

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 42By us, NARS, Date 7-31-84

8 November 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

My only comment is that the figures don't seem to be consistent:

a. Page 28 indicates that 32% of enemy O/B in I Corps is VC. VC strength is listed as 4,875. On this basis, total O/B in I Corps would be 15,200. But page 76 indicates the strength was 22,295. If the stated strength figures are correct, VC = 22%.

b. Measured in terms of battalions, there were 57 NVA and 18 VC battalions in DMZ/ I Corps area. This equates 24% VC.

c. Battalion strengths for I Corps alone -- eliminating DMZ -- are 43 NVA and 18 VC. VC = 30%.

d. Counting only infantry battalions in I Corps, we get 28 NVA and 18 VC or 40% VC.

Art is obtaining enemy O/B by Corps area. When we receive these figures, we can make our own calculations.

7

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

36

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

LBJ LIBRARY

CBS Subpoena

Case # NLJ/CBS

Document # 123

November 7, 1967

2a

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

I don't know if you have seen the attached booklet on Marine operations during September, but if you haven't, I commend to you especially the following:

1. During the period May 1 to September 30, 57 percent of all enemy losses (killed) in Vietnam occurred in the First Corps, and 56 percent of all U.S. losses in Vietnam have also occurred in First Corps.

2. Page 8 -- portrayal of enemy-initiated artillery/rocket/mortar attacks in the DMZ which shows that in the past six months, there have been three periods of intensified enemy high-explosives fire.

3. Pages 27, 28, and 29 -- a discussion of the changing enemy order of battle in First Corps during the past year. Today in First Corps, only 32 percent of the Regular and Main Force are Viet Cong; the rest are North Vietnamese Army Regulars.

4. Pages 45 and 46 -- ARVN contributions to RD.

5. Pages 76 through 81 -- enemy order of battle in the First Corps. Total enemy strength in the First Corps/DMZ area is now estimated at 42,465. The number of battalions are 57 North Vietnamese battalions and 18 Viet Cong battalions.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ-CBS 22

By iss, NAAS, Date 7-3-84

Art McCafferty

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

28

LBI LIBRARY

088 Subpoena

Case # NLJ/883

9

Document #

# OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES

## VIETNAM

SEPTEMBER 1967

343

316 159



36

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLJ/CBS 9  
By CCJ Date 7-25-83

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

This is a summary of activities of US Marine Corps forces in Vietnam for the month of September 1967. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering the period from March 1965 through August 1967.

GROUP 2

Exempted from automatic  
downgrading by CG FMFPac

~~SECRET~~

1  
COPY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

CONTENTS

SUMMARY . . . . .	3
LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS . . . . .	5
SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS . .	26
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT. . . . .	34
BASE DEFENSE . . . . .	50
AIR OPERATIONS. . . . .	55
LOGISTICS . . . . .	62
CONCLUSIONS . . . . .	75
STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS . . . . .	76

~~SECRET~~

COPY LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

### SUMMARY

In September the enemy continued to focus his efforts on the I CTZ. His preoccupation with this area is reflected in the facts that during the period 1 May - 30 September 57% of all enemy losses (killed) in RVN occurred in I CTZ, and 56% of all US losses in RVN have also occurred in I CTZ.

For the third time in six months, the enemy mounted a major combined arms effort against III MAF forces in the DMZ region. Directed for the second consecutive time against Con Thien, the enemy's artillery supported assault was detected by Marine reconnaissance, and was destroyed by a combination of heavy fire support and ground maneuver. In his September failure to drive the Marines from their Con Thien strongpoint, following his April defeat in the Hill 881-861 complex north of Khe Sanh and the failure of his combined arms thrust against Con Thien in July, the enemy was denied once again the military and propaganda victory he is seeking.

Continuing the campaign against the 2d NVA Division in its harboring areas within the heavily populated, rice-rich Nui Loc Son basin, III MAF Operations Swift and Wheeler killed 999 NVA/VC, at a cost of 168 friendly killed. The ARVN Operation Lien Ket 116, conducted in conjunction with the Marines' Operation Swift, killed an additional 212 NVA/VC.

The September GVN election produced substantial evidence that the III MAF counter guerrilla campaign and its companion ARVN pacification effort are slowly eroding enemy influence in the coastal plain of I CTZ. The exceptionally heavy voter participation--over 86%--attested to the growing ability of the GVN to protect the Vietnamese within the vital region.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Following the election, counter guerrilla efforts continued at near - record levels. III MAF units conducted over 37,000 of these small unit operations and accounted for 489 enemy killed within the III MAF tactical areas. Nearby, ARVN units, charged with searching out and destroying the enemy in and near RD priority areas, also killed over 400 enemy.

Companion with these counter guerrilla efforts by III MAF and the GVN, the Revolutionary Development program in I Corps achieved modest gains in September. Four new RD teams were added, bringing their total to 125--within range of the 1967 GVN goal of 138 teams deployed. Other modestly encouraging signs appeared in pacification, as 35 villages improved their status, while only 6 sustained reverses. At the end of September, the number of people residing in secure portions of III MAF tactical areas was 717,705, an increase of 10,131 persons over the preceding month.

The October realignment of forces will see three US Army infantry battalions replacing two Marine infantry battalions in the Nui Loc Son basin area. The two Marine battalions and the regimental headquarters, thus freed, will displace to northern Quang Tri, increasing infantry forces in that area from seven to nine battalions.


The northeast monsoon arrived, early and with exceptional violence. It had seriously adverse effects on both tactical and logistic operations.

~~SECRET~~

## LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS

In September, it was again evident that the thrust of the active combat in South Vietnam was focused on I Corps. In that region III MAF undertook fourteen large unit operations, centered on the Kingfisher area of the eastern DMZ region and the Nui Loc Son basin area in northern Quang Tin province. Of these fourteen large unit efforts during the month, nine were conducted by III MAF units, four by the Special Landing Forces of the 7th Fleet and one by ROK Marines. The locations of these operations are shown below.

