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(2) PROVIDE ONE BTR CO (REIN) AS COUNTERATTACK
HOURS
FORCE FOR DONG HA COMBAT BASE DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS.

(3) PROVIDE ONE PLT (REIN) AS SPARROW HAWK ON 10
MINUTE ALERT DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. THIS PLT MAY BE PART OF
COUNTERATTACK FORCE DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS.

(4) ASSUME OPCON OF MARINE ELEMENTS OF COMBINED
ACTION COMPANY AT C&I LO INCLUDING CAP-P1, P-2, P-3 AND P-4.

(5) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ROUTE #9 IN ZOA USING CAC
UNITS AND OTHER ASSIGNED FORCES.

(6) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE RELIEF/REIN-
FORCEMENTS OF GIO LINH ARMY OUTPOST, CUA VIET FACILITY AND CON THIEP
CAMP IN THE EVENT OF ATTACK.

(7) CONDUCT GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND SPOILING ATTACKS
THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED ZONES TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING
NVA FORCES.

(8) ORGANIZE BN CP AS ALTERNATE 9TH MARINES CP. BE
PREPARED ON ORDER TO ACTIVATE NECESSARY RADIO NETS TO INCLUDE
FSCC, REGT TAC, AIR, AND BASE DEFENSE NET.

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E. REGIMENTAL RESERVE.

(1) ~~2ND BN, 9TH MARINES~~

(a) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE ONE RIFLE CO (REIN) TO BE EMPLOYED EITHER IN 9TH MARINES OA OR AOR ON TWO HOURS NOTICE.

F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT AND FOR OPERATIONS 010001H JUNE 67.

(2) OPERATION CODE NAME- OMMARON

(3) BIRLAUTH ALCON.

(4) FIRE SUPPORT - SEE REFERENCE (C).

(5) AIR SUPPORT - SEE REFERENCE (C).

(6) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - SEE REFERENCE (C).

(7) THIS OPERATION ORDER SUPERSEDES 9TH MARINES OP O 3-67 AND 6-67

(8) THRUST POINTS:

(a) FISH 1374

(b) BIRDS 1469

(c) EGGS 1571

(d) FLOWERS 1673

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		INFO					

(e) CARS 1767

(f) GIRLS 1859

(g) BOYS 2260

(h) VEGETABLES 1459

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. SEE REFERENCES (B).5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

A. COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (E).

B. DEMAND LOST

- (4) 1ST BN, 9TH MARINES YD-115701 /
- (1) (2) NINTH MARINES YB 242597 b'
- (3) 2ND BN, 9TH MARINES YD-240594 L <
- (4) 2ND BN, 9TH MARINES YD-14515 -

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FROM NINTH MARINES

TO FIRST BN (-), NINTH MARINES
SECOND BN, NINTH MARINES
THIRD BN (-), NINTH MARINES
BLT FIRST BN, THIRD MARINES

INFO CG, THIRD MARDIV
TWELFTH MARINES
THIRD MARINES
THIRD TANK BN
THIRD AT BN
NINTH LIT BN
THIRD MED BN
THIRD LNCR BN
THIRD SP BN
FIRST AITRAC BN

OPERATION CIMARRON FR/G ORDER 9-67

A. NINTH MARINES OP O 7-67 (OPERATION CIMARRON)

TASK ORGANIZATION. SEE REF A

TIME ZONE HOTEL

1. SITUATION

- A. ENEMY FORCES. CURRENT INTSUMS, PERINTREPS AND SIGR'S
- B. FRIENDLY FORCES. SEE REF A
- C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. BLT 1/3 OPCON 9TH MARINES

EFFECTIVE _____ JULY 67.

2. MISSION. 9TH MARINES (-) (REIN) CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY

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			INFO						

OPERATIONS IN ASSIGNED OBJECTIVE AREA WITH TWO BATTALIONS TO
LOCATE, CAPTURE OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT.
(SEE OPN OVERLAY) (PASEP)

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. COMMENCING AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY
9TH MARINES CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS WITH TWO
BATTALIONS ATTACKING NORTH ALONG THE AXIS SHOWN ON OPN OVERLAY
(PASEP) TO EXPLOIT CONTACT DEVELOPED BY 1ST BN, 9TH MARINES 2 JUL 67.
BLT 1/3 LANDS BY HELO IN LZ HAWK COMMENCING AT L-HOUR ON D-DAY. MOVES
NORTH UNTIL ABREAST OF 3D BN, 9TH MARINES. ON ORDER BOTH BNS ATTACK
NORTH IN ASSIGNED MISSION.

B. 1ST BN, 9TH MARINES. CONDUCT ASSIGNED MISSION.

C. 2D BN, 9TH MARINES

- (1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION
- (2) SHIFT ROAD SECURITY TO NEW POSITION OF ROUTE 561.
- (3) CONDUCT SCREENING PATROLS WITH ONE COMPANY ORIENTED TO
NW PORTION OF ASSIGNED ZONE.
- (4) ASSUME SPARROW HAWK MISSION EFFECTIVE 030600H JUL67.

D. 3D BN, 9TH MARINES. ON ORDER, ATTACK IN ASSIGNED ZONE

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SUPPORTED BY SIX (6) TANKS TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES,
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT. (SEE OPN OVERLAY) (PASEP)

E. BLT 1/3

- (1) ON ORDER OF CG, THIRD MARDIV CHOP OPCON TO 9TH MARINES.
- (2) LAND BY H10 IN LZ HAWK.
- (3) MOVE NORTH UNTIL ABREAST 3/9.
- (4) ON ORDER, ATTACK NORTH IN ASSIGNED ZONE TO LOCATE AND

DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT. (SEE OPN OVERLAY)
(PASEP).

F. CO A, 3D TK BN

- (1) ASSIGN SIX (6) TANKS DS 3/9
- (2) REDEPLOY REMAINING ASBEST IAW VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS.

G. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT AND FOR
EXECUTION ON 3 JUL 67.
- (2) D-DAY - 3 JUL 67
- (3) H-HOUR - 1400H
- (4) L-HOUR -
- (5) CONTACT LEFT TO RIGHT

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		INFO							

(6) ALL PERSONNEL WILL CARRY PROTECTIVE MASKS.

(7) THRUST POINTS

- (A) CITIES 1375
- (B) STATES 1674
- (C) COUNTRIES 1470
- (D) TREES 1572
- (E) BOOZE 1768
- (F) FLOWERS 1859
- (G) FISH 1459
- (H) DOGS 2260

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. REF A

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS

A. THIRD MARDIV O P02000.2E (COI)

B. REPORT UNIT LOCATIONS AND CP'S IN FIRST SIX HOUR SITREP

AFTER EXECUTION OF THIS ORDER. THEREAFTER REPORT ONLY CHANGES.

GP-4

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				INFO						XXXX	

FROM: NINTH MARINES

TO: FIRST BN (-), NINTH MARINES
 SECOND BN, NINTH MARINES
 THIRD BN (-), NINTH MARINES
 BLT FIRST BN, THIRD MARINES

INFO: 2, 3D MARDIV
 TWELFTH MARINES
 THIRD MARINES
 THIRD TANK BN
 THIRD AT BN
 NINTH MT BN
 THIRD MED BN
 THIRD ENGR BN
 THIRD SP BN
 FIRST AMTRAC BN

FRAG ORDER 10-67

SECRET

A. OPERATION ORDER 7-67

B. FRAG ORDER 9067

TASK ORGANIZATION. NO CHANGE

TIME ZONE: HOTEL

1. SITUATION

- A. ENEMY FORCES. CURRENT INTSULS, PERINTREPS AND SICR'S
 B. FRIENDLY FORCES. NO CHANGE FROM REF (B).
 C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. CO A AND CO C, 1ST BN, 9TH

----- MARINES AND CO I, 2D BN, 9TH MARINES REVERT TO CONTROL OF PARENT -----
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BN'S UPON COMPLETION OF RELIEF.

2. MISSION. 9TH MARINES ^{CONDUCTS DAYLIGHT} ~~CONDUCTS DAYLIGHT~~ RELIEF IN PLACE OF 3D BN (-) (REIN) 9TH MARINES WITH 2D BN, 9TH MARINES.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. ON ORDER 9 JUL 1967, 9TH MARINES CONDUCT A DAYLIGHT RELIEF IN PLACE. 2D BN, 9TH MARINES RELIEVES 3D BN (-) (REIN), ONE COMPANY AT A TIME, IN PRESENT POSITION. CONDUCT RELIEF OVER A TWO DAY PERIOD TO BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO 101400Z JUL 67.

B. 1ST BN (-) 9TH MARINES

(1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION

(2) ASSUME OPCON OF CO A AND CO C AT A TIME MUTUALLY

AGREEABLE BETWEEN COMMANDERS.

C. 2D BN, 9TH MARINES

(1) CONDUCT RELIEF IN PLACE WITH 3D BN (-) (REIN) 9TH MARINES.

(2) ASSUME MISSION OF 3D BN (-) (REIN) UPON PASSING OF CONTROL DURING RELIEF.

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			ACTION							
			INFO							

(3) ASSUME OPCON OF CO H AT TIME MUTUALLY AGREEABLE BETWEEN COMMANDERS.

D. 3D BN (-) (REIN) 9TH MARINES

(1) CONDUCT RELIEF IN PLACE WITH 2D BN , 9TH MARINES.

(2) ASSUME MISSION OF 2D BN, 9TH MARINES UPON PASSING OF CONTROL DURING RELIEF.

(3) PASS OPCON OF CO A, C, AND H TO PARENT BN'S AT A TIME MUTUALLY AGREEABLE BETWEEN COMMANDERS.

E. BLT 1/3. NO CHANGE

F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT AND FOR EXECUTION ON ORDER 9 JUL 67.

