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MACV: Operations of US Marine  
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OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE FORCES  
VIETNAM

JULY 1967

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This is a summary of activities of US Marine forces in Vietnam for the month of July 1967. Its purpose is to update similar historical reports covering periods from March 1965 through June 1967.

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UNCLASSIFIEDSUMMARY

During July, the confrontation in I Corps continued in the pattern of the previous month. There was heavy fighting in the DMZ area, where the enemy was again frustrated in his attempts to reduce the Marine outposts, but where his substantial troop and logistic buildup continued, despite heavy US fire support efforts. There was also heavy fighting in the coastal plain, where the enemy campaign against the Revolutionary Development program met growing resistance.

The intensity of the conflict was reflected in the casualty figures for both sides. III MAF forces (including Task Force Oregon) killed 2,983 of the enemy and captured 246, while suffering 413 killed and 3,208 wounded. The enemy losses were the second highest to date, exceeded only by May's total of 3,914.

During the month, III MAF units and the two Marine Special Landing Forces of the 7th Fleet were engaged in twenty large scale operations - a record level of III MAF large unit offensive activity for the entire war. The previous high of fifteen occurred in June. The July large unit effort accounted for 1,864 enemy killed, the bulk in the DMZ area, where the enemy committed as many as five battalions in coordinated attacks on Marine positions. Two encounters are worthy of note. On 6 July, a Marine company observed two hundred NVA in a draw just northeast of Con Thien, called in artillery fire to block their escape, and then attacked the pinioned enemy, killing 154. There were no Marine losses. And shortly before midnight on the same day, another Marine company surprised four hundred of the enemy moving along a trail towards Con Thien and, in heavy night fighting, killed 155. Three Marines were killed.

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Not all engagements were favorable. On 2 July, eighty-four Marines were killed and 190 wounded when a company patrol northeast of Con Thien was attacked by five enemy battalions, who employed mortars, flamethrowers, and massed artillery with great effect. And, on 29 July, a Marine battalion suffered twenty-four killed and 202 wounded when it was attacked by a two battalion force near the DMZ boundary.

Powerful air attacks - some 2,300 USMC sorties - and artillery interdiction in the DMZ area damaged the enemy and caused him significant material and personnel losses, but did not halt his buildup of power within the sanctuary area.

Despite the drain on its resources imposed by sustained combat near the DMZ, work on the strong-point obstacle system, and heavy commitments elsewhere in I Corps, III MAF maintained the increasing pace in its counter-guerrilla campaign. Marines conducted 34,662 patrols, ambushes, and company size operations, while an additional 5,104 were undertaken by US Army units of Task Force Oregon. These resulted in 1,076 enemy killed, a monthly total exceeded only by the 1,518 killed in May of this year. In addition, sixty-one enemy were captured and 306 weapons were seized.

It was evident, at the end of the month, that the enemy's campaign to disrupt the Revolutionary Development program had failed to bear significant fruit. The resumption of RD progress in I Corps, which first was noted in June, continued during July. Forty GVN RD teams completed the political, social, and economic programs in their hamlets and either had moved elsewhere, to begin the process anew, or were preparing to move. Route 1 was opened from Duc Pho south to the II CTZ border, which means that the highway is now open the entire length of I Corps. Measurable

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gains in local security and self-government were made by thirty villages in the principal III MAF pacification areas, and 224 of the enemy defected during the month, raising to 1,504 the number of Chieu Hoi returnees in I Corps thus far in 1967 - a 62% increase over the comparable period a year ago.

On the night of 14-15 July, the enemy attacked Danang Air Base with 122mm rockets, despite an intensive program of patrols, observation and listening posts, searchlight posts and ambushes. Heavy damage was caused to facilities and aircraft at the base. Although friendly reaction was prompt, with fire on the enemy rocket positions within 3 minutes, the success of the attack underscores the need for obtaining from the Vietnamese people more and better information about the enemy's intentions in order to prevent the attacks in the first place.