### III MAF, SLF & ROKMC OPERATIONS - SEPTEMBER 1967



LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS CASUALTIES *	
NVA/VC	III MAF, SLF & ROKMC
2,212 KIA	
52 Captured	440 KIA
292 Weapons	1,787 WIA and evacuated

\*Includes 496 enemy KIA, 15 enemy and 101 weapons captured by US Army, and 404 enemy KIA, 14 enemy and 28 weapons captured by ROK Marines. USA casualties: 44 KIA, 182 wounded/evacuated.  
ROKMC Casualties: 39 KIA, 166 wounded/evacuated.



~~SECRET~~

### Operations in the DMZ Area

September combat in northern Quang Tri was concentrated in the area around Con Thien. In this area, the full spectrum of US fire support means delivered a record number of rounds of heavy weapons fire against the enemy, the enemy fired the greatest number of rounds of any month of the war, and preparations for a major enemy attack on Con Thien were discovered and thwarted before the attack could begin.

Enemy rocket and artillery fire from positions in North Vietnam continued, in September, to provide a canopy under which enemy ground elements sought to infiltrate, marshal and prepare for a major assault. It was increasingly evident that the weapons positions in North Vietnam, immune from infantry attack by III MAF, were the key to the enemy fire support structure in northern Quang Tri. Unable to overrun these positions, it was essential that our forces exploit every opportunity to neutralize or to destroy them.


To place pressure on the enemy guns, III MAF fired a total of 12,577 rounds at known and suspected enemy positions in the DMZ area during September. B-52 bombers of the Strategic Air Command continued their high rate of attack in the DMZ region, including a daily average of about fifteen sorties a day north of the Ben Hai River. Ships of the Seventh Fleet fired 6,148 rounds on the NVN positions in the same area. And COMUSMACV, on 13 September, authorized a temporary application of additional tactical air effort against the area harboring the threatening gun positions, to include sixty-five tactical sorties daily by the 7th Air Force and thirty-six by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

The chart on the following page displays the geographic region of principal concern - the sanctuary in North Vietnam which contains those NVA artillery and rocket positions which have delivered heavy fires on Marine units in the DMZ area, over the past six months, followed by graphs which portray the magnitude of the US fire support in the DMZ region.




~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


## SUPPORTING FIRES IN THE DMZ REGION



DAILY NUMBERS OF ROUNDS OR BOMBS DELIVERED ON TARGETS IN THE RED HATCHED AREA ABOVE.



DAILY TOTALS ARE APPROXIMATE. BASED ON A TYPICAL B-52 LOAD OF 42 750 POUND BOMBS AND 24 500 POUND BOMBS.




COPY LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

The heavy volume of fire which the enemy delivered during September directs attention to the pattern of those fires over the past six months. The diagram below exhibits the total daily rounds of enemy heavy weapons fire in the DMZ region since 1 April 1967.

### ENEMY INITIATED ARTILLERY/ROCKET/MORTAR ATTACKS IN DMZ



The chart above portrays that, in the past six months, there have been three periods of intensified enemy high explosive fire: in late April, in early July and throughout most of the month of September. Each of these periods of violent fire support relates to enemy infantry action, reflecting three major enemy combined arms efforts to achieve a ground victory.

COPY 1-1-1 LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The first of these was the April operation launched against Khe Sanh by an enemy force of two regiments. This effort was discovered by Marine reconnaissance in its early stages, and was defeated in a violent air/ground team attack on the Hill 881-861 complex north of Khe Sanh. Over 900 NVA troops were killed.

The July peak marked another major enemy combined arms attempt, this time focused on the Con Thien area. This triggered Operation Buffalo, during which the enemy attack was thrown back with the loss of almost 1,300 NVA dead. In that effort, the enemy made extensive use of NVN based artillery in close coordination with his ground attack. The high volume of that fire is apparent on the chart above.

In September, the enemy heavy weapons fire followed much the same pattern as the preceding two, except that both volume and duration were greater. The high volume during the first part of the month supported what was obviously intended to be a multiple pronged attack leading to the seizure of Con Thien. Details of his defeat in this attempt are described below.

#### Ground Activity Around Con Thien

The bulk of the combat activity during September was focused in a geographic area of about twenty square miles in extent, centered generally around the small 158 meter hill called Con Thien. The hill itself was never physically occupied by much more than a reinforced battalion. Most of the action, and the resulting Marine casualties, actually occurred as a result of contact between Marine units maneuvering in the surrounding region and NVA forces seeking to get set for a major attack on the hill.

During the first few days of September, Marine units operating to the south and southwest of Con Thien encountered increased enemy activity, characterized by engagements with small NVA units in bunkers. On the 4th, however, a platoon

COPY LIBRARY  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

patrol from Company I, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines engaged an NVA company, four miles south of Con Thien. The patrol was quickly reinforced by the rest of Company I, along with a second company which joined the action with tanks. The two Marine companies, supported by artillery and air, killed thirty-seven NVA in this engagement.

On 7 September, a company from the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines made heavy contact with an NVA force, about three miles south of Con Thien. Quickly reinforced by a second company, and employing tanks, artillery, and close air support, Marines killed fifty-one NVA in a five hour battle.

On the evening of the 10th, the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines made heavy contact with an NVA regiment, three and one-half miles southwest of Con Thien. In this case, it was evident that the continuous patrolling had exposed a major attack in the making, and aimed at Con Thien.

In intense fighting on the 10th, and making full use of artillery and close air support, the Marines inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, forcing him to withdraw at 2200. For the rest of the night, Marine artillery and air delivered fires on all enemy routes of withdrawal. In this four hour battle the enemy lost 140 confirmed killed, while another 315 were listed as probably killed, but not confirmed due to the difficulty of searching the dense undergrowth.


At 0325 on the 13th, following a heavy concentration of artillery, an NVA Force launched an attack against the northeast sector of Con Thien's defensive perimeter. However, the enemy thrust was repulsed, and the force withdrew.