(2) DIRLAUTHALCON

(3) DISMOUNT POINT, (YD 144689)

(4) THIS HQ WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THE ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE TIME OF EACH CO SIZE UNIT AND COMMAND GROUP AT DEPARTURE POINT, DISMOUNT POINT, AND DESTINATION.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. REF (A)

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		ACTION								
		INFO								

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. NO CHANGE FROM REF

(A), EXCEPT:

A. UPON COMMENCEMENT OF RELIEF, 2/9 WILL COME UPON M 982
AND CONTACT PIED PIPER ECHO FOR FIRE SUPPORT.

B. UPON COMPLETION OF RELIEF, 3/9 WILL COME UP ON M 492
AND CONTACT PIED PIPER FOXTROT FOR FIRE SUPPORT.

GP-4

REAPPOINT REAR	M-972 NESTOR
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E



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

TO: ARVID M, FIRST MARINE
 2ND BN (-) FIRST MARINE
 1ST BN, THIRD A BDE
 1ST BN (-) FIRST MARINE
 1ST BN (-) FIRST MARINE
 1ST BN, FIRST MARINE

1987: CG, DAVID HARRIS
DAVID HARRIS
FBI - NEW YORK
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 8

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325-11

SECRET
 CONTROL ORDER 11-67 (SECRET IT)

- A. 01 V BRAM, 1:09,000, AET STATES 17014
- B. 30 " " L I 2-67
- C. DITO 3100.10
- D. C3 171 " " 12 518" PAY67 57AE
- E. DITO 03443.17
- F. LIT 000000.23

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		ACTION					
		INFO					

3. INFO PERSONAL

FOR INFO: HOTEL

TASK ORGANIZATION

9TH MARINE

COL JONES

50 CO (1st)

MAJ SIZOGLA

1ST BN, 9TH MARINE (SLE PHIL 3 B)

LTC L SOMMERING

2D BN, 9TH MARINE

LTC L SOMMERING

3D BN, 9TH MARINE

MAJ SIZOGLA

1ST BN, 7TH MARINE

LTC L SOMMERING

3D BN, 7TH MARINE

LTC L SOMMERING

1ST BN, 10TH MARINE

MAJ SIZOGLA

1. SUMMARY

A. NAME CODE

(1) DISPOSITIONS AND LOCATIONS

MAJOR TIA CODE

PROBABLE
LOCATION

ESTIMATE
NUMBER

0030 1000/0000 DIV

N OF CON THIN
TO DNE

2,000

0100 1000/0000 DIV

N 1070

1,740

0100 1000/0000 DIV

TD 2002

1,600

0100 1000/0000 DIV

TD 1070

2,000

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		INFO				
						ROUTINE
						DEFERRED

320 N000/341ST DIV

TO 1400

1,700

29TH REGT (-)

TO 0303

1,200

NOTE: FURTHER LOCATION DURING CENTRAL OPERATING AREA NOT SPECIFIC
LOCATED. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT UP TO THREE REGS OF THE 341ST
DIV MAY BE SOUTH OF BEN HAI RIVER; PROBABLY ONE IS, 31ST REGT
WEST OF ROUTE 1 AND PROBABLY TWO REGS 31ST/320 REGT EAST OF
ROUTE 1.

(2) RECENT ACTIVITIES. FOLLOWING WERE/ARVN STAFF OF TAYNEN REG
DURING LAST HALF OF MAY, RVN FORCES REINTERPRETED INTO RVN AND PRESENT
STANDARD NORTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER IN THE VICINITY OF CON TRINE AND
GEO LINE IS ESTIMATED TO BE BETWEEN THREE AND FOUR REGULAR WTA REGIMENTS
SINCE/ARVN MOVEMENTS OF THESE REGS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE VICINITY
TO THE NORTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER. THE REGT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED
HIS ARTILLERY, ROCKET AND AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY DURING RECENT WEEKS
AND HAS STARTED UP HIS EMPLOYMENT OF BAILMENT WTA/ASSING FIRM AGAINST
SOUTHERN POSITIONS. RECENT GROUND CONTACTS INDICATE THAT THE REGT
IS PROVIDING NON-TAYNEN REGIMENTS UNDER WHICH TO INCREASE STRONG
OFFENSIVE ACT N. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, SEE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
REPORT
CONCLUSION.

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				INFO					
						OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		PRIORITY	
								ROUTINE	
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2. EXHIBIT

(1) THE MAP, IN CO. WITHIN THE 1 COPY, NOTED IS CONTAINED
JUNIOR AND CO. OPERATIONS IS LOSS OF DEFENSE PVA/VC TROOPS.

(2) 1ST PAV DIVISIONS AT CONTROL AND AIRFIELD OPERATIONS
PROCESSED AND FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING, ALL VEHICLE AIRCRAFT SUPPORT.

(3) 1ST AVN DIVISION CONDUCT SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS
ON OR ABOUT 140000Z JUL 67 IN AS NOTED SOA IN DISCUSSION WITH
3D MAFTH DIVISION OPERATIONS.

(4) CTF 76 CONDUCTS RESEARCH AND REPLY AGAINST SPACE LOCATED
VIC ED 240770 COMMENCING 140000Z JULY 1967 IN CONNECTION WITH 3D
MAF DIV AND 1ST AVN DIVISION OPERATIONS.

(5) PLAN "A" PP FILES LOCATED VIC AND OUT AND CONTROL LIA
IN 1000 SA.

(6) US SEVENTH FLEET SUPPORTED NAVAL OPERATIONS AND CTF.

(7) 7TH AF DIVISIONS AND DIVISIONS OF THE 1ST AF DIVISION
FOR DISCUSSION OPERATIONS.

(8) 1ST AVN DIVISION SUPPORTED CONTROL TROOP.

(9) CTF, 34TH FLEET "A" PP FILES LOCATED VIC AND OUT
AS NOTED.

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		INFO							

6. ATTACHMENTS AND REFERENCES

(1) 30 BATTALION, 4TH MARINE DIVISION ATTACHED 09H 131000Z JUL 67.

(2) 1ST BATTALION, 6TH MARINE DIVISION ATTACHED 09H 131000Z JUL 67.

(3) 1ST BATTALION, 4TH MARINE DIVISION ATTACHED 09H 131000Z JUL 67.

~~(4) 30 BATTALION, 4TH MARINE DIVISION ATTACHED 09H 131000Z JUL 67.~~

(4) ONE PLATOON, 1ST BATTALION, 4TH MARINE DIVISION AS ORDERED 09H 131000Z JUL 67.

FOR USE IN ASSIGNED PLANT, AT 130000Z JULY 67 TO 141000H JUL 67.

(5) ALL ASSIGNMENTS MUST BE COMPLETED BY 131000Z JULY 67.

2. MISSION. COMBATING AT 0100H ON 01-DAY COMBAT ORDER AND
1. FIRST OPERATIONS IN FOT OF WTS 3.

3. EXERCISE.

4. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

(1) BATTALIONS ARE ASSIGNED ZONE OF ACTION. OPERATIONS OVER
LAI (NORTH 0100H).

(2) COMBATING AT 0100H ON 01-DAY, BATTALIONS COMBAT
ORDER AND ORDER 0100H IN FOT TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND
MILITARY FACILITIES SOUTH OF LAI. CAP TO 100H IN FOT TO 100H.

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		ACTION							
		INFO							

BE EMPLOYED TO PREPARE FOR THE ATTACK, TO MANAGE BUNKER POSITIONS
IN AND AROUND OF THE HILL AND TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED.

B. 1ST BN, 4TH MARINES

- (1) WHEN RELIEVED IN PRESENT POSITION BY 3D BN (-) 4TH MARINES AND PRIOR TO 181600Z JUL 67 GROUP OPORD TO 3D MARINES.
- (2) ESTABLISH TRANSPORTATION USED TO MOVE 3D BN (-), 4TH MARINES TO COM ZONE, MOVE TO VIC CAMP RAINBOW AS DIRECTED BY 3D MARINES.

C. 2D BN, 4TH MARINES

- (1) ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITIONS VIC TRAIL (OPN OVERLAP)

D. 3D BN (-), 4TH MARINES

- (1) CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION OF DEFENSE OF CAMP 10.
- (2) ESTABLISH BLOCKS WITH MINIMUM OF TWO COMPANIES (OPN OVERLAP).

E. 1ST BN, 3D MARINES

- (1) COMMENCING AT 1800Z ON D-DAY CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN HRA (OPN OVERLAP).
- (2) BE PREPARED TO GROUP OPORD FROM 4TH MARINES ON OR ABOUT 16 JULY 67.

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			ACTION							
			INFO							

2. 1ST FL. AIR MARINES

- (1) EFFECTIVE 131000Z JUL 67 ON P 20000 TO 9TH MARINES.
- (2) PRIOR TO 101000Z JUL 67 NAVY TO POSITION BEHIND US OPERATION CTF/FLAY.
- (3) COMMENCING AT 11-00Z ON 3-DAY CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN AREA, (SEE WHEELS)
- (4) BE PREPARED TO DROP YOUNG 9TH MARINES ON OR ABOUT 16 JUL 67.

3. 12TH FL. AIR MARINES

- (1) EFFECTIVE 131000Z JUL 67 DROP OFFER TO 9TH MARINES.
- (2) CONDUCT SEARCH IN PLACE OF 1ST FL. 9TH MARINES AT COM THIN, ON 13 JUL 67.
- (3) PRIOR TO 131000Z JUL 67 NOTALISH MARKING POSITION VIC TRAGE (OPERATION CTF/FLAY).

4. 12TH FL. AIR MARINES (-) (DEP)

- (1) BEGINNING SEARCH AND DEW REL SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.
- (2) DEVELOP/ HAVE UNTIL MY PREPARATION YOUNG IN AND POWER OF 1ST FL. CONDUCT 140000Z JUL 67.

5. 1ST FL. AIR MARINES

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				ACTION				OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	
				INFO				PRIORITY	
								ROUTINE	
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(5) OPERATION 0602 NAME SIGNIFY II.

(4) ATTACKS OF THE NAUTICS WILL ^{ALL} COMMENCE 1-10 PM ON 1-10 PM.

(5) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (A) ^{AND (D)}.

(6) EMPLOYMENT OF HIGH GROUND ARTILLERY (HGA) AUTHORIZED.

REFERENCE (B) REFERS.

(7) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS WILL BE DELETED TO MAINTAIN
FEASIBLE EFFORT. AMEMB 1, REFERENCE (C) REFERS.

(8) REPORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (A) AND (G). THE NAUTICS
WILL SUBMIT AN OPERATIONAL ACTION REPORT FOR OPERATION SIGNIFY II.

(9) DIRECT BATTLES ARE CONTINUING AUTHORIZED.

(10) CIVIL AFFAIRS; REF (B) REFERS.

(11) WIDE SUPPORT COORDINATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTS 2 TO
REF (D). IN VIEW OF NUMBER OF COMMANDS INVOLVED AND NATURE OF AIR,
ARTILLERY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS TO BE EMPLOYED, CARE MUST BE EXERCISED
AT ALL TIMES AND BY ALL AGENCIES INVOLVED TO INSURE TRANSMISSION
OF INFORMATION AND TO MAINTAIN COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING JOBS AND
SAFE-A-PLAN PROCEEDURE.

(12) MAINTAINING ARTS 1 IN EFFECT COMMENCING 1300Z JAN 67.

(13) MAINTAINING USE OF COMBAT AND HIGH GROUND ARTILLERY FOR PROTECTION

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OF FACILITIES AND INFORMATION BACKLOG WILL BE UTILIZED.

(14) EXPERIENCE INDICATES EXTENSIVE USE OF C AIRBORNE TYPE MINES AND MINE TRAPS IN THIS OPERATING AREA. UNITS ARE CAUTIONED IN THIS REGARD.

(15) PLUS EXTENSIVE SET OF OPERATIONS FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF BUNKERS AND OTHER ENCLAVEMENTS ENCOUNTERED.

(16) THE FOLLOWING SUBJECT POINTS ARE APPROPRIATE 131000Z JUL 67. ALL PREVIOUS TRACKING WORKED IN ONE AT HILLSBORO AND IN THE SUPPORT OF ONE BUNKER ARE REPORTED.