The Combined Action program, an endeavor aimed at both getting more out of the thinly spread Marine assets and increasing the effectiveness of the Popular Forces, fell behind in its progress toward 114 combined platoons by the end of the year. Seventy-five platoons were in being at end-July, the same number as for the two previous months. This condition is attributable chiefly to a shortage of Marines for new units. Approval for additional Marine spaces for the program has been pending since April.

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GOALS  
And Progress Toward Achieving Them

Major goals sought by III MAF in 1967, and progress toward their attainment, are being reported at bi-monthly intervals. They will be discussed next in the August report.

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UNCLASSIFIEDOperations in the Western DMZ Region

June closed with Marines, in Operation Crockett, having successfully countered enemy movements north and east of Khe Sanh. In the first two weeks of July, contacts in Crockett were greatly diminished, and the operation was terminated in mid-month. Cumulative results were 206 enemy killed, two captured, and twenty-six weapons seized. Marine casualties were fifty-two killed and 285 wounded.

Concurrent with the diminution of activity in Operation Crockett, there were continuing attempts by the enemy to establish positions in force in the western DMZ region. As a consequence, Operation Ardmore was initiated on the 17th, with two battalions of the 26th Marines conducting search and destroy operations aimed at impeding enemy infiltration from both Laos and the north. On the 21st, patrolling rifle companies uncovered several NVA platoons in the mountains eight miles northeast of Khe Sanh. With air and artillery support, the Marines routed the enemy, killing at least ten.

Later that same afternoon, two miles south of the 26th Marines' contact, a patrol from the 3d Marines encountered an enemy battalion along Route 9. Two Marine rifle companies maneuvered rapidly to reinforce the patrol and, with Marine air and artillery support, killed twenty-four NVA before the enemy fled. The eleven Marine air strikes triggered ten secondary explosions.

On the 24th, aggressive patrolling in the same area of Route 9 exposed a large scale enemy ambush. An enemy minefield some two thousand meters long, on the south side of Route 9, was discovered by a patrol and destroyed by Marine engineers.

As the month drew to a close, it was apparent that North Vietnamese Army units were still threatening the

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
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remote Khe Sanh outpost from both the west and east, while at the same time attempting to interdict Route 9 between Khe Sanh and Cam Lo.

### ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN DMZ AREA - JULY 1967



### Operations in the Eastern DMZ Region

The major operation in the eastern DMZ region during July was Operation Buffalo, which led to one of the heaviest and most costly engagements of the war to date. At 1000 on 2 July, Company B of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, on a patrol a mile and a half northeast of Con Thien, made contact with what appeared to be a small but well-entrenched enemy unit. The action developed rapidly into a well-coordinated attack by five NVA battalions. The enemy, for the first time in the war, employed both light and medium artillery in mass and in close coordination with his ground attack, in addition to using both mortars and flame throwers.

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The remaining companies of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines maneuvered rapidly, both overland and by helicopter, to reinforce and relieve the pressure on Company B. They came under heavy mortar and artillery fire as they entered the action, and the battle throughout was intense and at close quarters. Marine aircraft, in the first few hours of the engagement, flew twenty-eight close air support sorties, delivering ninety tons of ordnance. The air attacks, in close coordination with Marines engaged on the ground, were credited with killing sixty-five of the enemy and destroying fifteen bunkers. Marine artillery fired 453 missions during the day, and 7th Fleet ships added their support with 142 rounds of 5 inch naval gunfire.

In his efforts to impede maneuver by Marine reinforcements, the enemy on the 2d fired a record number of artillery and mortar rounds (1,065) on Gio Linh and Con Thien. Over seven hundred rounds fell on the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines alone. In mid-afternoon, the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines entered the battle by helicopter from Dong Ha, and quickly launched an attack on the enemy left flank, which caused the NVA force to break contact and withdraw to the north. Initial confirmed enemy losses were fifty-five enemy killed, with another eighty-eight listed as probably killed. However, Marine casualties on the 2d were heavy - eighty-four killed, 190 wounded and one Marine missing.