At 0750 on the 21st, two companies of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines operating east of Con Thien, encountered heavy automatic weapons fire from a large enemy force. The enemy was well entrenched in a system of heavily fortified, mutually supporting, camouflaged bunkers, constructed in dense hedgerows and fronted by flat paddies. It was plain that the position had been organized to entrap an inferior force.

COPY LIBRARY  
~~SECRET~~

The companies requested assistance, and then launched an attack which closed to within thirty meters of the enemy positions. At this time they consolidated their positions and awaited reinforcements, while continuing to direct artillery and air strikes on the enemy. When the reinforcing elements made contact, the attack was resumed and lasted until dusk. Total enemy losses in this engagement were thirty-nine NVA confirmed killed, with another 149 probably killed.

### COMBAT ACTIVITIES AROUND CON THIEN - SEPTEMBER 1967



This sequence of enemy attacks, persisting over a three week period, appears to reflect the enemy's desperate desire for a military victory, one which would also gain for him a measure of beneficial world-wide propaganda. When his successive infantry drives, launched from three directions and supported strongly by artillery fires, failed to carry the Marine strongpoint, it is likely that he decided to attempt to reduce the position by a massive artillery attack. This latter scheme also failed.

Viewed in retrospect, the enemy's September defeat in the Con Thien region may be attributed to four major factors:

~~SECRET~~

-The intensified US firepower of tens of thousands of aircraft bombs and rounds of artillery and naval gunfire.

-The Marines' resolute and aggressive air-ground team action which intercepted the enemy's attack columns, and inflicted heavy losses on them before they could initiate a coordinated assault.

-The likelihood that the accelerated pace of his own heavy weapon fires caused the enemy to run short of artillery, rocket, and mortar ammunition in his forward dumps.

-The heavy rains, deep mud and extensive monsoon flooding which drove the enemy out of many of his protected positions, and curtailed his resupply movements.

Operating together, it is plain that these factors united to give the enemy a substantial defeat.

#### Operation Fortress Sentry

To the east of Con Thien, amphibious operation Fortress Sentry was initiated in the coastal region of Quang Tri to remove the threat to the eastern flank of the Kingfisher area. The combined amphibious/heliborne assault was launched by Special Landing Force Bravo (BLT 2/3) on 17 September against elements of the 270th NVA Regiment and local force VC units known to be operating in the area between Cua Viet and Dong Ha, north to the Ben Hai river. This represented the 44th amphibious effort by USN/USMC units in the war.

Only sporadic enemy resistance was encountered during the first days of the operation, which saw BLT 2/3 reorient the attack on a north-northwest axis, toward the DMZ, with elements of the 1st ARVN Division screening the left flank. On the 23rd, a 4-man patrol was attacked by a VC company, 4 miles northwest of Cua Viet. The fire team repulsed the attack killing 20 enemy troops and sustaining no casualties itself.

The next morning, two Marine companies located and


~~COPIES LIBRARY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

engaged elements of the 270th NVA Regiment in positions three miles east of Gio Linh. This action was highlighted by the execution of a rapid flanking maneuver by one of the companies north of the enemy positions, to prevent his withdrawal. Supported by air, artillery and naval gunfire, Marines killed fifty-three NVA on the 24th, losing two Marines killed in the action. A prisoner captured during this engagement volunteered the information that the NVA units intended to avoid contact with the Marines by escaping across the river, but were forced to turn back after sighting ARVN forces in blocking positions.

On 25 September Operation Fortress Sentry was terminated and BLT 2/3 joined the 3d Marine Division in Operation Kingfisher. The operation is portrayed graphically below.

# OPERATION FORTRESS SENTRY



COPY LIBRARY



Unsuccessful Attack on Marine Convoy

On 7 September, an NVA battalion set a deliberate ambush on Route 9, between Thon Son Lam and Ca Lu. The ambush site was established on favorable terrain two miles north of Ca Lu, and was designed to intercept one of the Marine resupply convoys which periodically travel the route between Dong Ha and Khe Sanh. It became evident, however, that the enemy commander was either unaware of, or chose to ignore the fact that a similar ambush, attempted in nearly the same spot only seventeen days before, had been defeated. The earlier attempt, on 21 August, had resulted in 109 NVA confirmed killed, with another 305 probably killed by artillery and Marine close air support aircraft. The enemy commander of the 7 September effort also apparently miscalculated the proximity of Marine forces, their ability to maneuver in support of the convoy, and the speed with which supporting arms could be brought to bear upon the ambush.


At 1010 the Marine convoy, consisting of two cargo trucks, a fuel tanker, two smaller vehicles, and two escorting tanks, triggered the action, as the enemy attacked with mortars and automatic weapons. The convoy returned fire with all available weapons, and within fifty minutes a reinforcing Marine company had moved from Ca Lu and one from Thon Son Lam. Both established contact with the enemy and, in heavy fighting which lasted until early evening, Marines, employing artillery and air strikes, killed 92 NVA and captured 3 machine guns. Another 93 enemy were listed as probably killed, while friendly losses were 5 killed and 56 wounded and evacuated.

The similarity of the errors committed by the enemy in the 21 August and 7 September ambush attempts is evident in the diagrams on the following page.


~~COPY LIBRARY~~

~~SECRET~~

## UNSUCCESSFUL NVA AMBUSH - 21 AUGUST 1967



## UNSUCCESSFUL NVA AMBUSH - 7 SEPTEMBER 1967



COPY 1-1-1 LIBRARY  
~~SECRET~~

## Factors Which Require Friendly Forces In The DMZ Region

The enemy's concentration of force on friendly units in the DMZ region, and the intermittent bursts of violent combat which have occurred over past months raise the question of why Marines are operating in the DMZ region at all. There are four principal reasons:

### -Construction of the Strong Point Obstacle System

III MAF, having been assigned responsibility for the installation, maintenance, and manning of the system, is obliged to protect the forces installing it. While Marine units man Gio Linh and Con Thien (strong points A-2 and A-4 in the obstacle system), other Marine forces must continue to maneuver throughout the area between Route 9 and the DMZ, protecting these strong points and providing overall security for the system's development.