- | | |
|----------------|---------|
| (A) AIRFIELD | TD 1060 |
| (B) FLOWERS | TD 1470 |
| (C) GAPS | TD 0940 |
| (D) CIVILIAN | TD 1400 |
| (E) DOY BATES | TD 1400 |
| (F) FOR BATES | TD 1400 |
| (G) RELATIONS | TD 1370 |
| (H) OPERATIONS | TD 1200 |

4. ASSIGNMENT AND LOCATION

5. THESE (a)

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SUPPLY

- (1) SUPPLY SOURCE FLSW #1 DONG HA
- (2) PRESCRIBED LOADS. IAW REF (B).
- (3) LEVELS OF SUPPLY
 - (A) UNITS. IAW REF (B).
 - (B) FLSW # 1 AS PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED.
- (4) WATER. UTILIZE WATER CANS WHERE POSSIBLE. THROW AWAY 6 GAL CONTAINERS MAY BE USED UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.
- (5) CONTROL AND DISTRIBUTION.
 - (A) SUPPLY POINT DISTRIBUTION (FLSW #1) FOR UNITS EXCEPT INFANTRY UNITS. INFANTRY UNITS - UNIT DISTRIBUTION.
 - (B) INFANTRY UNITS SUBMIT REQUESTS TO SHORE PARTY BSA ESTABLISHED VIC DONG HA AIRFIELD.
- (6) AERIAL DELIVERY. EMERGENCY ONLY WITH APPROVAL OF CG, THIRD MAR DIV.

C. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

- (1) EVACUATION TO D MED 3D MED BN.

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				ACTION					
				INFO					
				OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		PRIORITY		ROUTINE	
								DEFERRED	

(2) SPECIAL COLLECTIVE UNITS ARE ^{FORMED} ~~FORMED~~ TO FIGHT AS BATTALIONS DESIGNED FOR OPOW UNITS AS REQUIRED. THESE UNITS WILL BE ALLOCATED TO UNITS WHEN AVAILABLE AS REQUISITE.

(3) INFANTRY UNITS WILL NOT BE UTILIZED AS CASUALTY BATTALIONS.

(4) MEDICAL FACILITIES WILL BE AUGMENTED BY COLLECTIVE AND CLEANING UNITS.

4. ASSIGNMENTS

(1) 3D TOR IN (-).

(A) PROVIDE GENERAL UNITS'S SUPPORT AS DIRECTED.

(2) 3D SECRET PARTY IN

(B) OPERATES AREA NOT-DEFINED VIC TONG HA AND FUEL.

(C) ATTACK AREA NO INFANTRY IN AS TIMELY.

(3) 912 ^{RN} ~~MT~~ (-)

(A) GENERAL SUP-ONE

5. OPERATION AND CONSIDERATIONS

A. CONSIDERATIONS IN REF (7) AND (8).

B. MAXIMUM RADIO-TRANSMISSION CONSIDERATIONS OF EXISTING

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MOVE TO UNCLASSIFIED LINE. CANCELLED
AS FOLLOWS.

OR 1 - COMBAT USE

OR 2 - COMBAT USE

OR 3 - COMBAT USE (COM)

OR 4 - COMBAT USE

Q. IN PLACE WITH NEW TEXT.

D. REMOVE GROUPS IN OF LOCATIONS

GP-6

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Page 1 of 1

20 00, 9TH MARINE
30 00 (-), 9TH MARINE
20 00, 4TH MARINE

INFO: 02 3D MARINE
10TH MARINE (-)(REIN)
3D MARINE
3D TR. BR (-)
9TH MT BR
3D VCS BR
3D REAR BR
10TH REAR BR
12 SP BR
1ST AVIATION BR (-)
3D ENGINE BR (-)(REIN)
3D AF BR (-)
10TH BR (-)(REIN)(2ND) (AND 10TH ARMY, USA
2D BR 10TH MARINE (-)(REIN)

THE

~~REF ID: A66512~~ 12-57 (UNCLASSIFIED)

- A. ARMY: VINTAGE 1-100,000, AND SERIES 170-14, SERIES 6442I, 6542II, 6442IV, 6442III, 6442VI, 6542IV, 6542III, AND 6442V
- B. 3D MARINE DIV 7-67
- C. 3D MAR DIV OF 6 42-67 (3D MAR DIV 1962, 32 JUL 67)
- D. 3D MAR DIV OF 6 2-67 (3D MAR DIV)
- E. 3D MAR DIV OF 6 2-67 (3D MAR DIV)

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NAVAL MESSAGE
OPNAV FORM 2116-28 (REV 3 61)

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TASK ORGANIZATION**9TH MARINES (-) (MAIN)****COL JENSEN****HQ CO 9TH MARINES****DET COMM CO HQ BN****DET MP CO HQ BN****2D BN 9TH MARINES****LTCOL KRAFT****2D BN (-), 9TH MARINES****MAJ WOODRING****3D BN 9TH MARINES****LTCOL VEST****1. SITUATION****A. ENEMY FORCES. SEE CURRENT INTENS, PERINTENS, AND SIR'S.****B. FRIENDLY FORCES.**

(1) III MAF, IN COORDINATION WITH I ARVN CORPS, CONDUCTS SUSTAINED COORDINATED, UNILATERAL OR COMBINED GROUND AND AIR OPERATIONS TO DESTROY VC/NVA MAIN AND GUERRILLA FORCES LOCATED IN TCTR.

(2) 1ST MAW PROVIDES AIR CONTROL AND AIRFIELD OPERATIONS FACILITIES AND FIXED AND ROTARY WING ALL WEATHER AIRCRAFT SUPPORT.

(3) U.S. SEVENTH FLEET PROVIDES SHORE BOMBARDMENT AND GUNFIRE SUPPORT AND EMPLOYS THE ARG/SEF AS DIRECTED.

(4) U. S. NAVAL FORCES, 7TH AND 9TH, PROVIDE NAVAL SUPPORT IN COASTAL AND

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		ACTION							
		INFO							

CONTIGUOUS WATERS.

(5) 7TH AF AND VNAF PROVIDE AIR SUPPORT FOR GROUND OPERATIONS AND AIR DEFENSE OF RVN.

(6) FIRST DIVISION, ARVN, CONDUCTS OPERATIONS AND SUPPORTS THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN 11TH BTA.

(7) QUANG TRI PROVINCE HQ PROVIDES RF SUPPORT AND DEFENDS VITAL AREAS.

(8) ELEVENTH BSR BN (-) IN C/S, MAINTAINS AND UPGRADES ROUTE 561 CAN LD TO CON THIEU.

(9) 3D MAR DIV (-)(REIN) UNITS IN KINGFISHER OPERATING AREA CONDUCT MULTI-REGIMENTAL SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS; DEFEND COMBAT BASE AREA, AIRFIELD AND ANCILLARY FACILITIES AT DONG HA AND OTHER VIT C. INSTALLATIONS IN OA; MAINTAIN COMBAT BASES IN CONJUNCTION WITH RF UNITS AT DESIGNATED LOCATIONS; OPEN AND SECURE LINKS OF COMMUNICATION WITH OA; MAINTAIN ACTIVE GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND SCREENING OPERATIONS AND SPOILING ATTACKS AGAINST NVA/VC FORCES; AND SUPPORT GVN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) CAMPAIGN PLAN 1967.

(10) 3D MARINES (-)(REIN) PROVIDE FOR THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF VIT C. INSTALLATIONS IN OA; MAINTAIN COMBAT BASES CA LU AND BA LONG; MAINTAINS AN ACTIVE GROUND SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND CONDUCTS SPOILING ATTACKS.

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THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED OA TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING NVA PERSONNEL; MAINTAINS SECURITY OF ROUTE 9 IN ASSIGNED OA, INCLUDING ENGR CONSTRUCTION AND UPGRADING EFFORT; AND ASSUMES OPCON OF MARINE ELEMENTS OF CAC'S WITHIN ASSIGNED OA.

(11) 12TH MARINES (-)(REIN) PROVIDES D/S ARTILLERY TO INFANTRY REGIMENTS AS REQUIRED; PROVIDES C/S AND G/S REINFORCING FIRES AS REQUIRED; MAINTAINS FSEC AT DONG HA, SUBORDINATE TO DIV FSEC, FOR COORDINATION OF FIRE SUPPORT AND FOR LIAISON WITH 12TH; CONTINUE CURRENT MISSION OF GLO LINE ARTILLERY OUTPOST IN AREA ASSIGNED; PROVIDES ARTILLERY SUPPORT TO 3D RECON BN PATROLS, REPLACING ARTILLERY AS NECESSARY; AND PROVIDES SEARCHLIGHT SUPPORT 1AW 12TH MAR 031400Z JUL67 AS MODIFIED BY 12TH MAR 160630Z JUL67.

(12) 3D RECON BN (-)(REIN) G/S; PROVIDES LIAISON PARTY WITH EACH INFANTRY REGIMENT; COORDINATES ALL RECON INSERTIONS/EXTRACTIONS; FIRE SUPPORT AND USE OF REACTION FORCES WITH APPROPRIATE INFANTRY COMMANDERS.

(13) 1ST BN ADA AW (REIN) 44TH ARTY PROVIDES ONE ADA AW BATTERY REINFORCED WITH ONE ADA HQ SEC D/S 3D MAR; PROVIDES TWO BATTERIES

(-) REINFORCED WITH THREE ADA HQ SEC D/S 3D MAR; AND ONE ADA

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SEC D/S CIO LINH ARTILLERY OUTPOST.

(14) 3D TE BN PROVIDES ONE COMPANY REINFORCED WITH ONE PLATOON AND ONE PLANE SEC D/S 9TH MAR; AND PROVIDES ONE COMPANY (-) REINFORCED WITH ONE PLANE SEC D/S 3D MAR.

(15) 3D AT BN PROVIDES FLT (REIN) D/S 3D MAR; AND PROVIDES ONE COMPANY (REIN) D/S 9TH MARINES.

(16) 1ST ANTRAC BN (-) C/S; AS INSTALLATION COORDINATOR, CUA VIET FACILITY, COORDINATES SECURITY AND LOCAL DEFENSE MEASURES IN OA ASSIGNED; AND CONDUCTS OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OA IN COORDINATION WITH 9TH MARINES.

2. MISSION. 9TH MARINES (-)(REIN) ON ORDER PROVIDE SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF DONO HA COMBAT BASE; BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE REINFORCEMENTS, COORDINATE ATTACK AND RELIEF FORCES FOR CIO LINH ARTILLERY OUTPOST AND CUA VIET FACILITY; MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE GROUND SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND CONDUCT SPOILING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED OA TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING NVA PERSONNEL; PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ROUTE 9, ROUTE 561, AND ROUTE 1 IN ASSIGNED OA; ASSURE OPORD OF MARINE ELEMENTS OF CAGPS WITHIN ASSIGNED OA AND AOR; SUPPORT CYN RD PROGRAM WITHIN OA AND AOR; MAINTAIN COMBAT BASE AT COS THIEN AND

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OPNAV FORM 7110.7 (REV 3 61)

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PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CAM LO BRIDGE SITE; COORDINATE AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR BRON FORTIFICATION OPERATIONS BETWEEN GIO LINH AND COM THIEP; PROVIDE ONE RIFLE COMPANY (REIN) OPCON GIO LINH ARTILLERY COMMANDER FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF THAT POSITION; ASSIST UNITS LOCATED AT MOUTH OF GUA VIET RIVER WITH DEFENSE; SECURITY MEASURES, AND FIRE SUPPORT - AUGMENT SECURITY FORCES AS REQUIRED; AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED IN DESIGNATED AOR; COORDINATE USE OF AREAS WITH AEWB, AS REQUIRED.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. ON ORDER 9TH MARINES (-)(REIN) PROVIDES SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF DONG HA COMBAT BASE BY UTILIZING FORCES OF TENANT COMMANDS WITH INFANTRY FORCES PROVIDING COORDINATION AND RESERVE FORCES, PROVIDES SECURITY OF CAM LO BRIDGE SITE BY ONE RIFLE PLT (REIN). PROVIDES REINFORCEMENTS, COUNTERATTACK AND RELIEF FORCES FOR GIO LINH ARTILLERY OUTPOST AND GUA VIET FACILITY FROM ASSIGNED FORCES AS REQUIRED. MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE GROUND SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND CONDUCTS SPOILING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED OA WITH ASSIGNED FORCES TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING EVA