In the face of what appeared to be a growing artillery supported NVA effort in the eastern region of the DMZ, III MAF undertook to reinforce the 9th Marines. As the 1st Battalion's contact on the 2d was developing, Marine Special Landing Force Alpha was committed to land in eastern Quang Tri and, at the same time, Special Landing Force Bravo, which also was afloat, was alerted. In less than twenty-five hours after the 9th Marines' initial contact, SLF Alpha (BLT

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
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1/3 and HMM-362) began landing by helicopter a mile south-east of Con Thien. Both the infantry battalion and artillery battery were in place by the afternoon of the 3d.

A day later, SLF Bravo (BLT 2/3 and HMM-164) landed by helicopter near Cam Lo and moved northward, on the western flank of the activity, toward Con Thien. This landing, Operation Beaver Track, took place only two days after the same BLT had completed Operation Beacon Torch in the Pagoda Valley, one hundred miles to the southeast. The map below displays the actions in Operation Buffalo from the 2d to the 5th of July.

## OPERATION BUFFALO 2-5 JULY 1967



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Following the vigorous action at the start of Operation Buffalo, except for probes on Marine units and small meeting engagements, enemy units avoided contact for several days. However, on the morning of 6 July, a NVA force, supported by mortars, attacked the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines near Con Thien. The attack was unsuccessful and cost the enemy 35 confirmed killed. At about the same time, Company A of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines sighted about two hundred NVA concentrated in a draw, two miles northeast of Con Thien. Calling in artillery fire to fix the enemy in place, the company attacked and killed 154 NVA, before the enemy remnants were able to escape. There were no Marine casualties.

That same day, just before midnight, the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines surprised an NVA four hundred-man battalion moving along a trail in column, about three miles northeast of Con Thien. The Marines struck hard at the enemy and, in heavy night fighting, killed 155 NVA. Marine casualties were three killed.

On the 8th and 9th, the Special Landing Force units made contacts with additional NVA units southwest and southeast of Con Thien, killing eighty-four of the enemy there.

By the end of Operation Buffalo, on the 14th, enemy losses stood at 1,290 confirmed killed, two captured and another 513 probably killed. One hundred weapons, including twenty-one mortars and machine guns, were captured. Marine losses, by comparison, were 159 killed and 345 wounded.

Of the total enemy losses in Buffalo, supporting Marine air, artillery and naval gunfire were credited with 475 NVA confirmed killed, 164 bunkers destroyed, fifteen enemy artillery and rocket positions destroyed and forty-six secondary explosions from hits on ammunition dumps. Between the 2d

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
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and the 10th, the period of the heaviest ground fighting, 1,066 tons of aviation ordnance, over forty thousand rounds of III MAF artillery, and 1,500 five inch and eight inch naval gunfire rounds from 7th Fleet ships supported Marine infantry.

The map below depicts the major actions in Operation Buffalo on 6-14 July.

## OPERATION BUFFALO 6-14 JULY



-Hickory II

To exploit Operation Buffalo, COMUSMACV directed that another sweep be made of the DMZ south of the Ben Hai River. The operation was intended to destroy enemy fortifications and mortar and artillery positions in the southern half of the DMZ. The concept was similar to that employed during

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
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Hickory I (18-26 May), when five ARVN and eight US Marine battalions moved rapidly to the Ben Hai River and then swept southward. In Hickory II, two Marine battalions again drove north to the Ben Hai River, wheeled about, and attacked southward to the Cam Lo River, where two Marine battalions had set up blocking positions. BLT 2/3 (Special Landing Force Bravo) screened the west flank, while three ARVN infantry battalions and an armored personnel carrier troop advanced into the DMZ on Route 1, then turned and attacked southward. East of the ARVN thrust, the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion operated in the coastal sand dunes.