### -Defense against enemy invasion

COMUSMACV's perception, in 1966, of a major enemy invasion threat in the DMZ led to III MAF deployments into this region and, subsequently, to the enemy's major defeats in Operations Hastings and Prairie and, most recently, in Kingfisher. The Marines remain in the area to forestall further invasion threats.

### -Defense of Route 9

The basic GVN - COMUSMACV policy establishes Route 9, the major east-west artery north of Quang Tri city, as an essential communication route which must be secured, opened, and kept open. This can only be done if friendly forces are deployed north of the road, and in strength.

-Assumption of former ARVN security functions

The major reorientation, in January 1967, of ARVN forces to the vital Revolutionary Development program drew some of these forces from Northern I CTZ, and has forced COMUSMACV to assume the ARVN offensive tasks.

Thus, while Marine presence in the DMZ region is a heavy and challenging commitment, it is a necessary one. It is that presence which provides a shield against North Vietnam, and behind which other, vital internal, military, civil and political programs in South Vietnam can proceed.

Nui Loc Son Area

In September III MAF continued its offensive campaign to destroy enemy forces in the densely populated, agriculturally rich Nui Loc Son basin area, 25 miles south of Danang. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the North Vietnamese Army and Main Force Viet Cong units in this area. During the period May through August 1967, the enemy deployed the entire 2d NVA Division in this coastal basin, in an attempt to reassert his increasingly tenuous influence in this rice-rich region, and to bolster the guerrilla forces there.

The 2d NVA Division is composed of the 3d and 21st NVA Regiments and the 1st VC Regiment. The 3d NVA Regiment entered South Vietnam in March 1966 and for over a year, confined its activities principally to southern Quang Nam province. Six months later, the 21st NVA Regiment completed its infiltration into South Vietnam and began operations with the 1st VC Regiment in Quang Ngai province. Although elements of the 2d NVA Division had been encountered in the Nui Loc Son basin as early

~~SECRET~~

as mid-1966, the 21st NVA was the first enemy regiment to appear there in force, arriving in May of this year. Following in trace, the 1st VC and 3d NVA completed their moves to the basin in July and August, respectively. The headquarters of the parent organization, the 2d NVA Division has been confirmed in the basin since July 1966.

Beginning in late April, 1967, with Operation Union I, and followed in the succeeding months by Operations Union II, Adair, Calhoun, Brown, Cochise, and September's Operation Swift, Marine large unit operations in the Nui Loc Son basin have exacted a heavy toll from the 2d NVA Division, killing 2,491 of its soldiers. ARVN operations against this division have accounted for an additional 594 enemy killed. As a result of these III MAF efforts, the 21st NVA Regiment is currently listed as not combat effective while its sister regiment, the 3d NVA, is reported as only marginally combat effective.

September actions in the Nui Loc Son basin (Operation Swift, conducted by the 5th Marines, Operation Wheeler, by four US Army battalions and Operation Lien Ket 116 by ARVN), have achieved significant results in further destruction of the combat effectiveness of the 2d NVA Division. These operations, described in detail below, resulted in a total of 1,211 enemy troops confirmed killed.

#### -Operation Swift


Following their heavy losses to Operations Cochise, Lien Ket 112 and Benton in mid-August, 2d NVA elements avoided contact with friendly forces. However, at 0500 on 4 September, a company of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines located and engaged an estimated NVA battalion near Hill 63.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

When a second Marine company, maneuvering to reinforce the first, also made heavy contact with the enemy force, two additional companies from the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines were heli-lifted, at 0910, to a position to the northeast of the action. Striking to the southwest, both companies were heavily engaged by early afternoon, as was a third company moving from Thang Binh with tanks. During the first thirty-six hours of Operation Swift, the 5th Marines, supported by artillery and air, killed 190 NVA and captured 54 weapons.

### INITIATION OF OPERATION SWIFT - 4 SEPTEMBER 1967



Heavy fighting resumed again on the evening of the 6th, six miles northeast of Nui Loc Son, as the enemy made a series of company - size probes against forward Marine elements. Exploiting these probes, and employing artillery

~~COPY SECRET~~ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

and close air support, the 5th Marines launched a night attack, engaging a large enemy force. This battle continued until 0200, when the enemy broke contact, leaving behind 150 dead.

Then, at 0330, an NVA company attacked the Marines' rear guard company. The Marines returned fire with all organic weapons and directed artillery fires on the enemy, killing 34.

Documents taken from the enemy killed in these night actions confirmed the presence of the 1st VC and the 3d NVA Regiments in the area, and included a map which depicted the defensive posture of one battalion of the 1st VC Regiment. The map included locations of company positions, reserve positions, mortar positions, ammunition caches, and the battalion command post. This highly perishable information was immediately passed to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, which drove to the east on the 7th, directing heavy artillery and air strikes against positions depicted on the enemy map.

Largely as a result of the information gained from the captured documents, Operation Swift continued with significant contact for eight more days, accounting for an additional 191 enemy killed. An ammunition cache located on the 9th, contained 54 cases of small arms ammunition, 26 cases of both 82 and 60mm mortar rounds, 18 cases of recoilless rifle rounds, 10 cases of hand grenades, and 6 cases of B-40 anti-tank rockets. The last major ground engagement occurred on the night of the 11th, as two Marine companies maneuvered to kill 70 NVA.

Much of the success of Operation Swift can be attributed to the immediate availability to engaged ground units, of the Marine's organic close air support capability. With a total of 275 close air support missions being flown during the operation,

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~


COPY LBJ LIBRARY  
20

~~SECRET~~

Marine units were able quickly and successfully to exploit each ground contact.

Final results for Operation Swift, which terminated on 15 September, were 571 enemy killed, 8 captured, and 85 weapons seized, with another 529 probably killed in collapsed tunnels and bunkers. Marine losses were 127 killed, with 334 wounded and evacuated. Lien Ket 116, an ARVN operation conducted northeast of Nui Loc Son in conjunction with Swift, killed 212 NVA. The locations of Marine and ARVN contacts in Swift and Lien Ket 116 are shown below.