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PERSONNEL. PROVIDES SECURITY FOR ROUTE 9, ROUTE 561, AND ROUTE 1 IN ASSIGNED OA BY AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING ALONG FLANKS, UTILIZING COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS AND OTHER ASSIGNED FORCES, OCCUPIES AND DEFENDS CON THIEU COMPLEX. PROVIDES ONE RIFLE CO (PHEU) GPOCH GIO LINH ARMY CMDR FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF THAT POSITION. ASSISTS UNITS AT MOUTH OF CUA VIEU RIVER WITH REGARD TO DEFENSE, SECURITY MEASURES, AND FIRE SUPPORT, AS REQUIRED, AUGMENTING THESE FORCES AS REQUIRED. COORDINATES AND PROVIDES SECURITY FOR BRON FORTIFICATION OPERATIONS BETWEEN GIO LINH AND CON THIEU. CONDUCTS OPNS AS DIRECTED IN DESIGNATED AOR, COORDINATING USE OF AREA WITH ARVN, AS REQUIRED, IN CARRYING OUT THESE MISSIONS. GENERAL AND DIRECT SUPPORT ARMY WILL BE EMPLOYED AS FEASIBLE. IN ADDITION, FIXED WING AND HELICOPTERS WILL BE USED AS FEASIBLE AND COMMENSURATE WITH AVAILABILITY.

B. 3D BN 4TH MARINES:

- (1) OCCUPY AND DEFEND CON THIEU COMPLEX.
- (2) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE RELIEF/REINFORCEMENTS OF GIO LINH ARMY OUTPOST AND CUA VIEU FACILITY IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY ATTACK.

(3) CONDUCT GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND SPECIALS ATTACKS THROUGHOUT

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ASSIGNED OA (OAL) WITH ASSIGNED FORCES TO DETECT AND DESTROY
INTELLIGENCE BYA FORCES (OPNS OVERLAY - PASSED).

(4) MAINTAIN SECURITY ON ROUTE 561 IN OA BY AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING
ALONG FLANKS.

(5) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR MINE SWEEP TEAMS IN OA.

C (6) 3D BN (-), 9TH MARIANS

(1) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ANY POSITIONS LOCATED AT CAM LO POSITIONS

(2) PROVIDE SECURITY ALONG ROUTE 561 IN OA BY AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING
ALONG FLANKS.

(3) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR MINE SWEEP TEAMS ALONG ROUTE 561 IN OA.

(4) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CAM LO BRIDGE SITE.

(5) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR TRUCK CONVOYS BETWEEN CAM LO POSITIONS
AND CON THIN.

(6) CONTROL TRAFFIC ON NBR BETWEEN CAM LO POSITION AND CON THIN.

(7) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR 14TH MARIAN PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WHILE
UPGRADING NBR.

(8) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE RELIEF/REINFORCEMENT/ OF OTO
LINE OUTPOST AND CON VIET FACILITY IN THE EVENT OF NIGHT ATTACK.

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(9) CONDUCT GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND SPOILING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED (OA II) ⁰⁴ OA WITH ASSIGNED FORCES TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING EVA FORCES. (OPN OVERLAY- PASEP) ⁰¹⁻¹¹

(10) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE A PLATOON (REIN) REACTION FORCE IN THE EVENT CAN LO RESETTLEMENT VILLAGE COMES UNDER FERRY ATTACK.

D. 2D BN 9TH MARINES.

(1) ON ORDER PROVIDE ONE RIFLE COMPANY (REIN) AS COUNTERATTACK FORCE FOR LONG HA COMBAT BASE DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS.

(2) PROVIDE ONE PLATOON (REIN) AS SPARROW HAWK ON THIRTY MINUTES ALERT DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS. (SEE REF D)

(3) ASSUME OPCON OF MARINE ELEMENTS OF COMBINED ACTION COMPANY AT CAN LO TO INCLUDE CAP-1, CAP-2, CAP-3, AND CAP-4.

(4) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ROUTE 9 IN OA USING OAC UNITS AND OTHER ASSIGNED FORCES.

(5) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE RELIEF/REINFORCEMENTS OF GIO LINE ARMY OUTPOST AND CHA VIET FACILITY.

(6) CONDUCT GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND SPOILING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED OA (OA III) WITH ASSIGNED FORCES TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING EVA FORCES.

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(7) ORGANIZE BN CP AS ALTERNATE REGIMENTAL CP. BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO ACTIVATE NECESSARY RADIO NETS TO INCLUDE F30C, REPT TAC, AIR, AND BASE DEFENSE NET.

(8) PROVIDE ONE RIFLE COMPANY (REIN) OPCON 12TH MAR FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF CIO LINE ARMY OUTPOST.

E. REGIMENTAL RESERVE.

(9) 2D BN 9TH MARINES

(A) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ONE RIFLE COMPANY (REIN) TO BE EMPLOYED EITHER IN REGIMENTAL OA OR AOR ON TWO HOURS NOTICE.

F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT AND FOR OPERATIONS 161601H JUL67.

(2) OPERATION CODE NAME - KINGFISHER.

(3) DIRECTATH ALONG

(4) COORDINATE OPERATIONS WITH RVNAF UNITS AND DISTRICT LEVEL OFFICIALS IN OA AND AOR.

(5) THIS HQ WILL COORDINATE OPERATING AREAS WITH RVNAF AND OTHER FNAF AS APPROPRIATE.

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(6) THIS HQ WILL COORDINATE RECON INSERTIONS/EXTRACTIONS AND FIRE SUPPORT, AND PROVIDE REACTION FORCES TO RECON EXTRACTIONS AND/OR EXPLOITATION OF RECON CONTACTS.

(7) FIRE SUPPORT - SEE REF (B).

(8) AIR SUPPORT - SEE REF (B).

(9) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - SEE REF (B).

(10) THIS CP CANCELS 9TH MAR OP 0 7-67.

(11) THESE POINTS - TO BE PUBLISHED SEPARATELY.

(12) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. REF (C) AND CURRENT DIRECTIVES.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

A. COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (E).

B. COMMAND POSTS.

(1) 9TH MARINES - CAM LO.

(2) 3D BN 4TH MAR - CON THIN

(3) 2D BN 9TH MAR - LONG HA

(4) 3D (-), 9TH MAR - CAM LO

(5) REPORT ALL CHANGES OF CP LOCATIONS TO THIS HQ.

ANNEX A - OPN OVERLAY - PAPER

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FROM: NINTH MARINES

TO SECOND BN, NINTH MARINES
 THIRD BN (-) NINTH MARINES
 11TH ENGR BN
 CO C 3D ENGR BN
 CO A 3D TK BN
 2D ARVN REGT **-9th 4T BN**

INFO CG, THIRD MAR DIV
 THIRD BN, FOURTH MARINES
 ADC THIRD MAR DIV (FWD)
 1ST ARVN DIV
 THIRD MARINES

SECRET

FRAG ORDER NO. ONE (IN SUPPORT OF ARVN OPN LAM SON 88)

- SITUATION VAN KIM VILLAGE AND SURROUNDING AREA HAS LONG BEEN KNOWN AS A VC HARBOR SITE. ALL CIVILIANS HAVE LEFT THE AREA AND HAVE EXTRACTED PERSONAL BELONGINGS AND ITEMS OF CULTURAL INTEREST. SEE CURRENT SITREPS AND ISUMS.
- MISSION 2D ARVN REGT SUPPORTED BY NINTH MARINES CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION IN VIC OF VAN KIM VILLAGE AND ADJACENT VILLAGES.
- EXECUTION

A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ONE COMPANY, 1ST BN, 2D ARVN REGT SUPPORTED BY ONE RIFLE COMPANY (USMC) AND OTHER COMBAT SUPPORT

ELEMENTS, CONDUCTS A SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION IN ASSIGNED ZOA

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(SEE OPN OVERLAY). THE USMC RIFLE COMPANY WILL BE USED PRIMARELY AS SECURITY FOR THE COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS AND TO SUPPORT THE ARVN COMPANY IN THEIR MISSION.

B. 2D, BN 9TH MARINES

- (1) PROVIDE ONE RIFLE COMPANY WITH ARTY FO TEAMS AND EAC TEAM.
- (2) DIRECT RIFLE COMPANY TO RENDEZVOUS WITH COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS AND ASSUME CONTROL OF ALL USMC FORCES.
- (3) DIRECT RIFLE COMPANY TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS AND TO SUPPORT THE 2D ARVN REGT OPERATION.

C. 11TH ENGR BN,

- (1) REQUESTED TO PROVIDE TWO (2) BULLDOZERS TO SUPPORT OPERATION.
- (2) RENDEZVOUS WITH 2/9 RIFLE COMPANY VIC-YD 130659.

D. CO C, 3D ENGR BN

- (1) PROVIDE ONE (1) ENGR SQD WITH SWEEP AND DEMOLITION CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT OPERATION.
- (2) RENDEZVOUS WITH 2/9 RIFLE COMPANY VIC YD 130659.

E. CO A, 3D TK BN

- (1) PROVIDE ONE (1) TANK PLATOON (2 GUN TANKS AND 2 FLAME TANKS) TO SUPPORT OPERATION.

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4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. IAW CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

A. IAW CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS

B. CO H, 2D BN, 9TH MARINES MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS ON REGT TAC

C. SUBMIT SITREP AND SPOT REFS DIRECT TO THIS HQ.

D. SITREP DUE 1100, 1700, 2300, AND 0500. SPOT PEPs ON OCCURRENCE REPORTS TO INCLUDE ALL SUPPORTING UNITS.

E. REPORT CP LOCATIONS WHEN ESTABLISHED.

GP-4

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

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9th Marine
Jul 1967

DIN Overlay to Accompany
FRAG O. 1-67 (OPN KINGFISHER)



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FM NINTH MARINES

TO ZEN/SECOND BN NINTH MARINES

ZEN/THIRD BN FOURTH MARINES

ZEN/CO A THIRD TANK BN

ZEN/CO C THIRD AT BN

ZEN/CO C THIRD ENGR BN

HFO CG THIRD MARDIV

ZEN/ADC THIRD MARDIV DHC

ZEN/TWELFTH MARINES

THIRD MARINES

SECOND BN TWELFTH MARINES

ZEN/FIRST AMTRAC BN

ZEN/THIRD BN NINTH MARINES

ZEN/NINTH MT BN

TWENTY SIXTH MARINES

BT

SECRET

FRAG ORDER NUMBER TWO FOR OPERATION KINGFISHER

A- NINTH MARINE OP 0 12-67

PAGE TWO DHC SECRET

B- NINTH MARINES MSG 230659Z JUL 67 (NOTAL)

1- SITUATION

A- ENEMY. SPE CURRENT STRENGTHS AND INSUMS

B- FRIENDLY

(1) 7TH AIR FORCE WILL PROVIDE TAC (A)S AND AIR SUPPORT NORTH OF THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ.