### CONCEPT; OPERATION HICKORY II 14-16 JULY



The operation met with little resistance. One major contact occurred on the 15th, when the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion engaged an enemy force about four miles east of Gio Linh. After a

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day long engagement marked by extensive use of artillery and air attacks, as well as direct fire from 105mm howitzer-armed amphibian tractors, the enemy withdrew, leaving 25 KIA behind. Marine casualties, when the operation terminated on the 16th, were four killed and ninety wounded. Total NVA and Viet Cong losses were thirty-nine killed, twenty-three probably killed and nineteen weapons captured. From the light contact in Hickory II, it was apparent that the bulk of the enemy had previously withdrawn north of the Ben Hai River.

-Special Landing Forces

At the close of Hickory, the two Special Landing Forces reembarked in their amphibious shipping, refurbished, and resumed a ready status off the coast of I Corps.

Within three days, SLF Bravo landed again, in Operation Bear Chain, which was centered in the coastal region between Quang Tri City and Hue. The purpose of Bear Chain was to strike the exposed, seaward flank of the Viet Cong 806th Battalion, and to destroy that unit or drive it westward toward ARVN forces in Operation Lam Son 87. As it turned out, the enemy moved west to evade the Marines, abandoning over thirty-seven tons of rice stores in their haste to escape. In their withdrawal, the enemy ran into the ARVN, who stood firm, killing 252 VC and capturing eighteen others. Its purpose achieved, Bear Chain was terminated on the 26th. Ten Marines were killed in the operation.


The map on the following page portrays activity in Operation Bear Chain.

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### OPERATION BEAR CHAIN / LAM SON 87



SLF Alpha, meanwhile, had landed again and was engaged in counter guerrilla sweeps in the coastal area, eighteen miles southeast of Hue. This operation, called Beacon Guide, was conducted as part of III MAF's overall program to maintain pressure on guerrilla units in the rice-rich coastal regions of I Corps. In these operations, results often are intangible. As a rule, the enemy casualty total is not high, and there generally are few large-scale engagements. The benefits, nevertheless, are real. Enemy activity in the area is disrupted, as the guerrillas are forced to leave the region or risk capture or death; vacated enemy facilities are destroyed and, even though these may be rebuilt, the guerrilla knows that they are likely to be destroyed again. Finally, the populace is made aware of the weaknesses of the guerrilla force in comparison with the strength of the free world forces. In brief, they provide evidence of a strong and continuing friendly presence, a key factor in Revolutionary Development.

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In this regard, Beacon Guide was typical. There were only small clashes with guerrillas, although there was considerable evidence of recent VC activity. Four guerrillas were captured, and an enemy base camp was uncovered and destroyed, along with an extensive cave and tunnel complex.

In terms of enemy losses, results of SLF operations continued to be substantial. During July, they accounted for 445 enemy killed and six captured, which raised to 1,883 the number of enemy killed during thirteen SLF operations thus far in 1967. During the seven-month period, 248 Marines of the SLF's were killed and 1,313 wounded.

-Operation Kingfisher

While the two Special Landing Forces were moving from Operation Buffalo to launch the amphibious attacks just described, the other battalions from Buffalo were being committed to Operation Kingfisher, in the Con Thien area.

Kingfisher, like other operations in the DMZ area which preceded it, was aimed at blocking NVA entry in force into Quang Tri province. From the 16th through the 27th, it was characterized by minor contacts. On the 28th, however, the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines discovered an enemy base at Thon Cam Son, in the DMZ on the banks of the Ben Hai river, five miles northwest of Con Thien. With supporting Marine tanks, amphibian tractors, and Ontos, the battalion began a systematic destruction of the base, which contained over 150 bunkers and an extensive water supply system, the latter with an estimated capacity of ten thousand gallons a day. Other than firing small arms at Marine aircraft striking north of the Ben Hai, the enemy avoided contact.