### OPERATION SWIFT/LIEN KET 116



Operation Swift demonstrated again that NVA units which are removed from their North Vietnam sanctuary cannot prevail against our forces which are free to maneuver and uninhibited by geographic boundaries. Marine units repeatedly flanked the enemy, cut off escape routes and utilizing their organic air mobility and close air support, were able to defeat NVA units in each successive engagement of this operation.

~~COPY TO LIBRARY~~

REF ID: A66211



~~SECRET~~

### -Operation Wheeler

While the 2d NVA Division was suffering heavy casualties from Marine forces in Operation Swift, Operation Wheeler was initiated on the 11th, directly to the south of Swift, against enemy forces and base areas west of Tam Ky. The four US Army battalions involved in Operation Wheeler had a two fold objective in III MAF's continuing offensive against the 2d NVA Division. The first was to exploit contacts made by Marines against the 1st VC and 3d NVA Regiments, believed to be fleeing to the south and, second, to locate and destroy elements of the 21st NVA Regiment, believed to be located in the hill mass north of Thien Phuoc.

Although there were no individual large unit engagements, Operation Wheeler produced significant results throughout the month. Multiple platoon and company size contacts were developed and effectively exploited by rapid heliborne movement, coupled with artillery and air strikes. Operating in a large area five miles wide and ten miles long, west of Tam Ky, US Army units have accounted for 428 VC/NVA killed through 30 September, while friendly casualties have been 41 killed and 171 evacuated with wounds.

### Operation Dragon Fire

In northern Quang Ngai province on the 5th, 14 miles south of Chu Lai, ROK Marines launched a coordinated heliborne/amphibious assault against the Batangan peninsula to establish a tactical base for the newly formed 5th ROKMC Battalion. The Batangan area has long been under Viet Cong domination and recent intelligence reports gave evidence that the 48th VC battalion (Local Force) had returned to the area for recruiting and tax collection purposes.

COPY LBJ LIBRARY


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Dragon Fire, a three battalion ROK Marine effort enjoyed continued success against these forces. In conjunction with the heliborne amphibious assault by one battalion against the peninsula, two additional battalions swept toward the sea from the west and trapped the enemy in large numbers. Supported extensively by air, artillery, and naval gunfire, ROK Marines have killed 404 enemy and captured 14 prisoners and 28 weapons, while friendly losses stand at 39 killed and 166 wounded.

The location of Operation Dragon Fire in the Batangan peninsula area is shown below.

### OPERATION DRAGON FIRE



~~COPY SECRET~~ LIBRARY

### Realignment of Forces in I CTZ

Throughout 1967 the enemy has concentrated his effort against the I CTZ. Since May, the pace of activity, measured in terms of US and enemy troops killed, has been greater than all the rest of RVN combined.

-About 57% of all enemy killed in Vietnam since 1 May have been killed in I CTZ (37,400 in RVN; 21,300 in I CTZ).

-About 56% of all US troops killed in Vietnam since 1 May have been killed in I CTZ (3,960 in RVN; 2,227 in I CTZ).

To counter the enemy's growing effort in I CTZ, COM-USMACV, in late September, instituted planning for the reinforcement of III MAF. The initial plan, as stated, was scheduled for execution in the following three increments:

(1) By 4 October, one brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), consisting of three battalions, would deploy to I Corps, freeing a Marine regiment to deploy north to the DMZ area.

(2) On or about 25 October, the 1st Cavalry Division Headquarters, with four additional battalions would deploy to I CTZ, allowing additional Marine forces to move north.

(3) In early 1968, it was planned that the remainder of the 1st Cavalry would join the division, giving III MAF a total increase of nine infantry battalions in I CTZ.


Subsequent plans however, have reduced the total reinforcement effort. Thus, beginning in early October, three US Army battalions will replace the two battalions of the 5th Marines in the Nui Loc Son basin area, enabling III MAF to move two Marine battalions and a regimental headquarters into Northern Quang Tri province. Plans for movement of the remaining Army forces, as originally

~~SECRET~~

contemplated, have been deferred.

These additional US Army forces will raise the I CTZ share of friendly forces from 18% to 20% of those in RVN. The net result of this projected realignment of forces is displayed below.

### INFANTRY REALIGNMENTS PROJECTED TO 4 OCTOBER 1967



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

### SMALL UNIT COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

A testimonial to progress in the counter guerrilla campaign in I CTZ was registered at the polls in early September. The enemy had avowed publicly his intent to stop the elections, and his campaign to disrupt them probably represented the maximum effort of which he was capable. But in spite of his political maneuvering, his overt attacks, terrorist violence, threats and propaganda, 86% of the eligible voters in I CTZ went to the polls on election day. This turn-out, in the face of the enemy's all-out opposition can be regarded as a validation of the protective program executed, in coordination, by Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces and by US elements.

III MAF's long term campaign against the guerrilla remained at a high level through the election period and the remainder of the month, even though hampered by the beginning of the northeast monsoon. In all, 37,285 small unit patrols, ambushes and company size search and destroy operations were conducted by III MAF, an average of over 1,240 a day. Noteworthy was the fact that 23,870 or 64% were conducted at night. Marine units were responsible for 33,306 of the total number, and elements of the newly designated U. S. Army Americal Division in the southern portion of I CTZ carried out 3,979.

These and related figures are displayed on the graphs on the following page. Also, because of the shifting pattern of enemy troop structure, and his increasing preoccupation with the Revolutionary Development Program, there are displayed similar figures related to III MAF large unit operations. This growing convergence of large unit operations and small unit counter guerrilla operations is discussed in more detail following the graphs.