(2) 3D MARDIV WILL PROVIDE AD'S ON STATION DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO 2D BN, 9TH MARINES.

(3) 1ST MAW WILL PROVIDE FIXED-WING AIR SUPPORT ON STATION AS REQUIRED IN ADDITION TO ON CALL AIRCRAFT DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO 2D BN, 9TH MARINES. IN ADDITION, HELOS WILL BE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE, ON CALL, TO 2D BN, 9TH MARINES FOR THE RAPID REPOSITIONING OF FORCES UP TO PLT SIZE.

(4) 12TH MARINES WILL PROVIDE LONG RANGE GENERAL SUPPORT FIRES COUNTER ENEMY ARTILLERY/MORTAR CAPABILITIES IN AND NORTH OF THE DMZ.

(5) 2D BN () (RE) 12TH MARINES WILL PROVIDE CLOSE, DIRECT SUPPORT. A MINIMUM OF TWO DS 105MM HOWITZER BATTERIES WILL BE POSITIONED TO BE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO FIRE IN SUPPORT OF 2D BN.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE DMCB SECRET

(6) 1ST AMTRAC BN PROVIDES LVT AND LVTE SUPPORT FOR ENGRD OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF 2D BN, 9TH MARINES.

2. MISSION. 9TH MARINES CONDUCT SPOILING ATTACK WITH ONE REINFORCED BATTALION INTO SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ IN THE AREA NW OF CON THIEU.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. 9TH MARINES CONDUCT SPOILING ATTACK INTO THE DMZ ALONG AXIS OF ADVANCE BLUE. (SEE OPN OVERLAY-ASEN). THIS ATTACK WILL BE PRECEDED BY AT LEAST TWO DAYS OF INTENSIVE ARTY AND AIR PREP. ARTY AND AIR WILL ALSO BE UTILIZED EXTENSIVELY FOR SUPPRESSIVE FIRES ON THE FLANKS AND TO THE NORTH AS THE BN MOVES ALONG THE AXIS OF ADVANCE. ARC LIGHTS WILL BE RUN IN DESIGNATED AREAS TO THE NORTH OF THE AXIS ON THE TWO NIGHTS PRECEEDING THE ATTACK. THE ATTACK WILL BE COMPLETED WITHIN A TWENTY-FOUR TO THIRTY-SIX HOUR PERIOD (NOT RESTRICTIVE).

B. 2D BN (REIN), 9TH MARINES

(1) CONDUCT SPOILING ATTACK ALONG AXIS OF ADVANCE BLUE. (SEE OPN OVERLAY-ASEN).

(2) DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS ENCOUNTERED IN AREA.

(3) UTILIZE SUPPORTING ARMS TO THEIR MAXIMUM CAPABILITY TO COVER

PAGE FOUR DMCB SECRET

FLANKS AND TO RECON BY FIRE.

(4) REPORT UNIT LOCATIONS AT LEAST EVERY TWO HOURS WHILE MOVING.

C. CO A (-) (REIN), 3D TK BN

(1) PROVIDE ONE COMPANY, REINFORCED WITH ONE SECTION FLAME TANKS. DIRECT SUPPORT 2D BN, 9TH MARINES.

(2) MAINTAIN ONE PLT OF THE COMPANY PROVIDED. AT CON THIEU AS STANDBY TO REINFORCE IF NECESSARY.

D. CO C, 3D AT BN

(1) PROVIDE ONE PLATOON UNTOS DIRECT SUPPORT 2D BN, 9TH MARINES.

E. CO C, 3D ENFR BN

(1) PROVIDE ONE PLATOON ENGR'S DIRECT SUPPORT 2D BN, 9TH MARINES.

(2) PROVIDE DEMOLITION AND SWEEP CAPABILITY WITH PLATOON.

F. RESERVE

(1) 3D BN, 4TH MARINES

A. BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT OR EXPLOIT OPERATIONS WITH CMD GRP AND THREE RIFLE COMPANIES.

B. SCREEN ADVANCE OF 2D BN, 9TH MARINES IN 3D BN, 4TH MARINES OA UNTIL CLEAR OF SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF DMZ.

C. MAINTAIN UNITS IN POSITION TO COVER 2D BN, 9TH MARINES REAR WHILE MOVING ALONG AXIS IN THE DMZ.

D. SCREEN EXIT AREA FROM DMZ IN ADVANCE OF 2D BN, 9TH MARINES.

G. COORDINATION INSTRUCTIONS

(1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT AND

EXECUTION ON ORDER.

SECRET

TAB-D

SECRET

PAGE FIVE DMOB SECRET

(3) H-HOUR - TBA

(4) AXIS OF ADVANCE BLUE - DEPEND ON GROUND LAY - BASED

(5) POINT OF DEPARTURE - (PLDST/17)

(6) ALL UNITS WILL IMMEDIATELY REPORT TIME IF 4:17

ENTER NT DMZ AND TIME LAST ELEMENT HAS CLEARED DMZ TO THIS 10.

(7) ALL UNITS WILL FORM LATER SEARCH PARTIES FOR AVAILABLE ASSETS TO RELIEVE FIGHTING ELEMENTS OF THIS RESERVE 1

(8) EMPHASIZE USE OF AIR PANELS TO MARK FRONT LINE DEATH DNS.

(9) KEEP THIS HQ INFORMED OF NEAREST AVAILABLE 12

(10) ANTICIPATED DURATION OF OPERATION TWENTY FOUR TO

4 HOURS / 1 HOUR (NOT ESTIMATIVE)

A. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. LAW RET (A) AND CURRENT DIRECTIVE

B. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELFTRINCO

C. AIR RET (A) AND CURRENT DIRECTIVES.

D. REGIMENTAL RELAY STATION WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT CONVICTION FOR COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATION.

E. ALL UNITS REPORT COLOCATIONS WHEN ESTABLISHED.

10-4

10-4

25/15107 Dec 67 AN
5

TAB-2


SECRET

9th Marine, Jul 67.

SECRET

9th Marines
3d Marine Division FMF (Rein)

14
+ 76



OPN

THIS OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY
FRAG ORDER NUMBER TWO FOR
OPERATION KINGPISTON

SECRET

66 +
07

TAB-2

SECRET

JCS 003000167
21 October 1967

529867

4. Ltr. 003000167 on CC 9th Marines ltr 04MWS/pt, 3106, Serial
5- -67 o 21 August 1967

Pro. Com. andin General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FIF
cc. Com. andin General, I Marine Amphibious Force

Subj. After Action Report (Operation BUFFALO)

2. E. was to be concurred in, in t. analysis and recommendations
with reporting commander.

J. R. Stockman
J. R. STOCKMAN
By direction

Copy No. 10 of 10 copies
SECRET

SECRET

TAB M

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101000 0
OF 14R AND H/W NR 11...11...11...11...11

*More on the monsoon
planning.*

GPA

G-3A

ACTION

101000 0

0 040515Z JUL 67

FM NINTH MARINES

TO CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

PLANNING CONFERENCE

A. CG, 3D MARDIV MSG 021123Z JUL 67

1. IAW THE REF AND ASSUMING THIS REGIMENT WILL BE IN THIS
GENERAL OPERATING AREA WITH BASICALLY THE SAME ASSETS AVAILABLE,
THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION.

2. UNITS OF THIS REGIMENT WILL BE GENERALLY DISPOSED AS AT
PRESENT WITHIN THE CURRENT OPERATING AREA. CONSIDERATION
SHOULD BE GIVEN HOWEVER TO EXTENDING THE OPERATING AREA TO IN-
CLUDE HIGHWAY NR 1 TO THE EAST. THIS BECOMES MORE NECESSARY WITH
THE ADVENT OF THE MONSOON SEASON IN ORDER TO IMPROVE CONTROL OF
THIS VITAL LINK AND ENSURE ADEQUACY OF AN MSR.
3. CONSIDERATION SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO UP-GRADING THE POSITION
AT CON THIEU AND GIO LINH TO MAKE THEM TENABLE DURING THE MONSOON
SEASON. THE SAME APPLIES TO RI 561 INTO CON THIEU.
4. DUE TO THE RESTRICTED AVAILABILITY OF HELICOPTERS DURING

PAGE TWO: 14R C O N F I D E N T I A L

THE MONSOON SEASON, CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO OPERATING COMPANY
AND PLATOON PAAROI BASES TO COVER THE AREA. IN THIS SAME
CONNECTION, OTHERS AN FOLLOW-ON TYPE VEHICLES SHOULD BE CON-
SIDERED FOR MOVEMENT AND RESUPPLY DURING THE MONSOON SEASON.
5. THE BASIC CONCEPT FOR THIS OPERATING AREA DURING THE MON-
SOON SEASON WILL BE LIMITED OBJECTIVE TYPE OPERATIONS AND
SUPPORT OF CAC UNITS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT OPERATIONS OF THIS
SORT IN SUPPORT OF THE ADVISOR EFF
T ARE THE KEY TO PREVENTING THE
TYPE INTERFERENCE MENTIONED
IN UVARA. 1, P. OF THE REF.

CP-4

BT

FOR 09/0925/1864/1967 04 JUL 1967

04

CONFIDENTIAL

TAB A

HEADQUARTERS
9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Reinf), FME
FPO San Francisco 96602

9th Mar Regt
Control No 00706 67
Copy No 12 of 12

3/MWS/pz
3100
SER # 35-67-67
AUG 21 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Reinf), FME

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) Maps Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6342 I,
6342 II
(b) 3d MarDiv LOI 1-67
(c) 3d MarDivO PO2000.2E
(d) 3d MarDivO 3100.1C

Encl (1) Operation BUFFALO Overlay
(2) After Action Reports; 1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 1/3, 1/4 and 3/4

1. Code Name. BUFFALO
2. Date of Operation. 021000H Jul67-140900H Jul67.
3. Location. QUANG TRI Province (CAM LO and GIO LINH District)
4. Command Headquarters. 9th Marines (-) (Reinf)

Task Organization

9th Marines

COL JERUE

Hq Co (-) (Rein)

1st Bn, 9th Marines

LTCOL SCHENING

Co A, 1st Bn, 9th Marines
Co B, 1st Bn, 9th Marines
Co C, 1st Bn, 9th Marines
Co D, 1st Bn, 9th Marines

2d Bn, 9th Marines

LTCOL PEELE - 021000H - 051200H Jul67
LTCOL KENT - 051200H - 140900H Jul67

Co E, 2d Bn, 9th Marines
Co F, 2d Bn, 9th Marines
Co G, 2d Bn, 9th Marines
Co H, 2d Bn, 9th Marines

Downgraded in three (3) year intervals
Declassified after twelve (12) years.