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On the morning of the 29th, the battalion began to move southward, but the lead company soon encountered strong resistance, including mortar fire, command-detonated mines and small arms fire. A company of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines quickly advanced northward toward the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, relieving the pressure on that unit, and causing the enemy to break contact. By noon the following day, all elements of the battalion had moved south of the DMZ without further enemy resistance. Confirmed enemy losses stood at forty-eight killed, two weapons captured and a regimental size base camp destroyed. Marine casualties were twenty-four killed and 142 wounded-evacuated. An additional sixty Marines who received minor wounds returned to duty within the day.

### OPERATION KINGFISHER-16 JULY-31 JULY 1967



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The contact on the 29th was the last significant contact for Kingfisher during July. As the month ended, cumulative enemy losses stood at 159 enemy confirmed killed and fifteen weapons captured. Marine casualties were forty-one killed, 215 wounded seriously enough to be evacuated, and 140 additional Marines wounded slightly.

#### Artillery Fire in the DMZ and North Vietnam

During the month, some 15,249 rounds of artillery were delivered on enemy forces and installations in the DMZ and northward. This heavy effort, coordinated with an intensified air interdiction campaign (see Air Operations section) served to impede enemy logistic activity and interfere with his troop marshalling and movement. However, it was not of the magnitude or intensity needed completely - or even largely - to halt a growing buildup of enemy power in the DMZ sanctuary facing our forces in the Gio Linh-Con Thien-Khe Sanh area.

#### Enemy Losses in DMZ Area

In all, enemy losses in the DMZ area during July were substantial -- 1,513 confirmed killed, an additional 935 probably killed, and thirteen prisoners and 134 weapons taken. In the year that has passed since Operation Hastings thwarted the enemy's initial bid in Quang Tri, enemy losses in the DMZ region total 7,458 NVA confirmed killed, eighty-two captured, and 1,363 weapons captured. Marine casualties in the same period were 1,318 killed and 7,122 wounded. Most of the latter returned to action within twenty-four hours.

#### Operations in Southern I Corps - Operation Malheur II

In the populated region of southern Quang Ngai province, two US Army infantry battalions, with a cavalry

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troop in support, continued their search for guerrillas and main force units of the enemy's 2d and 22d Regiments. Action, in the main, was characterized by the extensive use of helicopter-borne reconnaissance teams who sought to draw fire from the enemy. When the enemy disclosed his position, other helicopters loaded with infantry were called in. These tactics netted good results against the enemy in this area; during July, 253 enemy were confirmed killed, thirty-four captured and seventy weapons seized. This brought the total for Malheur II, which began on the 8th of June, to 471 enemy killed, fifty-two prisoners taken and 147 weapons captured. US Army losses for the month were nine killed and 106 wounded. Cumulative friendly losses for Malheur II were twenty-nine US killed and 258 wounded. Particularly noteworthy is the contribution of these operations to Revolutionary Development progress in southern Quang Ngai, which has long been a VC stronghold. RD progress in this area is discussed in detail in the Revolutionary Development section.

#### Sting Ray Operations


While the battalions and regiments of III MAF were heavily committed to larger scale operations during the month, the small, deep reconnaissance patrols were busy directing surprise air strikes and artillery or naval gunfire missions on the enemy. 115 of these Sting Ray patrols during July controlled 164 artillery missions and fifty-six air strikes on the enemy moving about in the hinterland. These accounted for forty-three enemy confirmed killed and an additional 172 probably killed, but not confirmed due to the patrols' reliance on covert measures for security. Marine casualties in Sting Ray operations were five killed and thirty-seven wounded.

The graph on the following page shows casualties resulting from Sting Ray operations since their initiation in May 1966.

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# CASUALTIES IN STING RAY OPERATIONS



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COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS  
And Their Relationship To Large Unit Operations And  
Revolutionary Development

In July, 29,743 patrols, 9,732 ambushes and 291 small unit search and destroy operations were carried out by III MAF against enemy guerrillas.