COPY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~


COPY 26 LIBRARY

### III MAF OPERATIONS IN THE I CTZ COASTAL PLAIN 1 OCTOBER 1966 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1967


SMALL UNIT PATROLS, AMBUSHES  
AND SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS




LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS IN PROGRESS



ENEMY KILLED BY SMALL UNIT PATROLS, AMBUSHES  
AND SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS



ENEMY KILLED BY LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS



In addition to the figures above, 7,457 enemy have been killed in 18 Large Unit Operations in the DMZ area since September 1966.

The number of enemy killed in small unit counter-guerrilla operations in September was 489, a relatively low figure compared to past months, but one which points to a major change in the character of the enemy. The number, strength and influence of the Viet Cong Main Force have gradually been diminished over the past two years, and the enemy has consequently been obliged to commit progressively greater numbers of regular NVA troops in order to maintain pressure on the populated regions of the I CTZ coastal plain.

~~SECRET~~

Since March 1965, over 59,000 enemy troops have been confirmed killed in the I CTZ. There is no method of determining precisely how many of these were Viet Cong and how many were North Vietnamese; however, the changing enemy order of battle provides a clue to this. The enemy forces who faced the Marines in the spring of 1965 were virtually all Viet Cong. Today, in I CTZ only 32% of the regular and main force enemy are Viet Cong; the rest are North Vietnamese Army regulars, most of them conscripts. Enemy order of battle estimates show a peak Main Force Viet Cong strength of 11,253 in December of 1965. In September 1967 the figure had dropped to 4,875.

These losses of Viet Cong Main Force troops, an important element of the enemy infrastructure, have made it progressively more difficult for him to cope with the pressure of the GVN Revolutionary Development Program. The hard-core Viet Cong guerrilla is not replaceable on a man-for-man basis by the NVA regular. Two years ago, Main Force Viet Cong units were made up largely of tough, resourceful, determined guerrilla soldiers, whose leaders had long combat experience, reaching back to the Viet Minh. The highest ambition to which a young Viet Cong militia recruit could aspire was one day to become a member of a Viet Cong Main Force unit, a process which required years.

The Main Force VC soldier, as a result, represented a very considerable problem to the free world side. He knew the terrain, since it was his home. His actions, speech, and mannerisms were those of the local populace, so that it was a simple matter for him to melt away into the country side. And, being from the south, he usually had friends and family who, although not communists or Viet Cong, would give him food, shelter, support and information.

COPY LBJ LIBRARY  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Replacement of losses among such troops with NVA regulars tends to change the overall character of the enemy in I CTZ. The NVA soldier generally is better equipped, and better armed than the Viet Cong, but overall is less effective against the pacification programs because he lacks the guerrilla's skills and ties with the local population. The result is that the enemy must try to compensate in numbers for the decreased individual troop effectiveness.






This set of conditions provides an insight into the shifting trends in enemy offensive effort in I CTZ. It explains his introduction of the 2nd NVA Division into the Nui Loc Son basin, to bolster his infrastructure, which was being seriously eroded by III MAF's long term Danang and Chu Lai counter guerrilla campaigns. It accounts for the repeated large unit contacts, with subsequent heavy enemy losses, that III MAF has been able to achieve, mainly because the NVA units lack the elusiveness of the Viet Cong Main Force. However, the infusion of strength that the 2nd NVA Division brought has made possible the slightly increased enemy attack rates around the Nui Loc Son basin (Quang Nam and Quang Tri provinces), while the overall I CTZ number of enemy ground attacks in September (36) was generally an extension of the 1967 average (31). The more advanced weapons of the NVA have brought about the enemy's increased rate of mortar, rocket, and artillery activity. These and other details of the current trends in the enemy offensive pattern are exhibited on the following graphs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

# ENEMY ATTACKS IN I CTZ PROVINCES 1 OCT 1966 - 30 SEP 1967



GROUND ATTACKS



ATTACKS BY MORTAR,  
ROCKET OR ARTILLERY

~~COPIED SECRET~~

-Kit Carson Scouts

During the month, the sixty-seven Kit Carson Scouts attached to Marine units participated in 467 patrols. The volunteer Chieu Hoi returnees were directly responsible for killing two Viet Cong, finding three weapons and uncovering three caves with tunnel complexes. But more important, the Scouts discovered thirty explosive devices which, if left in place, could have maimed or killed Marines.

An example of the aggressiveness and spirit of the Scouts took place during an enemy ambush of a patrol on 14 September, three miles north of Phu Bai. A Scout was next to the lead Marine moving through the brush, when an intense burst of fire was directed at the patrol, severely wounding the Scout and five others. Disregarding his painful wound, the Scout remained in his position and delivered a heavy volume of suppressive fire which successfully thwarted the enemy attack.

Of interest also during the month was the effective monitoring of an enemy radio transmission by a scout accompanying a Marine reconnaissance patrol in the region approximately twelve miles northwest of Hue. From the radio intercepts, he discovered that his patrol was being watched by an enemy observation post which was directing another enemy unit to establish an ambush. The Scout quickly relayed this information to the patrol leader, and the Viet Cong attempt was foiled.

-Combined Action Units

The Combined Action program, initiated by Marines in August, 1965 to improve the effectiveness of Popular Forces - the local militia - again contributed to III MAF's


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~


counterguerrilla campaign, conducting 5,524 patrols and ambushes. Results included forty-five confirmed enemy killed, twelve enemy captured and forty-eight weapons seized. This compares favorably with previous months, as depicted below.

### COMBINED ACTION UNIT ACTIVITY


NIGHT OPERATIONS




DAY OPERATIONS



ENEMY KILLED



ENEMY CAPTURED



COPY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~


NOT IN 732 LIBRARY

-Sting Ray Patrols

Sting Ray patrols, inserted deep into enemy dominated regions to locate and direct fire on enemy units, killed 88 enemy during September with air strikes, artillery missions, and small arms fire.

The monsoon season is expected to limit Sting Ray effectiveness from October through January, due to limited visibility and poor flying weather. A graphic portrayal of Sting Ray operations conducted for the past year is shown below.