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TAB-M

9TH MAR

A/A RPT OPN BUFFALO

2-14 JULY 1967

3d Bn, 9th Marines

Major MOODRING

Co I, 3d Bn, 9th Marines
 Co M, 3d Bn, 9th Marines
 Co L, 3d Bn, 9th Marines
 Co H, 3d Bn, 9th Marines

1st Bn, 3d Marines

LtCol WICKVIRE

Co A, 1st Bn, 3d Marines
 Co B, 1st Bn, 3d Marines
 Co C, 1st Bn, 3d Marines
 Co D, 1st Bn, 3d Marines

1st Bn (-), 4th Marines

Major BELL

Co A, 1st Bn (-), 4th Marines
 Co B, 1st Bn (-), 4th Marines
 Co C, 1st Bn (-), 4th Marines

3d Bn (-), 4th Marines

LtCol VAST

Co K, 3d Bn (-), 4th Marines
 Co L, 3d Bn (-), 4th Marines
 Co M, 3d Bn (-), 4th Marines

5. Supporting Forcesa. Direct Support and General Support Units

12th Marines - Direct Support and General Support as required.
 3d Recon Bn (-) (Rein) - General Support
 2nd Bn, 12th Marines - Direct Support
 Co B, 3d Ldr Bn - Direct Support
 Co C, 3d Ldr Bn - Direct Support
 Co A, (Rein), 3d Tk Bn - Direct Support
 Co J (Rein), 3d Ldr Bn - Direct Support
 Ltry "A" and "B", 1st Bn (-) (Rein) 4th Arty, USA - Direct Support

b. Air Support(1) Helicopter Support

(a) During the afternoon of the first day of the operation one battalion (-) (three companies and a command group of Third Battalion, Ninth Marines) and Company C of the First Battalion, Ninth Marines were helilifted into the area just east of Cu Lihai. This troop-lift of 640 men was expeditiously and professionally executed with a minimum of advance notice.

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(b) Medevac and resupply missions were flown extensively throughout the operation. Medevac missions evacuated 322 casualties. Resupply missions carried a total of 267,661 pounds of supplies to the field units.

(c) UH1E gunships gave excellent fire support to Companies A and B of the First Battalion, Ninth Marines during the initial engagement on 2 July.

(2) Fixed Wing Support

(a) Fixed wing aircraft were utilized as T.O.(A)'s, A's, flare-ships, C&S, and on IP& missions.

(b) The prompt and professional response by fixed wing, close air support aircraft and their airborne controller (TRAIL 64) was instrumental in the relief of Bravo Company, First Battalion, Ninth Marines in their initial contact on 2 July.

(c) Fixed wing aircraft flew 523 C&S and 472 TrQ missions, expending 4,297,500 pounds of ordnance during the operation.

•• Artillery Support

(1) Artillery support for the Ninth Marine Regiment during Operation BOUTBOK was provided by the Second Battalion, Twelfth Marines operating in a direct support role. Reinforcing fires were provided by the Twelfth Marine Regiment. On 7 July A/1/12 landed from the Special Landing Force and assumed a direct support mission from Q&S T&L&L. The same day, W/2/12 landed and was placed in support of the A&G H. Combat Base. On 12 July, W/2/12 displaced to C&S L&C in order to better support the Ninth Marine Regiment.

(2) Direct support artillery fired 25,306 rounds broken down as follows

<u>Targets</u>		<u>Rounds</u>	
Observed	147	105MM	17,940
Unobserved	257	107MM	5,612
<u>Sub</u>	<u>3269</u>	<u>155mm</u>	<u>1,834</u>
Total	3673	Total	25,306

(3) Significant surveillances were as follows

229 MI. (Conf)
 101 MI. (Prob)
 7 Secondary explosions
 1 automatic weapon destroyed
 1 Artillery piece destroyed
 1 Fuel complex destroyed

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6. Intelligencea. Estimate of enemy strength in operating area

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>
90th Regt.	North of QN THILN centered in G ₃ (YD 1372)	2,400
1 Bn of the 803d Regt.	N of QN THILN in south- ern DMZ	700
29th Regt. (-)	Along western boundary of the operating area	1,500
Elements of 012th Regt.	Throughout operating area (Recon elements)	Est. 200-300
31st Regt.	East of Highway #1 and South- ern DMZ centered on G ₃ (YD 1676)	2,285

b. Estimate of enemy Capability of Reinforcing

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>
32d Regt.	Eastern DMZ	2,625
803d Regt. (-)	North of QN THILN in DMZ	1,700
012th Regt. (-)	North of QN THILN in DMZ	Est. 1200-1500

c. Specific Information on Enemy in Area

(1) There had been a build up of intelligence information indicating that the enemy would undertake offensive action during the period 3-14 July, 1967. The indication that he would act was based on the following evidence:

- (a) Increased sightings in the DMZ area by U.S.
- (b) Increased contacts by patrols around QN THILN.
- (c) Build up of enemy artillery and anti-aircraft weapons in area north of the S. River.
- (d) S-2, 2d ARV Regiment, indicated that enemy had a five year history of conducting offensive operations during this period of the year.

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(e) The "dark of the moon" coincided with other indications of offensive action.

(f) An increase of SPAR activity in the eastern DMZ region.

(2) An inspection of the bodies of the enemy that had been killed in the GIA BINH area 2, 3, and 4 days before the commencement of this operation revealed that a new regiment, the 90th Regiment, had moved into the area around CON THIEN. The enemy was dressed in new uniforms and had new equipment. All enemy bodies that were recovered during this period had homemade gas masks included in their equipment.

(3) During the initial phases of the operation a very close liaison was maintained with division aerial observers. This close contact was invaluable in keeping track of enemy movements; however, heavy shelling of the DONG HA airfield necessitated moving the planes to PHU THAI and the benefits of close personal liaison were greatly diminished.

d. Enemy Capabilities

(1) Enemy was capable of massing up to three regiments (90th, 29th (-), and 31st) in the area around CON THIEN at the beginning of the operation.

(2) Enemy was capable of conducting small unit attacks against friendly forces throughout the area of operation.

(3) Enemy was capable of defending in the DMZ area.

(4) Enemy could reinforce with units from North Vietnam.

(5) Enemy was capable of withdrawing but would do so only under heavy pressure.

e. Adequacy of Pre-D-Day Intelligence. Information provided by division and obtained from intelligence gathering units in the OA provided adequate intelligence prior to commencement of operation.

f. Enemy Casualties.

991 (Confirmed)
297 (Probable)

g. Fortifications. Extensive enemy bunkers and trenchlines were known to exist throughout the area surrounding CON THIEN. In the opening contact of the operation the enemy fought from prepared positions. The positions were nothing more than improved drainage ditches utilizing hedgerows and bushes for concealment.

h. Terrain Analysis. No specific terrain analysis was made for this operation. 9th Marine's intelligence estimate for July, 1967 includes a terrain analysis.

i. Weapons Captured.

76 Individual weapons
20 Crew-served
96 Total weapons

j. Enemy Tactics. The enemy employed no new tactics but at the onset were in a position which initially offered some measure of success. With the opening of the operation, the enemy fired two command detonated claymore mines at "A" Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. "A" Company was delayed due to evacuation of casualties. This resulted in "A" Company not meeting up with "B" Company as expected. "B" Company became engaged with what was estimated initially to be a large sized unit in a position, previously prepared on terrain favorable to their forces. The enemy opened fire on "B" Company from the right flank and front. The enemy utilized captured Marine uniforms, flak jackets and helmets to confuse friendly troops. During the initial phase of the operation, "A" Company and "C" Company became heavily engaged. There were reports that the enemy used tear gas on the first two days of the operation, but an investigation could produce no positive evidence that tear gas was used by the enemy. During the ensuing battle, the enemy displayed effective use of both artillery and mortars. Pre-registered targets were scattered throughout the GIA BINH area and the enemy, on a number of occasions, opened fire with a "fire for effect". On two separate occasions, enemy troops assaulted friendly positions during their own mortar barrage. The enemy fiercely defended his positions and could not be ousted by infantry assault alone. Massive use of air support and artillery fires were used to blast the enemy out of position. The enemy withdrew only after tremendous amounts of heavy ordnance were delivered on his positions.

k. Intelligence Gained from Interrogation. No tactically significant intelligence was gained from PW's or Detainees.

7. Mission. 9th Marines (-)(Rein) conduct search and destroy operations in assigned objective area with two battalions to locate, capture or destroy enemy forces, supplies and equipment.

8. Concept of Operation. Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day 9th Marines conducts search and destroy operations with two battalions attacking north along the axis shown on operation overlay to exploit contact developed by 1st Bn, 9th Marines on 2 July. ELT 1/3 lands by helicopter in LZ Hawk commencing at L-Hour on D-Day. On order, both battalions attack north in assigned area.

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9. Executiona. Significant Events02Jul67

At 021000H Operation BUFFALO commenced when B/1/9 encountered an estimated two battalions of well entrenched NVs vic (YD 133712). Heavy fighting continued throughout most of the day resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. A/1/9 tried to relieve the pressure on the western flank while C/1/9 was helilifted from A-1/9 to an LZ vic (YD 133712) to reinforce Bravo Company. Shortly after arriving in the LZ C/1/9 received 150 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. A platoon of tanks and a platoon from D/1/9 were dispatched from CON THLEN to help retrieve the casualties which were mounting at this time. At 021500H reinforcement units were requested from the Ninth Marines. While evacuating the casualties two tanks hit mines and were hit with H&C rockets. Between 021600H and 021700H A, B, and C Companies came under heavy artillery fire. At 021715H 3/9 (-) landed by helicopter in the vicinity of CON THLEN and assumed control of A/1/9, B/1/9 and C/1/9. A/1/9 and B/1/9 moved their casualties to CON THLEN. Throughout the day artillery and air support were used extensively in support of 1/9. Units of 1/9 received an estimated 500 rounds of 82mm mortar fire throughout the day. Friendly casualties resulting from the day's activities were 51 KIA, 170 WIA, and 34 MIA. Later bodies of 33 Marines were recovered and identified, decreasing the total to 1 MIA. A/1/9's flying in support of 1/9 reported 65 MIA (Conf) and 55 MIA (Prob) as a result of airstrikes. B/1/9 reported 31 MIA (Conf) from 020930H-021930H (from initial contact). At 021030H 1/9 CP vicinity (YD 115702) received 3 rounds of artillery with no damage or casualties. At 021420H 1/3/9 vicinity (YD 294539) received small arms fire. 1/3/9 returned fire and searched area with negative results. At 021515H 1/9 CP vicinity (YD 115701) received 50 rounds of incoming artillery from several enemy positions. At 021745H K/3/9 located east of CON THLEN received 10 rounds of artillery. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions. At 021800H A/3/9 vicinity (YD 1372) captured and destroyed 1 heavy machinegun, 1 light machinegun, 4 AK-50's and 8 AK-47 rifles. At the same time the 3/9 command group picked up 1 NV, wounded prisoner vicinity (YD 135718). At 021830H, 3/9 located east of CON THLEN received approximately 24 rounds of artillery fire. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position. At 021910H 1/3/9 vicinity (YD 132722) discovered and destroyed 2 light machineguns, 9 S&S rifles, and 7 AK-47 rifles. At 022000H A/3/9 vicinity (YD 125714) captured 1 RPG-7. At 022125H 1/9 CP vicinity (YD 115701) received rounds of incoming artillery. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions.