The total of 39,766 small unit counter guerrilla operations represented an increase of 2,289 over June's total. This was a continuation of the accelerated pace of these operations which began in November of 1966. Each month has seen the level of activity exceed that of the preceding month, and the aggregate growth since that time has been substantial. In October 1966, 10,713 small unit counter guerrilla operations were conducted; in July 1967, there were 39,766 - an increase of over two hundred percent, or an average growth of 3,228 per month. In July these operations maintained heavy pressure on the enemy infrastructure and resulted in 1,076 enemy killed, sixty-one captured and 306 weapons seized.

The vital relationship of the small unit counter guerrilla campaign to the Revolutionary Development program has long been evident. In July, there was also becoming apparent a growing interrelationship between these small unit efforts, large unit operations and the RD program. This combination of large and small offensive operations has resulted in mounting and coordinated free world pressure against the enemy's activity in the coastal plain.

Fifty-eight large unit operations of this coastal campaign thus far in 1967 have resulted in 5,350 enemy troops confirmed killed, another 549 captured and 898 weapons seized. Small unit patrols, ambushes, and search and destroy operations have accounted for another 5,239 killed. These and related data are displayed on the following page.


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
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### III MAF OPERATIONS IN THE I CTZ COASTAL PLAIN 1 AUGUST 1966 TO 31 JULY 1967


SMALL UNIT PATROLS, AMBUSHES  
AND SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS




LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS IN PROGRESS\*



ENEMY KILLED BY SMALL UNIT PATROLS, AMBUSHES  
AND SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS



ENEMY KILLED BY LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS\*



\* Figures do not include 19 Large Unit Operations and 7,458 enemy killed in DMZ area since July 1966.

The significance of those companion large and small unit campaigns becomes clear when they are viewed in relation to the current enemy effort in the coastal plain, his failure to defeat the GVN RD program there, and the price he is paying in attempting to do so.

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Late in 1966, the enemy began to introduce substantially larger numbers of NVA troops in an effort to strengthen his eroding infrastructure and to defeat the GVN Revolutionary Development program. Since that time he has been willing to accept large losses in the DMZ region in order to draw free world forces away from support of the Revolutionary Development program in the coastal plain. He has so far lost an estimated 10,400 troops near the DMZ in 1967 in order to kill 980 free world troops and to occupy the attention of as many as 15 free world battalions.

The cumulative effects of these losses, plus the large and small operations in the coastal plain, are apparent in prisoner interrogation reports gathered during June and July, which underscore enemy problems derived from shortages of personnel, food, and equipment. Typical reactions of returnees, ralliers, and POW's are shown below:

-Phan Van Tin, a fourteen year old NVA who surrendered under Chieu Hoi in July, stated that he received orders to report for induction at age thirteen. All of the men of his village between the ages of twenty and thirty had already been drafted and all boys who were fourteen or near fourteen were drafted with him.

-Hoang Van Minh, a fourteen year old squad leader with the 72nd VC Battalion, who rallied at Que Son, stated morale in his unit was low, as most personnel were forcibly inducted.

-MSgt Dao Van Ho, a Chieu Hoi returnee in June, stated that his unit, the 60th Battalion, 1st Regiment, lost over two hundred killed and many weapons during April-June. He further reported that all battalions of the regiment were so understrength that they are referred to as "reinforced companies."

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-Tran Manh Giang, of the 3d NVA Division, stated that he was drafted, along with two hundred men from his street in Nam Dinh (NVN), and that the only way to be exempt from the draft was to be minus a limb, have a serious disease, or weigh less than 50 kilos.

-Tran Van Cuu, a squad leader with C-19B Sapper Company, who gave himself up to the Mo Duc National Police in mid-June, stated that he was forcibly inducted, along with ten other youths from his hamlet.

-Nguyen Truong Hung, a NVA 2d Lt returnee, stated that his unit had suffered 30% battle casualties and that the attrition rate during infiltration was high, due to malaria. No replacements had been received since arrival in RVN and the unit will not conduct joint operations with local VC units, due to low VC morale.