**CASUALTIES IN STING RAY OPERATIONS**



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

The Revolutionary Development program in I Corps registered moderate gains in September, following the successful completion of balloting in the national elections. Pacification gains were registered in twenty-four villages within the III MAF tactical areas and, within the RD Priority Areas, the ARVN achieved noteworthy results, conducting 21 operations in support of RD, during which over 400 enemy were killed.

Other noteworthy achievements were seen in the RD Team program. By the end of the month, 125 teams were functioning in I CTZ, an increase of 4 teams from August which brings the total within 13 of the number needed to meet the 1967 GVN goal (138).

A critical factor, which affected RD activities (as well as virtually everything else in I CTZ) was the onset of the northeast monsoon. In September, the downpour ranged from 16 inches at Danang to 20 inches near Phu Bai. It slowed RD construction, impaired security and communications, upset transportation schedules and hampered commerce.

Despite the interference created by the continuing monsoon, September closed on a note of promise of even greater Revolutionary Development progress in the future. The impending insertion of a fourth US Army brigade into I Corps, scheduled for early October, will permit movement of additional Marine forces northward to Quang Tri while also strengthening III MAF in and near the coastal RD Priority Areas.

COPY 1BJ LIBRARY  
~~SECRET~~

### Pacification Progress


The September evaluation of villages within the III MAF tactical areas at Danang, Chu Lai and Phu Bai again disclosed moderate pacification progress. Twenty-four villages improved in status, seven of them sufficiently to advance to higher categories on the III MAF evaluation scale. Only six villages sustained losses, and none of these moved to a lower category.

Evaluation also disclosed marked progress within the tactical area at Duc Pho, where ten villages gained, including two which moved to higher categories. In northern I Corps, where enemy activity was heaviest, the status of pacification remained almost unchanged this month. One village increased on the pacification scale; none lost ground.

On the following pages, five maps depict the status of RD progress in the Danang, Phu Bai, Chu Lai, Duc Pho areas and in northern I Corps. These are followed by a series of graphs showing the growth of local government and improvement of village security in those areas.

~~SECRET~~

# REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - DANANG AREA




PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67
Under 20%	667	630	645	144,747	132,088	193,826	34	32	44
20%	52	65	83	86,425	79,448	55,464	19	17	13
40%	84	102	83	84,892	93,031	66,422	16	13	15
60%	102	75	86	85,718	68,337	89,175	17	15	16
80%	94	127	151	339,243	366,533	409,640	18	22	24
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	999	999	1,048	741,025	739,437	814,527	104	104	112

COPY-ABLES LIBRARY  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - CHU LAI AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67
Under 20%	207	156	213	100,272	63,339	85,940	25	19	22
20%	68	105	43	32,168	52,289	24,475	6	10	5
40%	89	53	96	48,365	36,962	60,151	8	7	8
60%	87	65	57	36,316	41,705	51,567	7	7	11
80%	81	133	124	62,457	75,736	57,291 *	11	14	11
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	532	532	533	277,578	270,031	279,424*	57	57	57

\* Reflects minor census adjustment.


COPY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

COPY LBJ LIBRARY



## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STATUS - PHU BAI AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	SEP-66	MAR-67	SEP-67
Under 20%	40	41	35	10,381	10,381	11,199	11	11	11
20%	41	41	17	9,524	9,524	3,585	2	2	1
40%	17	—	—	9,049	—	—	1	—	—
60%	8	24	63	5,296	14,345	29,003	1	2	4
80%	55	56	47	33,787	33,787	22,734 *	7	7	6
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	162	162	152	68,037	68,037	66,521 *	22	22	22


\* Reflects minor census adjustment.

COPY FILED FEBRUARY

COPY FILED FEBRUARY

~~SECRET~~

# REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS - DUC PHO AREA



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES		CIVILIAN POPULATION		VILLAGES	
	MAR-67	SEP-67	MAR-67	SEP-67	MAR-67	SEP-67
Under 20%	—	—	—	—	—	—
20%	43	36	32,799	28,466 *	6	6
40%	—	89	—	54,711	—	8
60%	—	32	—	18,669	—	4
80%	—	5	—	7,133	—	1
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	43	162	32,799	108,979 *	6	19


\* Reflects minor census adjustment.



~~SECRET~~  
COMPTON LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

# REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN NORTHERN I CTZ



PERCENT PACIFIED	SQUARE MILES			CIVILIAN POPULATION			VILLAGES		
	OCT-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	OCT-66	MAR-67	SEP-67	OCT-66	MAR-67	SEP-67
Under 20%	—	—	51	—	—	5,275	—	—	3
20%	—	—	13	—	—	4,641	—	—	1
40%	—	29 *	44	—	4,803 *	14,719	—	2 *	3
60%	102	119	63	18,014	19,894	17,216	6	7	6
80%	10	23	37	10,799	13,654	15,277	2	3	3
100%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	112	171 *	203	28,813	38,341 *	57,128	8	12 *	16


\* Adjusted total

COPY 1BJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN III MAF AREAS\*



\*Danang, Chu Lai, Phu Bai, Duc Pho, northern I CTZ

~~COPY SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

### RD Progress Evaluation

Since July, there has been a progressive evaluation of pacification progress as measured according to the Marine system and the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). Although the HES technique was based originally on the Marine system, and while there remains a considerable similarity between the two systems, they differ in several important areas. The HES is oriented at the hamlet level, while the Marine system is based on village status. HES uses a letter grading scale, while the Marine system employs a 100-point numerical scale. HES derives its information from the advisor system; the Marine program utilizes the military structure for its information. The grading system of HES is not weighted, each of its six measurement categories being accorded equal importance. The Marine system assigns security factors more importance than civil factors. The result is that the HES assessment is oriented more directly upon administrative, political and economic matters, while the Marine system is oriented more toward measurement of military conditions. Thus, there may be considerable variation between the scores of the two systems for individual villages.