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03Jul67

Action on 3 July started at 0500H when DONG HA Combat Base received 120 rounds of artillery resulting in 30 USMC WIA and minor damage to the DONG HA area. Simultaneous with the attack on DONG HA, 1/9 CP vic (YD 11570) received 30 rounds of artillery. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions. One secondary explosion was observed vic (YD 083788) at 030830H. No working for 3/9 reported 5 En KIA (Conf) vic (YD 145718) as the result of an airstrike. At 031030H QM THIN received 4 85mm artillery rounds with no damage or casualties. At 031314 K/3/9 vic (YD 124714) found 2 En KIA (Conf). At 031330H scout snipers attached to H/2/9 vic (YD 123677) fired on one NV, resulting in 1 En KIA (Prob). The enemy also fired resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 031600H BLA 1/3 completed lift into LZ Hawk. At 031715H 3/9 CP vic (YD 131708) received two volleys of 85mm artillery fire. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions vic (YD 097783) and (YD 125725). At 031730H 1/9 CP vic (YD 11570) received incoming artillery fire. There was no damage. At 031915H B/1/3 captured 1 NV, vic (YD 152703). At 032000H B/1/3 vic (YD 132703) exchanged small arms fire with 1 NV, resulting in 1 En KIA (Conf) and 2 USMC WIA. At 032130H A/1/9 vic (YD 122708) received 2 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. D's reported 8 En KIA (Conf) and 19 En KIA (Prob) on 3 July.

04Jul67

040115H-040200H F and H/2/9 received three probing attacks from an estimated squad size unit. The attacks were beaten off. Results of the action were 7 USMC KIA (5 medevac). At 040645H F/2/9 vic (YD 126677) received approx 82 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 7 USMC WIA. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions. At 040720H B/1/3 vic (YD 146717) found 1 En KIA (Conf), 1 7.62 rifle and assorted ammo. At 040800H K and L/3/9 vic (YD 127718 and YD 132719, respectively) received an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds from vic (YD 125716). Counter mortar fire was delivered on the suspected enemy position. There were a total of 7 USMC WIA for the action. At 040800H A/1/3 vic (YD 138722) found 1 flamethrower and a rocket launcher. They were returned to En S-2. At 040830H K/3/9 and L/3/9 vic (YD 126711 and YD 132719), respectively, received an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds resulting in an additional 6 USMC WIA. At 040930H 1/9 CP vic (YD 114701) received 6 rounds of 85mm artillery fire. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position vic (YD 095705). At 040935H A/B/C/1/3 vic (YD 142720) received approximately 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 4 USMC WIA. From 040910H until 041010H A/3/9 vic (YD 127718) while moving north received heavy automatic weapons fire resulting in 11 USMC WIA. 1 tank was disabled by an RPG round. It was noted in this action that the NV were mining the tops of ditches. K/3/9 pulled back and called artillery on NV to the north. At 041030H 3/9 CP vic YD 131708 received approximately 12 rounds of rocket fire. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position vic (YD 042700). There were 11 USMC WIA. At 041035H F/2/9 vic (YD 126667) received 3 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 1 USMC WIA. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position vic (YD 116685). At 041030H 1/3 CP vic (YD 152700) received 30-40 rounds of incoming

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rocket fire resulting in 8 USMC KIA. At 041120H SLT 1/3 chopped ORCON 9th Marines. At 041130H 3/9 CP vic (YD 133714) received 128 rounds of unknown caliber artillery fire. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position. At 041145H 3/9 command group observed secondary explosions from airstrike vic (YD 133720.) At 041300H F/2/9 vic (YD 133654) detained 1 Viet Cong without I. D. board. At 041415H A/1/9 vic (YD 136717) had 9 USMC WIA from a friendly airstrike. At 041645H 1/9 CP vic (YD 114701) received unknown number of 85mm artillery rounds resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 041915H E/2/9 vic (YD 149621) received 3 rounds of small arms fire resulting in 3 USMC WIA. 60mm and 81mm mortar fire was delivered on suspected enemy position. At 041750H DONG HA Combat Base received approximately 7 rounds of heavy artillery resulting in 5 USMC WIA. At 041755H vic (YD 129717) CO of I/3/9 was killed by sniper fire. AO's reported 7 EN KIA (Conf) and 17 EN KIA (Prob) on 4 July.

5 July 1967

At 050330H DONG HA Combat Base received approximately 12 rounds of heavy artillery resulting in 2 USMC KIA, and 3 USMC WIA. At 050450H A/1/3 vicinity (YD 136718) received 130-150 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. At 050500H F/2/9 vicinity (YD 124664) received approximately 80 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 3 USMC KIA and 35 USMC WIA. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position. At 050630H 1/9 CP vicinity (YD 116701) received 5 rounds of enemy mortar fire. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position. At 050730H B/1/3 vicinity (YD 143713) found 1 EN KIA (Conf). At 050920H L/3/9 vicinity (YD 131720) found and destroyed an enemy minefield. At 050940H C/1/3 vicinity (YD 145717) found 1 EN KIA (Conf). At 051030H L/3/9 vicinity (YD 131723) found and destroyed an 82mm mortar position and 43 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition. At 051000 F/2/9 called artillery mission on suspected enemy. Rounds landed short resulting in 4 USMC WIA and 1 damaged bulldozer. A second bulldozer was damaged by an AT mine when it tried to retrieve the bulldozer hit by artillery. At 051130H L/3/9 vicinity (YD 131774) discovered a bunker 4x45 ft and captured 1-82mm and 3-60mm (US Type) mortar rounds. Bunkers and ammunition were destroyed. At the same time L/3/9 vicinity (YD 130726) captured a 60mm mortar tube and accessories. At 051150H 3/9 CP vicinity (YD 131709) received 4 rounds of recoilless rifle fire. There was no damage. At 051225H I/3/9 vicinity (YD 132725) discovered 5 EN KIA (Conf) and captured 1 light machine gun. At 051340H A/1/3 vicinity (YD 137724) had 1 tank damaged from an AT mine, resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 051445H A/1/9 vicinity (YD 132713) discovered 3 EN KIA (Conf). At 051500H F/2/9 vicinity (YD 119667) discovered 8 bunkers, 12 fighting holes and 3 mortar pits. They also discovered safety clips and shipping plugs with Russian and Chinese writing on them. At 051630H H/2/9 vicinity (YD 154694) exchanged small arms fire with 1 NV4 resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 051745H 9th Marines CP at Dong HA received 4 rounds of heavy artillery resulting in 16 USMC WIA. At 051855H 1/9 CP vicinity (YD 115701) received 4 rounds of 85mm artillery. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions. At 052140H A/1/3 vicinity (YD 137724) made contact with an estimated 35-40 NV4. Results of the encounter were 1 USMC WIA, 8 EN KIA (Conf) and 15 EN KIA (Prob). At 051600H A/1/3 vic (YD 136721) discovered 1 EN KIA (Conf).

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06Jul67

At 060600H 1/9 CP vic (YD 115701) received 4 incoming rounds of artillery. Counter-battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position. At 060845H 3/9 CP vic (YD 133709) received 8 rounds of artillery fire, resulting in 1 USMC KIA. At 060915H CP at CON THIEU observed 1 vehicle at (YD 110840.) Vehicle fired twice. 175mm fire mission was fired at target with unknown results. At 061030H 0/1/3 vic (YD 154713) received 1W fire resulting in 2 USMC KIA and 3 USMC WIA. At 061100H 1/9 CP at CON THIEU observed muzzle flashes from (YD 083842) and (YD 093820.) Counter battery fire was delivered, resulting in 3 secondary explosions and 2 fires. At 061140H 1/3 vic (YD 140732) received 73 rds of 85mm arty fire resulting in 5 USMC WIA. At 061145H 1/3/9 vic (YD 138724) received 30 rds of arty fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 061205H H/2/9 vic (YD 12694) apprehended 5 detainees. At 061325H 1/9 CP at CON THIEU received 30 rds of arty resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 061530H B/1/3 vic (YD 138722) received 15 rds of arty resulting in 6 USMC WIA. At 061800 DONG HA Combat Base received approximately 25 rounds of heavy artillery resulting in 7 USMC WIA. From 061900H-062100H 1/9 CP at CON THIEU received 30 rounds of rocket fire, 200 rounds of mortar fire and 100 rounds of artillery resulting in 4 USMC KIA and 17 USMC WIA. At 062200H F/2/9 vicinity (YD 135645) received 1 enemy frag grenade resulting in 1 USMC WIA. Throughout the day 1/3 was in heavy contact resulting in 7 USMC KIA, 75 USMC WIA, 22 EN KIA (Conf) and 73 EN KIA (Prob). The following weapons were captured: 1 50 caliber machine gun, 3 AK-47's, 3 AK-44's and 1 30 caliber machine gun.

07Jul67

At 070745H 1/9 CP vicinity (YD 115701) received 11 rounds of 85mm artillery resulting in 5 USMC KIA and 4 USMC WIA. At 070750H vicinity (YD 123725) 4/1/9 counted 150 EN KIA (Conf) killed the previous night. At 070750H 4/1/9 sweep at (YD 123725) found 1 NV KIA (Conf). At 070830H K/3/9 vicinity (YD 125745) found 2 EN KIA (Conf). At 070827H 1/3 elements at (YD 137724) received 50 rounds of mortar fire from (YD 178724). Observed 35 NV at (YD 137724) moving away. At 070830H 1/3 elements at (YD 137724) received 3 EN KIA (Conf), and 3 EN KIA (Prob). 3/9 CP reported that its units were in contact throughout the night on 6 July until 070800 in GS (YD 1474) with an estimated 400 NV. The results of that action were 155 EN KIA (Conf), 100 EN KIA (Prob), 3 USMC KIA, 21 USMC WIA, 1 60mm mortar destroyed, 3 light machine guns destroyed and 3 AK-47's destroyed. These are separate from 4/1/9 action on 070750H. At 071245H 1/3/9 vicinity (YD 124715) had snail contact resulting in 4 EN KIA (Conf). At 071320H K/3/9 vicinity (YD 128715) killed on 8-10 NV in woodland resulting in 3 EN KIA (Conf).

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At 070720H 4/1/9 vicinity (YD 125724) discovered and destroyed 2 60mm mortars, 40 60mm rounds, 11 SKS rifles, 16 AK-47's and 1 light machinegun. At 071250H L/3/9 vicinity (YD 133720) fired 90mm and small arms at 6-8 NVAs in open, resulting in 5 ENEMY KIA (CONF). At 071330H B/1/3 sweep at (YD 142717) captured 3 AK-47 rifles, 3 AK-44 rifles, 1 30 caliber machinegun, 2 60mm mortars, 500 rounds 7.62 ammunition, 60 rounds 30 caliber ammunition, 4 rounds B-40 ammunition, 1 homemade gas mask and 5 NVA KIA (Conf). At 071345H 1/9 COC received a direct hit resulting in 9 USMC KIA and 21 USMC WIA. At 071400H L/3/9 vicinity (YD 132724) called in UH1E gunships on enemy resulting in 3 EN KIA (Conf). At 071630H L/3/9 vicinity (YD 126713) captured 1 AK-47, 2 SK-50's and 1 unknown type barrel and receiver group. At 071615H vicinity (YD 125727) to (YD 134726) 3/9 40 reported 200 NVA KIA (Conf) as a result of artillery and air strikes.