-Dinh Van Binh, a Chieu Hoi returnee from the 48th VC Battalion in Quang Ngai, reported that his unit's strength was down to seven men per squad. Morale was low because of a lack of food and the necessity of remaining constantly on the move.

-Tran Thu, a NVA private captured north of Hue, stated that his company had only 85 men, because of casualties and desertions. Morale was low because there was no other food available to supplement a meager rice ration and eighteen soldiers from his battalion had defected in the past two months.

-Duong Tung, a local VC returnee in Gio Linh, stated that the morale of the local VC is very low due to forced induction of many of them.

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-Do Van Bach, a NVA soldier captured by 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, stated that his unit (K-4 Bn) numbers only 4-7 men per squad, and that morale is low because most of the personnel were drafted.

These conditions were brought about partly by the bombing of infiltration routes and supply points outside RVN, and partly by the large losses the enemy suffered near the DMZ. But a substantial share of the enemy's difficulties in I CTZ have been caused by the combination of large and small unit operations in the coastal plain, conducted by III MAF and the ARVN to defeat the enemy's major effort against the RD program.


This is an effort which the enemy is continuing to pursue, despite the cost. Its progressive development and present status can be traced in the shifting patterns of enemy activity, particularly in attacks during past months. A detailed, province-by-province inspection of those patterns is presented on the following pages.

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UNCLASSIFIEDQuang Nam Province

The graph below displays the pace of enemy activity, measured in number of attacks since July 1966, and distinguishes between attacks by fire (artillery, mortars or rocket) and attacks employing troops.



On this graph, the generally level monthly enemy attack rate is apparent through end-1966. The sharp rise in January marks the beginning of the enemy's accelerated campaign against the RD program, coinciding with his intensified activity near the DMZ, which is evident on the chart relating to Quang Tri province, at the end of this section.

The drop in April and subsequent months coincides with the arrival of the nine US Army battalions of Task Force Oregon, which freed five Marine battalions in the Chu Lai area for operations in southern Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces.

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Of particular note on the chart on the preceding page is the red shaded portion, which displays the number of enemy attacks by mortars or rockets only, without ground follow-up. The relatively small number of these attacks is deceptive. Danang and Marble Mountain airfields present attractive targets for enemy mortar or rocket attacks, such as the one on the night of 14-15 July against Danang, and a limited number of attacks can cause considerable damage. As pointed out elsewhere in this report, such attacks remain an enemy capability, and even the most rapid reaction will not stop the attack. This can only be accomplished by improved intelligence, realized mainly through the Revolutionary Development program, a fact which the enemy recognizes.

US intelligence field evaluations, collected in June and July, underscore this fact and point out enemy concern over Revolutionary Development progress. One such report states, in part, "...VC problems were in replacing local support in the face of RD successes in winning support of the population... VC policy in Quang Nam province remains directed against Government of Vietnam programs - specifically, Revolutionary Development and the September elections and against Allied military forces...."

The locations of recent enemy attacks in the populated region around Danang, such as Hoi An, the province capital, around Que Son, a district headquarters and RD center, and throughout the villages where Danang's RD effort is focused, make clear the anti-RD orientation of the enemy military effort. The map on the following page reflects this.


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## LOCATION OF ENEMY ATTACKS IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE: 1 JAN - 31 JUL 1967

Quang Ngai Province

Quang Ngai province, especially the coastal region south of Quang Ngai city, has been for many years a traditional Viet Cong stronghold. Some steps had been taken by III MAF to improve the security in that area so that Revolutionary Development could move ahead. 3,135 enemy had been killed there in 24 III MAF large unit operations in 1965 and 1966 and, beginning in December 1966, a battalion-size outpost was established near Nui Dau in an effort to maintain a level of friendly presence in the area. In general, however, III MAF troop shortages and pressing combat commitments elsewhere had prevented full development of the area.

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