Nevertheless, and despite these understandable differences in emphasis, the two systems co-relate reasonably well. They are complementary and tell generally the same overall story about conditions in the countryside of I CTZ, although the Marine system tells a story one or two months more current. A test was made, using reports on the 224 villages in the Marine areas for the months of July and August (the latter being the most recent HES report). In the test, a hamlet which moved up or down one letter-grade according to HES was listed under the appropriate "gain or loss" column.

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Similarly, a village which moved up or down one 20 percentile in the Marine system was shown as a corresponding loss or gain. The results are shown here.

1967	HES (HAMLETS)			MARINES (VILLAGES)		
	GAIN	LOSS	NET	GAIN	LOSS	NET
JULY	62	53	+9	8	4	+4
AUGUST	45	5	+40	13	3	+10
TOTAL	107	58	+49	21	7	+14

The figures above exhibit general agreement on July and August pacification level changes between the two systems. It is significant that both systems reflect change in the same direction and, on the basis that there is an average of four hamlets per village, the numbers co-relate reasonably well.

To assess the correlation on a village-by-village basis in a single month, a second test was undertaken. A technique for making gross estimates of equivalents between the two systems was devised. This was based on three categories, generally representing villages which are at an advanced stage of pacification (Category I), those at an intermediate

~~SECRET~~  
COPY LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

level (Category II), and those in the early stages where much remains to be done (Category III). Accordingly, the following table of equivalents was used:

HES GRADE	MARINE SCORE	EQUIVALENT CATEGORY
A or B	100% to 70%	I
C	69% to 35%	II
D, E or V	34% to 0%	III

In order to conduct the test, a HES village grade was developed, based on the average grade of its hamlets. Then, using the table above, each village was given two grades: one based on its HES grade and the other based on the score according to the Marine system. Again, the systems tended to converge.

Eighty-seven (78%) of the 112 villages turned out to have the same category grade, and only 11 (less than 10%) differed in a gross degree.

In sum, the two systems tended to validate and reinforce each other. HES offers an evaluation in areas where there is little US military presence, while the Marine program gives an in-depth appraisal in areas under our influence. The Marine system will continue to be used in this series for the areas accessible to US military reporting and the HES reports will be employed in addressing other areas.

~~COPY LIBRARY~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


### ARVN Contributions to RD

During late August and early September, ARVN forces in I Corps were engaged in providing close-in protection for polling places, in what proved to be an effective effort to prevent enemy interference with the September 3rd national elections. Behind an outer protective screen of III MAF forces, the ARVN, with national and local police and Regional and Popular Force elements, succeeded in providing the protection required to free I Corps voters of Viet Cong intimidation. The degree of their success can best be judged by the I Corps voter turnout of over 86%.

Following the elections, there was little letdown in the ARVN activity in support of RD. Twenty-one search and destroy operations were conducted during the month, just short of the record of 24 RD support operations undertaken in August. The September total, which greatly exceeded the 1967 average of 12 operations per month, accounted for 403 enemy killed, 93 others captured and 116 weapons captured.

ARVN units have been employed in direct support of RD only since the start of 1967. As shown on the graphs below, the ARVN effort has had a steadily increasing effect.

### ACHIEVEMENTS OF ARVN UNITS SUPPORTING REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT



~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

By end September, GVN forces committed to the direct support of the RD program in I CTZ included fourteen ARVN battalions, one Regional Force battalion, twenty-six Regional Force companies and 191 Popular Force platoons. In general, these support activities involve aiding the provincial RD plan by driving enemy units out of villages and hamlets before RD Teams are inserted therein, while conducting extensive patrolling and other counter guerrilla activities to ensure that the enemy does not reenter previously cleared areas.

In one action during the month, the ARVN demonstrated creditable strength in dealing with the enemy. Early on September 6th, an attack was launched on the Quang Tin provincial headquarters at Tam Ky, defended by elements of the 6th ARVN Infantry Regiment. The enemy force, later identified as the 70th Battalion, 1st Viet Cong Regiment and the 72nd Viet Cong Local Force Battalion, began the action with an intense mortar and recoilless rifle preparation, followed by a ground attack. The ARVN positions were severely tested but the defending force held fast and, with close air support, repelled the enemy, killing 217 Viet Cong while sustaining 22 killed and 60 wounded, themselves.

Among other highlights of ARVN activity in support of RD last month was Operation Lam Son 120, a multi-battalion operation conducted during the period 5-8 September in the Thua Thien RD Priority Area, east of Hue, which resulted in 78 VC killed and 11 captured. Within the Quang Ngai priority area, two multi-battalion size operations conducted during the month netted 194 enemy killed, 50 captured and 58 weapons seized.

COPY 1BJ LIBRARY  
~~SECRET~~

46  
COPY 1BJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

### Revolutionary Development Teams

Despite coordinated enemy opposition, Revolutionary Development Teams improved in both growth and performance in September. Four new teams were formed during the month, bringing the total number functioning in I CTZ to 125. This represented an improvement over the growth rate achieved in recent months, when the GVN averaged just over one team formed per month. If the present rate continues for the remaining months of the year, the 1967 goal of 138 teams deployed should be very nearly achieved.

A typical example of effective RD Team performance was evidenced during the month by one of those deployed in the hamlet of Da Ngan, just north of Quang Ngai City. This team has already completed 60% of its assigned mission after only two months in the hamlet. It has encouraged and supported numerous self-help projects such as reconstruction of over 600 meters of fence previously damaged by the Viet Cong, the digging of 8 wells, and the repair of hamlet roads and culverts. In addition, in this short time, the team has completed a census in the hamlet and created a functioning local intelligence net to expose the enemy infrastructure. Partially as a result of knowledge obtained through this intelligence system, three enemy attacks were repelled in September.

### Chieu Hoi Program

In September, there was a sharp decline in the number of Chieu Hoi ralliers in the I Corps. Seventy three returnees materialized during the month, far below the 1967 monthly average of two hundred. In considering possible reasons for the decrease, it has been noted that the preponderance of the US/GVN psychological warfare effort in September was directed at matters

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

FORM 1-47