08Jul67

At 080800H 1/3 vicinity (YD 145719) ran airstrike resulting in 3 EN KIA (Conf). At 080955H 1/3/9 discovered and destroyed 2 bunkers, 1/3/9 also found a gas mask carrier filled with 7.62 ammunition and a booby trapped gas can. At 081010H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received 5 rounds of heavy artillery resulting in 2 USMC KIA and 3 USMC WIA. From 081000H until 081800H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received approximately 30 rounds of heavy artillery resulting in 1 USMC KIA and 14 USMC WIA. At 081400H L/3/9 vicinity (YD 129723) found 3 enemy tunnels and bunkers with assorted gear and ordnance. At 081100H C/1/3 vicinity (YD 141718) discovered 50 EN KIA (Conf) wearing khaki and green uniforms. Some of the NVA were wearing flak jackets. 3 EN KIA (Prob) were estimated due to gear in the area. At 081120H L/3/9 found assorted NVA gear and ordnance. At 081145H 4/1/9 vicinity (YD 126725) captured 2 AK-47's. At 081210H 1/3/9 vicinity (YD 123723) discovered and captured 1 SKS rifle and 9 60mm mortar rounds. At 081530H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received 1 round of heavy artillery resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 081600H, C/1/3 sweep from (YD 145719) to (YD 145720) found an NVA base camp containing 250 bodies, 63 of which had been previously reported, and 1 observed rifle destroyed. At 082230H F/2/9 spotted 7 NVA vicinity (YD 129647). A small fire fight ensued. Area was searched with negative results. On 8 July 40's reported 6 EN KIA (Conf) vicinity (YD 147727). At 082250H CO Ninth Marines issued Frag Order directing Second Battalion, 9th Marines to relieve Third Battalion (-), 9th Marines are company at a time. Time of completion, prior to 101400H.

09Jul67

From 091000 - 091050H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received 7 rounds of heavy artillery. No damage. From 091420-091500H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received 3 rounds of artillery resulting in 3 USMC WIA. From 091700-091830H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received 8 rounds of heavy artillery. 40 called airstrikes on suspected enemy positions. At 091255H 8/2/9 vicinity (YD 128698) discovered a hut with a letter, pamphlet and flag in it. Material was turned over to the Bn S-2.

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10Jul67

At 101800H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received 5 rounds of artillery with delayed fuse. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions. At 102320H F/2/9 vicinity (YD 133603) fired on 5 NVs resulting in 2 EN KIA (Prob). Prior to 101400H Second Battalion, 9th Marines completed relief of Third Battalion (-), 9th Marines. Third Battalion (-), 9th Marines assumed the defense of CM LO and the CM LO bridge site and security for Route 561.

11Jul67

At 111210H B/1/3 vicinity (YD 116721) located an enemy base camp and 1 60mm round and 21 82mm rounds. They also found a large amount of equipment. The ammunition was destroyed. At 111330H E/2/9 vicinity (YD 138697) discovered assorted documents. The documents were sent to Bn S-2. At 111245H 2/9 reported that friendly aircraft made a bombing run to the rear of their positions. There were no casualties. At 112250H F/2/9 vicinity (YD 133703) spotted enemy movement. Subsequent action resulted in 1 USMC WIA.

12Jul67

At 120724H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received 3 rounds of artillery resulting in 3 USMC WIA. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions vic YD 102838. At 120900H D/1/9 found 1 En KIA (Conf) vic (YD 121703). At 121340H B/1/3 vic (YD 146701) had a patrol that detonated a mine resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 121440H an airstrike for 1/3 was run vic (YD 152730) resulting in 6 En KIA (Prob). A total of 4.9 hours of visual reconnaissance, was flown by two AD's, over eastern QUANG TRI Province on 12Jul67. Airstrike conducted on fortified positions accounted for 2 NVs KIA (Conf) and 1 NVs KIA (Prob).

13Jul67

At 131200H 1/4 and 3/4 (-) chopped OPCON to Ninth Marines. At 131640H K/3/4 vic (YD 122703) received 3 rounds of unknown caliber artillery fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA. Counter battery fire was called on suspected enemy positions. At 131030H H/2/9 vic (YD 130696) picked up 3 female detainees and forwarded them to DONG Hoi Combat Base. On 13Jul67 3/4 (-) relieved 1/9 and assumed the defense of CON THIEN. At 131600H Ninth Marines chopped OPCON of 1/9 to Third Marines. AD's debriefed on 13Jul67, counted 2 EN KIA (Prob) from airstrike at (YD 16728) and 2 NVs KIA (Conf) from airstrike at (YD 090707).

14Jul

At 140900H Operation BUFFALO terminated. No significant events on this date.

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b. Civil Affairs

(1) On 4Jul67 3d Bn, 9th Marines found a rice cache consisting of 66 - 77 lb bags. The rice was transported to the 3/9 rear at DONG HA.

(2) On 10Jul67, S-5, 9th Marines, transported 3d Bn, 9th Marines rice cache from the 3/9 rear to the CAM LO District Headquarters for distribution by the District Chief.

c. Psychological Warfare

(1) During the operation the operating area was saturated with leaflets, and on each day of the operation leaflet drops and broadcasts were conducted.

(2) The themes utilized during the operation were:

- (a) NVA Chieu Hoi
- (b) NVA surrender
- (c) Exploitation of VC misery
- (d) A variety of Chieu Hoi appeals

(3) A total of 2,770,000 leaflets were dropped in support of the operation.

(4) A total of 10 hours and 5 minutes of aerial speaker broadcasts also supported the operation.

10. Cumulative Losses

a. Friendly: 129 KIA
576 WIA

b. Enemy 991 KIA (Conf)
297 KIA (Prob)
11 Detainees
2 POW

c. Weapons Captured or Destroyed.

96 Weapons
76 Individual Weapons
20 Crew-Served Weapons

d. In addition there was numerous miscellaneous material captured or destroyed.

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11. Administrative Matters

a. Supply

(1) Discussion: The high density of units, and the swift moving tactical situation involved considerable coordination between the using units, FLSU-1, H&T, and LSA. As the operation developed and contact with the enemy increased, nearly all resupply was by helicopter. Emergency resupply, in nearly all cases, was based on requirements for water. The landing of the SLF also increased the need for coordination and supervision at the Regimental level. This was caused primarily by a lack of familiarity with logistical procedures in this area. The urgency with which they landed contributed to some misunderstandings, however, cooperation was excellent in all areas and from a logistical point of view, the operation was successful.

(2) Problem areas: The requirement for water cans become critical and their availability was inadequate at this base. The SLF was unfamiliar with the method of resupply in this area and relied completely on helicopters as their method of resupply. Also, the SLF required transportation ashore which they didn't have on landing.

(3) Solution: An adequate back up of water cans should be available at FLSU-1 for immediate issue should the situation require. The SLF should make every effort to effect early liaison in order to become familiar with the resupply procedures in this area. The SLF should land at least two mites and trailers for use by their S-4. Also, one 6x6 should be landed for moving supplies from FLSU-1 to the LSA.

b. Casualties. All casualties requiring medical evacuation were taken to Co. D, 3d Medical Bn, IONG HA or to the USS OKINAWA.

c. Transportation. Other than as listed in paragraph 11a(2) above there were no transportation difficulties encountered.

d. Communications

(1) At the commencement of Operation BUFFALO normal command and control communications for the units within the 9th Marine Regiment were maintained from our CP located within the IONG HA Combat Base.

(2) Upon assuming OPCON of two additional infantry battalions, a manual radio (R1) relay station was activated on 3 July at CON THIEN to assure continuous communications with all units. At the same time, a secondary FM radio net was activated within the regiment to better control the units OPCON to the 9th Marines.

(3) On 7 July the 9th Marines command group displaced from IONG HA to CAM LO.

(a) Message Center. A 60 WPM covered simplex teletype circuit established from the 9th Marines forward CP to the IONG HA Combat Base message center.

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(b) Wire

1 Two SB-22 switchboards were activated at the forward CP to provide internal local CP telephone communications and external trunk lines to the Shove switchboard at PHU BAI and the Shove switchboard at DONG HA.

2 Hot lines from the 9th Marines COC were provided to the COCs at the 3d Marine Division Headquarters and the 3d Marines, and from 9th Marines FSCC to the 12th Marines FSCC in DONG HA.

(c) Radio

1 Both the Regimental tactical nets and the division tactical nets were displaced to the forward CP at CM LO. Both maintained a covered voice (Nestor) capability.

2 Direct communications to the 3d Marine Division CP at PHU BAI from the 9th Marines CP at CM LO on the division tactical net #2 was not feasible due to the distance involved. Direct contact was maintained with the ADC at DONG HA, 3d Marines at CMC CARROLL and the 4th Marines at CMC EVANS. In order to pass traffic to the 3d Marine Division Headquarters at PHU BAI it was necessary to relay messages via one of these stations.

(d) Radio Relay

1 Two radio relay circuits were established at the 9th Marines CP.

a An AN/MRC-62, four channel radio relay circuit was established from the 9th Marines CP at CM LO to the 3d Marine Division Headquarters at PHU BAI.

b An AN/TRC-27B, eight channel radio relay circuit was established from the 9th Marines CP at CM LO to the communication facilities at DONG HA Combat Base.

12. Special Equipment and Techniques. None

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13. Commander's Analysis

a. This operation could best be termed a meeting engagement. This regiment was operating with the mission and guidance set forth for operation CIMARRON at the time of commencement of Operation BUFFALO.

b. Intelligence had indicated a build-up in the area north of the eventual battlefield. To investigate this intelligence a battalion, minus, swept the area north and east of CON THLEN to the Market area a week prior to the operation. This battalion encountered only small reconnaissance units. A few days later, two companies from 1/9 again swept a portion of the area and found indications that a stronger force than previously encountered was sliding into the area. As a result, "A" and "B" Companies were reinserted the day following their withdrawal at which time Operation BUFFALO was triggered.

c. It is believed that an NVA force was moving into the area for a possible attack on CON THLEN. Further, it is believed that subsequent action between 2-4 Jul 67 by units of this regiment disrupted this intended attack and severely reduced the capability of the enemy force to conduct offensive operations in the immediate future.

d. There were indications during the early stages of this operation that the enemy was dressed in Marine jungle utilities and boots, flak jackets and helmets in an attempt to confuse our forces. While there is some indisputable evidence that this occurred, it is not believed that this was a widespread tactic of the enemy forces. There were also two reports of the enemy's use of tear gas. However, this has not been substantiated.

e. By the use of hindsight it is believed that an excellent opportunity was lost on 4 July when the initial action was not exploited since additional assets were not available with a rapid enough reaction time to turn this action into an operation similar to that of HICKORY I.

14. Recommendations

a. That attempts be made from all sources to gather evidence of the use of gas, and the use of USMC clothing and equipment by NVA units.

b. That every effort be made to increase USMC assets in sufficient strength to increase our fast reaction means in order to enhance our exploitation capabilities.

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S E C R E T

TERMINATION OF OPERATION HICKORY 1

4. 3D MAR DIV OP 3 59-67

1. OBJECTIVES ASSIGNED BY REF(A) WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY
16:000H JUL 67.

2. THOROUGH SEARCH OF ASSIGNED ZONE NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF
TERRAIN AND TIME LIMITATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE EASTERN PORTION
OF THE ZONE. HOWEVER, BY-PASSED AREAS WERE SATURATED WITH AIR
STRIKES AND ARTILLERY FIRE. BY-PASSED AREAS IN THE EASTERN ZONE
WILL BE PATROLLED BY ORGANIC UNITS OF THIS REGIMENT IN THE NEXT
FEW DAYS.

3. RECOMMEND OPERATION HICKORY 1 BE TERMINATED AT 16:000H JUL 67

GP-4

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